



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A FEW LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE BALKAN WAR



By
ALFRED H. FRIED

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Sub-station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

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NOTE

"Some Roads Towards Peace," President Charles W. Eliot's report of observations and impressions in China and Japan during his visit to those countries in behalf of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has been recently published in pamphlet form and is a most interesting and authoritative description of social, industrial and political conditions in these countries. The report of 88 pages will be forwarded free of charge, upon application to the Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment. No. 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

Alfred H. Fried, Editor of *Friedens-Warte*, was born at Vienna in 1864. In recognition of his work in the cause of International Conciliation, Mr. Fried has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and has also received the honorary degree of Doctor from the University of Leyden.

A FEW LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE BALKAN WAR

THE NECESSITY FOR STRIKING A BALANCE.

The presentation of the facts furnished by the war which for a year devastated the Balkan Peninsula affords us a rare opportunity of exposing the great fallacies of war and the still greater falsehoods promulgated by the war enthusiasts.

It behooves us, therefore, to strike a balance in order to save from the awful wreckage something of cultural value for future generations and to gather information that will help to prevent wars in days to come. At the present time all military experts are at work endeavoring to apply for the benefit of their respective armies the technical lessons taught by this war. We, the advocates of peace, must pursue a similar course. War has long since ceased to be a purely military event. On account of its incisive effect upon Society we are obliged to ascertain whether the social organism of to-day with its international complexities can suffer so crude an interference. Moreover, the current claptrap of the adherents of War can and must now be put to the test.

NOT A CRUSADE, BUT A RAID.

From the outset the official justification of the war proved to be an insult to common sense. Ostensibly undertaken as a crusade against the Crescent for the deliverance of supposedly oppressed kinsmen, it was,

in reality, a predatory expedition against enfeebled Turkey, as was shown by the ensuing conflict over the division of the spoils. The oppressed kinsmen have by no means all been delivered. Many of them have surely changed oppressors and, from all reports, they are longing for their former, more indulgent master, the Turk. Moreover, Bulgaria, leader in this fight of the Cross against the Crescent, eventually entered with Turkey upon a sort of alliance directed against Greece. As mankind advances, the essential bestiality of War, ill concealed under fine ethical pretexts, becomes ever more obvious, as was illustrated by the Bearers of the Cross in their bloody wrangle over the spoils of war taken from the Crescent.

IS WAR A NATURAL PHENOMENON?

The perpetrators of war would have us believe that it is a natural phenomenon comparable to a thunderstorm, which, since it is beyond human control, only a madman could hope to combat. The fallacy of this assertion was beautifully illustrated in this war by Roumania's behavior toward Bulgaria. It was a plain case of extortion, and such action is, in all countries, regarded as a criminal offense. Nor can the nature of this act be altered by the fact that, in this instance, it was committed by one state against another. If, in the face of this despicable outrage, anyone can still assert that wars are natural phenomena, then the highwayman on our roads may urge with equal justice that his felonies are determined by the Laws of Nature.

"FOREIGN WARS" NO LONGER EXIST.

The bloody conflict in the Balkans has recently shown that violence applied at any point in the world

is fraught with serious consequences for all. The Balkan War has induced Germany to raise the peace footing of her army to 900,000 men, to impose upon herself extraordinary expenditures to the extent of 1,200,000,000 marks (\$300,000,000) and to increase the regular disbursements of the war budget by 180 million marks annually. It has caused France to make the extraordinary expenditure of a billion for the army and navy and to re-establish the three years' service. The Austro-Hungarian War Ministry is asking for 1,200,000,000 Kronen (about \$240,000,000) for military expenditures made necessary by the Balkan War, of which sum nearly 500 millions are intended for mobilization purposes; and, in addition to this, for a permanent increase of the budget and the increase of the peace footing of the standing army by 80,000 men. Thus, Germany and Austria-Hungary as well as France will now maintain, in times of peace, armies which outnumber the military forces placed in the field by these powers during their last wars. Figures for the increase of Russian and Italian armaments are not yet available. Undoubtedly these nations will emulate their neighbors' efforts, as will also Great Britain, Spain, and the smaller European countries. All Europe, already overburdened with armaments, will, in consequence of the Balkan War, allow military preparations to run riot.

The problem of European armaments, however, is not the only one affected by the war. Its tremendous economic importance can be established from the fact that, at the Berlin Exchange alone, the losses due to a slump in the money market amounted to 4,150,000,000 marks (\$1,000,000,000). In other words, the Berlin Exchange paid for the Balkan War with a sum exceeding the French war indemnity of 1871. The other

financial centers of Europe suffered similarly. In Austria-Hungary these losses were probably much greater on account of the war peril, so acute at times. Here, more than elsewhere, the people also felt that War is a destroyer of normal commercial relations and an obstacle to industrial enterprise. The bankruptcy of entire branches of industry, the falling-off of industrial activities and the consequent abnormal lack of employment throughout the land were its direct results. Terrible suffering prevailed among the laboring classes, aggravated in part by the fact that many wage earners had to serve for several months in the partially mobilized army.

WHAT IS THE VALUE OF A TREATY?

From these few data it appears that the preservation of peace is a matter of common interest to the entire group of nations and that it must not be left to individual members to disturb this peace at will. It can, moreover, now be seen that the observance of an international treaty is not merely a moral obligation but an act of practical common sense as well. The enormous loss sustained by Europe through the violation of the Berlin Treaty of 1878 can be figured out to a cent. When Count Aerenthal lightly set aside the provisions of this treaty and transformed the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a annexation, he gave the signal, so to speak, for the financial shocks of the last five years. For thirty years the Berlin Treaty had served to maintain the European order, imperilled by the apprehended collapse of Turkey's rule. With the loosening of the first stone the whole wall tumbled down. Upon the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina followed the breaking away of Bul-

garia, the seizure of Tripoli, and, finally, that chain of violent events known as the Balkan War, which even now (in October, 1913) does not seem to have reached an end. For decades the Berlin Treaty had preserved the lives of thousands and protected billions in securities and properties. When it was violated, slaughter and destruction ensued. This should be borne in mind in estimating the value of international treaties.

THE UNFOUGHT EUROPEAN WAR.

One great achievement, however, must be noted. The continued recurrence of war is urged as a final proof against the realization of the pacifist's ideal. In this connection, however, two items should not be overlooked:

1. The significant change in the nature of recent wars.

2. The wars no longer fought.

The wars of late years (e. g., the Boer War, Manchurian War, Balkan War) have all been waged on the outskirts of civilization, not in the countries which were the scene of the great conflicts of the nineteenth century. They were colonial wars or else wars between nations not yet fully civilized. The level of economic and cultural conditions in the Balkan States may fairly be compared to that of Europe during the Thirty Years' War. There has been no war-like eruption for more than forty-two years among the Great Powers of Europe in the strongholds of civilization. This fact is generally overlooked by the opponents of the Peace Movement. Grave problems, such as the Morocco crisis, which formerly would have surely resulted in war, were peacefully solved and settled. The unfought European wars—they are the

great achievements of our Age. No longer are they to be regarded as isolated instances. A "Modern History of War" might be written, a history of all those menacing conflicts which formerly would have spelled War, but which, in our day, were disposed of peacefully. Surely, here is a change in the international organism, and of this the Balkan War furnishes a splendid proof. The collapse of Turkish power in Europe, for decades held to be the signal for an unavoidable catastrophe involving all Europe, actually took place attended by severe shocks and crises. The nations were ready to plunge into a war. But somehow, despite the endeavors of military enthusiasts longing for a sanguinary adjustment, the great world-conflagration was averted. This was an important event—this unfought "War of 1913"—its inside history cannot be fully learned at this early date. The ridicule of all Europe, was heaped upon the London Conference of Ambassadors, yet it seems to have been an institution which future generations will regard as a great event. Though only a fainthearted product of the common purpose of the nations, it nevertheless proved that such a purpose existed. Its powers were limited and its resolutions were often disregarded, but its very existence prevented a war. The joint action of all paralyzed individual ambitions whose manifestation would have endangered the peace. Take, for example, the signal and memorable success achieved in the Scutari problem where a war seemed practically certain. Austria wanted to march alone, to take the city from the victorious Montenegrins and to turn it over to the Albanians. Such a move would have meant bloody strife; for not willingly would the Montenegrins have submitted to the demands of a single nation. Once bloodshed had set in, Montenegro

could easily have found support among the other great powers. Thereupon the European catastrophe would have become inevitable. But this danger was removed by the Ambassadors' Conference when it transformed the isolated action of Austria into a common international one. The English vice-admiral who commanded the international fleet in Montenegrin waters issued a proclamation beginning with the words: "In the name of the international fleet which represents the great powers of Europe." In the history of civilization of our continent this proclamation will be regarded as of the greatest moment. "In the name of Europe" the evacuation of Scutari was demanded, and it was thus effected without bloodshed. And this, not merely because resistance would have been futile, for it would have been futile also against Austria-Hungary; but because the observance of a will resulting from order implies no humiliation for any country.

Moreover, this crisis has demonstrated the truth of our contention that the European federative policy constitutes an automatic safety-device against war. This policy, although arising from military intentions, is really a product of that logical order of things which unconsciously leads mankind toward peace; the effect of this federative policy is, therefore, a corresponding one. The fact that every war involving one member of an alliance involves the other as well makes it necessary for the war causes to be of such importance to the allies that they will expose their peoples to the perils of war. Only far-reaching problems can bring about such an exigency.

Hence it was that in these critical times Germany restrained Austria-Hungary from obeying her martial impulse, and that France similarly quieted Russia.

At the same time another happy result was engen-

dered by the logic of things. Through their common interest in the preservation of peace the two principal civilized nations of Europe, estranged for more than a decade by an artificial antagonism, were once more brought into closer touch. The Anglo-German understanding is a product of the apprehensions concerning the Balkan crisis.

THE TOLL OF WAR.

What were the practical results of the war as regards the Balkan States? An increase in territory and population. For Bulgaria, Servia and Greece this is distributed as follows:

Country.	Increase in territory in sq. kms.	Increase in population.
Bulgaria	25,200	490,000
Servia	35,500	1,290,000
Greece	56,000	1,900,000

For the sake of these 124,000 square kilometers more than 300,000 men were sacrificed, who either remained dead on the field of battle or else were permanently disabled.

(The losses of the dead and wounded were: Servia, 71,000; Montenegro, 11,200; Greece, 68,000; Bulgaria, 156,000.)

These, however, are but the losses sustained by the armies of the former Balkan League. To these must be added the 150,000 dead or wounded which Turkey lost in this war. Even then the total represents only the human sacrifices exacted from the armies. Of course, there are no official statistics—nor ever will be—setting forth the losses resulting from massacres, disease and privations. An approxi-

mate estimate is quite sufficient, however, to show that war is a form of criminal insanity.

The costs of the war, too, can be only roughly computed. Estimates vary between five and six billion marks ($1\frac{1}{4}$ – $1\frac{1}{2}$ billion dollars.) This amount covers merely the military expenditures for the maintenance of the armies during mobilization and for the destruction of war materials. The principal item of destruction is not included in this at all. The destruction of economic values and the obstruction of commerce, industry and agriculture will swell the grand total by many additional billions.

Anyone bearing in mind all these sacrifices and looking at the few square kilometers gained in return will realize the absolute frivolity of this anti-cultural enterprise.

THE WAR MIGHT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED.

The contention that the Balkan States were compelled to fight, that they had no choice in the matter, is untenable. There was no real cause for this war. Every argument in favor of the war proved to be a fanciful historical delusion or a hypocritical pretext. Ambition, greed and a certain military impulse were responsible for the war. There are circles who believe themselves destined to make history and to whom history means nothing if not slaughter and destruction. In this instance their efforts were successful.

Nevertheless the war might have been prevented, since even those who brought it on were evidently undecided until the last minute. According to officially inspired reports, a well-informed authority, Herr von Jagow, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated the matter somewhat as follows (on April 3, 1913, before the budget commission of the

Reichstag): "As a matter of fact the sentiments in the capitals of the Balkan countries had^b been wavering up to the last few days before the outbreak of the war, and this outbreak came contrary to the intentions of the other allies by the premature start made by Montenegro." The King of Montenegro declared war against Turkey on October 8, 1912. It was publicly claimed at the time that he had done this in connection with a financial maneuver undertaken in Vienna and Paris, which is said to have netted him millions. This widely published and detailed assertion has never been denied. Accordingly, the wavering sentiments of the Balkan States might have augured well for the preservation of peace, had not the royal stockgambler prematurely precluded this possibility. Such is the origin of wars, alleged to be natural phenomena. Hundreds of thousands who now rot in their graves might still be alive, another hundred thousand who were permanently injured might be enjoying their health. Suffering and distress might have been kept from millions of families in Europe if the great powers had made a serious effort to maintain the peace. But behind this impotence of Europe, too, there lurk no mysterious historical laws or tendencies, as the war philosophers would have us believe, but merely the ambitions and intrigues of a few diplomats. Had the governments of the great powers been just a little more imbued with the present-day spirit of civilization, and had they laid stress on fictitious values, this war could never have developed.

THE FRUITLESSNESS OF THE WAR.

This war will be recorded in history, not as the only, but as one of the most eloquent proofs of the complete failure of wars and of the precariousness of

political calculations based thereon. Bulgaria's fate in itself will be a warning to future conquerors. With wanton arrogance she took the leading part in the war. When victory was already assured she caused the hostilities to be resumed by her unreasonable demands and her stubborn attitude in regard to Adrianople, which city she seemed to regard indispensable to her happiness and welfare. It was the passion for prestige that prompted the Bulgarian commanders to make that awful and superfluous assault on Adrianople. Then the tragedy of fate would have it that Bulgaria had to relinquish her claims to Adrianople and other conquered ground without striking a blow. It soon became apparent that the idea of possessing Adrianople had been a frivolous fancy instead of a vital necessity; and Bulgaria will manage to exist without this city as she has done heretofore. But for many a year this mania for glory on the part of the Bulgarian government will impose a heavy burden upon the nation. Forty-five thousand of her sons were cut off in the prime of life, 105,000 more were made cripples—an appalling loss when one considers that the British army lost only 21,000 dead in the Boer War!

The economic situation in Bulgaria is best revealed by the fact that the former national debt of 688 millions has now, after the war, grown into a burden of *two* billions, which will presumably be further increased by new military preparations. For the time being the Bulgarian government has to direct all its efforts to the suppression of internal disturbances which threaten to break out among the incensed and exhausted people. Such is Bulgaria's predicament. The other Balkan States, although apparently placed in more favorable circumstances on account of their final victories, will undergo similar experiences.

WAR BRINGS NO FINAL DECISION.

Here another truth, which we pacifists have always preached, makes its appearance: No war ever brings a real solution, but merely a temporary shifting of the situation; thus imposing even upon the victor the heavy burden of preparations for the next war. In giving out the order of the day, King Ferdinand, after the conclusion of the Peace of Bucharest exhorted his people to hold themselves ready for the purpose of "bringing to a successful end the glorious task entered upon." And on the same occasion King Constantine said, "Our task, however, is not yet fully accomplished; Greece must become strong, very strong. I shall work incessantly to attain this goal." The sentiments of the other kings were of a similar character, and the Turks presumably entertained the same ideas. The belief that war brings peace is utopian fancy. It brings ever new preparations and ever new causes for war. All that remains to the Balkan nations, victors and vanquished, from their bloody orgy is the hope that in the work and exertion of decades they will succeed in overcoming the effects of this war. Had there been no war their labors would have been devoted to the cause of further advance. As matters stand, they must strive to retrieve their losses. And yet there are people even in our day who dare to assert that war is a promoter of civilization and a bearer of progress. In the Balkans the conclusive proof has been furnished that war is an obstacle to progress and a destroyer of civilization.

(Signed) ALFRED H. FRIED.

Vienna (October, 1913).

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL
CONCILIATION

PAN AMERICAN DIVISION



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JANUARY, 1914

(P. A., S. No. 1)

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407 West 117th Street
New York City

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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

PAN AMERICAN DIVISION

THE American Association for International Conciliation is the American branch of the Conciliation Internationale, founded by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant after the first Hague Conference in 1899. The American Association was organized in coöperation with the founder and incorporated January 19, 1909. At that time the parent society in Paris had correspondents in other countries, but the American Association was the first branch society to be organized. Branches have since been organized in other countries, and it is expected that new branches will be started in the near future.

All branch associations look to the association in Paris as the parent and model, but they are practically independent societies. Their relations with the parent society and with each other while close and coöperative are informal and involve no other than moral obligations.

The parent society and all the branches use a common seal and the same motto, which appear on the title page of publications issued by them.

PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

A program of International Conciliation was issued by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant in 1905, in which he states clearly the reasons leading to the organization in Paris, its aims and purposes as well as the methods to carry them into effect. This program is in general the program of branch associations. A copy in French, in English or in Spanish, may be had upon request to the American Association in New York.

OBJECTS OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

The particular objects of the American Association for International Conciliation, as stated in Article II of the Certificate of Incorporation, are, to record, preserve and disseminate the history of organized efforts for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations; to print and circulate documents and otherwise to aid individual citizens, the newspaper press and organizations of various kinds to obtain accurate information and just views upon these subjects; and to promote in all practicable ways mutual understanding and good feeling between the American people and those of other nations.

The American Association also acts in many matters as the agent of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for the execution of plans undertaken by the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Endowment.

OBJECTS OF THE PAN AMERICAN DIVISION

The Pan American Division is a division of the American Association organized for the special purpose of facilitating the development of closer intellectual and cultural relations between the peoples of the republics of America. The program which it is hoped may be carried out effectively through this division is the following:

- 1 To collect and to distribute reliable information for the guidance and assistance of persons interested in the social and intellectual life and institutions of the different republics of America.

- 2 To collect and to furnish freely appropriate and exact information for the guidance and assistance of persons who may wish to come from other American republics to the United States, or to go from the United

States to one or more of these republics for the purpose of travel or of study.

3 To facilitate and to encourage the voluntary interchange of students, instructors and professors of educational institutions in the United States and of similar institutions in other republics of America.

4 To encourage international visits of representative men and women in the United States and in other American republics, thus promoting friendly intercourse and at the same time supplementing the existing tide of travel east and west by encouraging a new tide of travel north and south.

5 To encourage a wider study of the Spanish and Portuguese languages in the United States, and of the English language in other republics; also more ample provisions in the colleges and universities of the United States for the study of the literature, life and institutions of the other republics and in similar institutions in these republics for the study of the literature, life and institutions of the United States.

6 To encourage and to facilitate, when the time is opportune, the opening in the capitals or other appropriate centers of the different American republics special institutes for the study of the languages, literature, life and institutions of the republics concerned, these institutions serving at the same time as clubs or centers for social and intellectual intercourse between the peoples of these republics.

7 To establish and to maintain connections with other organizations or agencies for the cultivation of good understanding and good relations between the peoples of the republics of America, and to coöperate with them in every practicable way to accomplish a common purpose.

PARTIAL LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

The regular series of monthly bulletins of the American Association for International Conciliation now comprise 76 numbers, and besides these a considerable number of special bulletins have been published. Up to the limit of the editions printed, any one of these publications may be sent postpaid upon receipt of request addressed to the Secretary of the Association, 407 W. 117th Street, New York.

- 6 Possibilities of Intellectual Co-operation Between North and South America, by L. S. Rowe. April, 1908.
- 8 The Sanction of International Law, by Elihu Root. July, 1908.
- 10 The Approach of the Two Americas, by Joaquin Nabuco. Sept., 1908.
- 14 The Logic of International Co-operation, by F. W. Hirst. January, 1909.
- 16 America and the New Diplomacy, by James Brown Scott. March, 1909.
- 21 Journalism and International Affairs, by Edward Cary. August, 1909.
- 27 The Moral Equivalent of War, by William James. February, 1910.
- 28a The United States and Australia, by Percival R. Cole. March, 1910.
- 38 School Books and International Prejudices, by Albert Bushnell Hart. January, 1911.
- 39 Peace and the Professor, by Grant Showerman. February, 1911.
- 40 Woman and the Cause of Peace, by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. March, 1911.
- 44 The United States and Latin America at the Hague, by William I. Hull. July, 1911.
- 46 Letter to the Apostolic Delegate to the United States of America, by His Holiness Pope Pius X. September, 1911.
- 47 The Existing Elements of a Constitution of the United States of the World, by H. La Fontaine. October, 1911.
- 55 The International Mind, by Nicholas Murray Butler. June, 1912.
- 56 Science as an Element in the Developing of International Good Will, by Sir Oliver Lodge. July, 1912.
- 61 The Cosmopolitan Club Movement, by Louis P. Lochner. December, 1912.
- 62 The Spirit of Self-Government, by Elihu Root. January, 1912.
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The South American Point of View. Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, former Minister to the Argentine Republic.

SOME PAN AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS, WITH HEADQUARTERS IN THE UNITED STATES, AND THEIR PURPOSES.*

PAN AMERICAN UNION

Washington, D. C.

Director General, John Barrett ; *Assistant Director*, Francisco J. Yánes ; *Governing Board*, The Secretary of State of the United States, and the Diplomatic Representatives in Washington of the other American Republics.

Purposes: "The Pan American Union is, in brief, the organization and office maintained voluntarily by the twenty-one American republics and controlled by a Governing Board composed of the Diplomatic Representatives in Washington of the other American Nations, and of the Secretary of State of the United States, administered by a Director General and Assistant Director chosen by this Board, and assisted by a staff of editors, statisticians, compilers, trade experts, translators, librarians, clerks and stenographers, and devoted to the development and conservation of commerce and friendly intercourse and good understanding among all American Republics."

PAN AMERICAN STATES ASSOCIATION

Greeley Square, New York

President, Hudson Maxim ; *Secretary*, William C. Egerton ; *Treasurer*, Henry Birrell ; *Managing Director*, Robert Lee Dunn.

Purposes: "To foster and conserve reciprocal trade relations between the United States and the Latin American Republics ; to provide a permanent exposition of domestic and Pan American products ; to diffuse accurate and unbiased trade information ; to maintain permanent commissioners in the Southern Republics ; to promote greater commercial unity and action between the business men of Latin America and of the United States ; to provide commodious club rooms where Pan American men of affairs may meet Americans for business and social intercourse ; and to assist in obtaining better transportation and banking facilities between all the countries of the American Continent."

PAN AMERICAN SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES

15 Broad Street, New York

President, Henry White ; *Honorary Presidents*, William Jennings Bryan, Domicio da Gama ; *Honorary Vice-Presidents*, Elihu Root, Andrew Carnegie, Archer M. Huntington, Melville E. Stone, John Bassett Moore ; *Vice-Presidents*, Lloyd C. Griscom, Cabot Ward, John Barrett ; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Frederic Brown.

Purposes: "To promote acquaintance between the representative men of the United States and those of the Latin American Republics.

"To show hospitality and attention to representative Latin Americans who visit the United States.

"To take such other steps, involving no political policy, which the Society may deem wise, to develop and conserve good understanding, true friendship and mutual knowledge of each other among the American Republics and peoples."

* A complete list of these organizations and their purposes, including Pan American, Latin America, and Spanish American Clubs and other societies of a local as well as of a general character engaged in work which makes for good understanding and good relations between the peoples of America, will form material for a later bulletin.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SPECIAL BULLETIN

WANTED—A FINAL SOLUTION OF THE
JAPANESE PROBLEM



BY

HAMILTON HOLT

Editor of The Independent

JANUARY, 1914

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

Mr. Holt was one of the founders, in 1907, of the Japan Society of New York and has been a member of its executive committee from the beginning. He was decorated in 1909 by the late Emperor of Japan with the Order of the Sacred Treasure for his work in promoting better relations between Japan and the United States. In 1910 he conceived the idea of a perpetual exchange of distinguished scholars and men of affairs between Japan and the United States, which resulted in the Japanese government sending Dr. Inazo Nitobe to the United States in 1912 and in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sending Dr. Hamilton W. Mabie to Japan in 1913. In 1910 he visited Japan, Korea and China in order to study the foreign policy of Japan with special reference to the peace of the world. While in Japan he made many addresses and speeches before educational, cultural and social organizations. Since his return home he has lectured on the Far East throughout the United States. He is an honorary trustee of Doshisha University at Kyoto, Japan, and a member of the Executive Committee of the American Branch of the Association Concordia of Tokyo, Japan.

WANTED—A FINAL SOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE PROBLEM

By HAMILTON HOLT

Editor of the Independent

If the Pacific Ocean is to be the theatre of the world's future civilization, then there is no nation on the face of the earth with whom it is more important for the United States to be on cordial terms than Japan. At present the historic friendship between these two great powers is strained. Indeed, the situation is so delicate that unless it is handled rightly it is likely to flare up at almost any time. Let me briefly trace, therefore, the series of events that have led up to the present untoward situation and then suggest a remedy that, if applied, ought to restore the ancient friendship so much desired by all good citizens of both countries.

On March 31, 1854, Commodore Perry, in behalf of the United States, signed with Japan a treaty of commerce and friendship which opened Japan to the

world and inaugurated the most remarkable political and social revolution known to history. The first sentence of that treaty reads as follows:

“There shall be perfect, permanent, and universal peace and a sincere and cordial amity between the United States of America on the one part and the Empire of Japan on the other, and between their people respectively without exception of persons and places.”

From that day to this Japan has lived up to the letter and spirit of that treaty. She has never let an opportunity pass to express her gratitude and to show her friendly feelings to the United States. She has sent her brightest young men to be trained in our universities and technical schools. She has employed many Americans within the empire as advisers, teachers and administrators. Even at this moment an American citizen, Mr. Dennison, is serving as chief adviser of the Foreign Office.

The United States had an equally unblemished record for cordiality to Japan until the close of the Russo-Japanese War. Then the change began. I take no stock in the charge that the American war correspondents, whose work at the front was so restricted by the Japanese military authorities, started the anti-Japanese cry in a spirit of revenge. Nevertheless, all of a sudden statements began to appear in the Amer-

ican press that we would have to fight the Japanese. They were getting "cocky" as a result of their victories over Russia, and needed to be "taught a lesson." Besides, the periodical English and German war scares were beginning to experience the law of "diminishing returns" and our naval friends and ordnance manufacturers were under the necessity of conjuring up some new adversary against whom we needed the protection of a great and ever greater navy. Then came the law segregating the Japanese in the California schools, as if they were not fit to associate with white children. That stirred up Japan to strong protest, but it ended in Japan's stopping all emigration, so that even students find it difficult to come here to-day.

President Roosevelt, however, immediately after the California outbreak, sent the fleet on its voyage around the world, ostensibly on a "peace" cruise, but in reality to "impress" Japan. Japan turned the other cheek by spending a million dollars to entertain it. Here were a people who were brutally insulted by our Pacific Coast, a people we called "heathen" and sent missionaries to christianize, actually teaching us a lesson in Christian ethics. Though we all but drove them out of California, they met our officers and men, strewing their paths with flowers. Though we excluded them from our schools, they suffered their little children to greet us, singing our national hymn.

Japan has shown similar hospitality to our delega-

tions of merchants and others who have since visited her shores. Yet the pin pricks continued. Bills began to be introduced into the California Legislature aiming to drive the Japanese from the Coast and to prevent those already there from owning land or engaging in business.

Next came the report that Japan had a secret treaty with Mexico against us, and was to be allowed a Pacific port. That, of course, turned out to be a "fake." There were also the reported speeches of a member of Congress, formerly of the navy, declaring that Japan was preparing to declare war and seize the Philippines, Hawaii and the Pacific Coast. On February 25, 1911, nearly three years ago, Mr. Hobson, on the floor of the House, prophesied war with Japan within twenty months. Then came Secretary Knox's proposal for the neutralization of the Manchurian Railway, which would have deprived Japan of the rights on the mainland she had gained by the treaty of Portsmouth and have destroyed her preponderant influence on the border state facing her Korean frontier.

Next appeared a scheme of American capitalists to build the Chinchow-Aigun Railway, to rival the South Manchurian Railway, in China. This was followed shortly by the proposal from bankers, originating here, that a syndicate representing four Powers—the United States, England, France and Germany—should loan China \$50,000,000, the interest to be guaranteed by all

the unhypothecated resources of Manchuria, thus dethroning Japan from her primacy in Manchuria and all China. Though the Knox neutralization plan and the American railroad scheme fell through, and the bankers controlling the four-Power loan subsequently invited Japan and even Russia to join their circle, these proposals made a very bad impression in Japan.

Then, in the early part of 1912, a measure known as the Dillingham bill was favorably reported to the Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations, which would have excluded the Japanese from our shores as the Chinese are now excluded. Fortunately, the exposure of the "joker" in the bill led to a modification of the anti-Japanese clause. But in the meantime the news had been cabled to Japan and the harm done.

Immediately upon that, Senator Lodge revived the Magdalena Bay war scare by charging that Japan was seeking concessions in Mexico, in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Although it is well known that Magdalena Bay was in the rainless belt of lower California, in a region in which nothing grows except cactus and a few stunted cedars, and that a single spring among the sand dunes was the sole water supply of the diminutive fishing village on its shores, the Senate passed a resolution to the effect that the Monroe Doctrine applied to such cases. The Senate also, in emasculating the great Taft-Knox peace treaties with England and France, gave Japan another slap by adopting

an amendment reserving from arbitration the question of the "admission of aliens to the educational institutions of the several states."

But early in 1913 our insults reached their climax. Some forty anti-Japanese bills were introduced into the California legislature. Some of these provided for increasing the license fees of Japanese fishermen from \$10 to \$100, for the segregation of Japanese school children throughout the state, and for the imposition of a special poll tax upon the Japanese. Others prohibited the Japanese from employing white girls, from using power engines, and from taking out liquor licenses. But by far the most offensive was the Webb bill which was passed by the legislature in May and provided in effect that aliens not eligible to citizenship could not acquire or hold any land in the state. The object of this law was avowedly to exclude the Japanese from participation in a liberty which had previously been freely accorded them and which is still freely accorded to other aliens. The measure took effect August 10, despite the strenuous protest of the Federal Government and the almost unanimous opposition of the enlightened sense of the nation.

The Japanese are a very proud and sensitive people. That is known. They are also a very self-controlled people. That is not so well known. At first they were thunderstruck. Then they became angry. Then they controlled themselves.

After Mr. Bryan had returned from his unsuccessful mission to Sacramento, and the yellow journals had become less vociferous for war, the American people, with characteristic irresponsibility, promptly forgot Japan and her grievances and turned their attention to the Thaw case, the movies, baseball, turkey trotting, and Mexico. Mr. Wilson began his assiduous study of the tariff and the currency. Mr. Bryan went lecturing.

The Japanese, as I have said, are a proud, sensitive and self-controlled people. But the Japanese do not forget. Let no one for an instant imagine that time and indifference on our part will heal this latest wound.

Half a year has now elapsed. What is the present situation?

The world does not know what Viscount Chinda has asked of Mr. Bryan or what replies Mr. Bryan has made. It only knows that the Japanese Ambassador has frequently called on Mr. Bryan, and even President Wilson, and that apparently the two governments have not yet come to any mutually satisfactory conclusion.

Now there will be no war between Japan and the United States. That is unthinkable. But Japan has evidently felt that the time has come to settle this recurrent trouble once and for all, and she proposes to take up the whole case and lay her side before us. She is ready to do anything we ask, as she always has been ready, provided she can do it with honor.

There are two important questions involved in the present dispute. The one is legal, the other moral. The legal question is this: Does the existing treaty between Japan and the United States permit the Japanese to own land in the United States? There seems to be no reason why this should not be decided by the United States Supreme Court, or if both parties prefer, by the Hague Court. If the case should come before the Supreme Court, it is likely to be decided in favor of Japan. Under our constitution no state can deal directly with a foreign nation. All such powers inhere in the Federal Government. All aliens, therefore, stand on the same footing, as far as a state is concerned, and derive their rights primarily from international treaties.

If the case should go to the Hague Court, the decision would probably likewise be in favor of Japan. The equity is on her side, and the Court has already decided, in 1905, in the Japanese House Tax case, that a nation cannot change the tenure of property actually held without the consent of the alien owner.

But a mere legal decision, no matter which side won, would hardly prevent the recurrence of similar disputes in the future. The real question, therefore, is how the statesmen of Japan and America can devise a plan for permanent peace and good understanding between the two nations. In other words, how can they apply the golden rule to their mutual intercourse?

If it is a fact that nothing is ever settled until it is settled right, then the Japanese question will never be settled until the Japanese have the same rights of naturalization in the United States as the citizens of England, France and Germany. Japan has already become one of the five great world Powers measured by any qualitative test. In the virtues of patriotism, loyalty, alertness, thoroughness, self-control, physical bravery, personal cleanliness, æstheticism and politeness they excel us. Only in respect to the morality of business, the position of women, the organization of labor and the qualifications for suffrage they have something to learn from the western nations. Japan is, therefore, fairly entitled to recognition by us as an equal, with all the privileges such recognition implies. She is bound to receive it sooner or later. But no nation can put itself in the position of asking another to naturalize its citizens, any more than self-respecting parents can ask others to adopt their children. If Japanese citizens are to be given the privileges of naturalization in this country, the initiative must be taken by us. But this can hardly be expected at the present moment, or, I fear, for some time to come. Japanese naturalization is not a present issue.

What, then, can be done? All Japan wants is to be treated as an equal, not as an inferior. Her honor is dearer to her than all else. Any one who would understand Japan must never forget that the two policies

which her statesmen have pursued with unswerving constancy since the restoration of the late Emperor in 1868 are, first, to maintain her national integrity and independence, and second, to make her the equal of any civilized nation in existence. Japan does not care whether her citizens own land in California or not, but that they shall have the same privileges of owning land that other aliens do. Japan does not care to have her subjects emigrate to America. Korea, Manchuria and Formosa are the natural outlets for her surplus population.

Japan can be depended upon to do in the future what she has already done since 1907—to stop absolutely all emigration that we think undesirable. There is now an excess of Japanese returning home from the United States over Japanese coming to our shores by about three thousand a year. The latest statistics show that in 1911 the excess of Japanese laborers returning home over those coming here was 8,966, out of a total population of 70,000 in the Hawaiian Islands and 60,000 on the mainland. No laborers can now get passports to the United States except the wives and aged parents of those already here. Japan wants to keep her subjects at home to please us, and not because we refuse to receive them. What she cannot understand is how a mere 40,000 of her citizens, who have the highest standard of literacy on the Pacific slope, and who own but 17,000 acres of land

and whose numbers are decreasing every year, can be a menace to a population of 2,377,000 souls living in over one hundred million acres of territory.

What, then, would be a practical, reasonable and satisfactory solution of the present difficulty, pending the ultimate giving of full naturalization rights to the Japanese?

It is evident, I think, from what has been said that the Administration should forthwith negotiate a treaty with Japan granting to those Japanese permitted by their Government to come here the right to own land just as other aliens do. Japan should in return issue no passports to any class of her subjects we preferred not to receive.

By such a treaty and informal agreement Japan would gain the recognition she craves and California the relief from labor competition she fears.

Indeed, Japan would probably be wise enough to concede another point if such a treaty were entered into. On the principle that it is generally best to let sleeping dogs lie, she might well agree to let the treaty have reference only to the future, and not raise at all the constitutionality of the present Webb law. That has already done all the mischief it can. If an attempt is now made to make California back down, the whole states-rights question will be raised. There is little to be gained and much to lose by such a course, especially with the Democratic party in the saddle and the

Jeffersonian Mr. Bryan in the State Department. The only possible danger is that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan will have to get the treaty confirmed by the Senate before it can become law. There are jingo Senators who would take the opportunity to do no little harm to the good relations of the two countries.

But Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan should take their chances with the Senate. A solemn duty to Japan requires it. Surely they cannot object in principle to such a treaty. Let the Senate take the responsibility, if it cares to, of straining still further an historic friendship.

The time to act is now. Already it is rumored that the California politicians are secretly boasting that when the next legislature meets they will pass measures to drive the Japanese absolutely out of the state.

Let the President, then, turn his attention to Japan and prove himself as great an international statesman as he has already proved himself a national statesman.

He has the opportunity.

January 10, 1914.

New York City.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

THE SOUTH AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW



BY

CHARLES HITCHCOCK SHERRILL

Former Minister to the Argentine Republic

JANUARY, 1914, No. 74^c

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

THE SOUTH AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW

In this hemisphere the twentieth century will sooner or later come to be known as the century of the Southerner. Already clear evidence is being shown of the steady strong tendency which must, unless diverted or dissipated by some historical cataclysm, write this title across the century upon which we have entered. And any man concerned in public affairs who does not take into account the viewpoint of the Southerner has no claim to statesmanship, and does not deserve the confidence of his fellows. Nor is this true in our hemisphere alone, but also across the Atlantic as well, for who can fail to have observed the awakening of the Latin races of Europe? Is not the splendid new national spirit of France a significant proof of this movement? And what of the stream of money being constantly transmitted to Italy by her industrious and economical toilers in the harvests and on the railways of both North and South America—toilers who return to their native land and add not only to its public wealth, but also to its worthy citizenship! More marvelous still are the amazing annual increases to be noted in the already impressive foreign trade of Argentina and of Brazil. In our own southern states, are we not witnessing the working out along practical lines of one of commerce's strangest fairy tales? Go to Birmingham or Atlanta or Chattanooga or any one of the long list of great modernized cities in the South, and the truth of this proposition will receive ocular demonstra-

tion of a surprising completeness. When, two years ago, upon my return from Argentina, I spoke before nearly two hundred commercial organizations, the most instructing experience of all (and there were many) was the realization that municipal collective effort was on the whole better conceived and conducted, and yielding better results in the South than in any other section. All parts of the United States have come to recognize and to be proud of the New South, and of all it means to the strength of our nation: why are we so reluctant to give the same recognition to the great republics of South America?

I am an enthusiastic Pan-American, and an earnest believer in the high ideals of Pan-Americanism, and one of those ideals is respect for the viewpoint of our fellow-Americans. The peoples of our hemisphere have been allowed to develop naturally in an atmosphere of liberty and of ample opportunity, amid surroundings that in Europe the trammels of an older civilization would have rendered either difficult or impossible. This very freedom of the Americas has worked strange and radical changes in the European races that came to it and have become Americanized by its influence. It has accelerated the mentality of the Anglo-Saxon of North America, and it has steadied and broadened the vitality and energy of the Latin of South America, and it is insensibly bringing them nearer together. An interesting ethnological parallel could be drawn between the change effected in an Irishman by moving him from Ireland to New York, and that in a Spanish emigrant before he leaves his old home and after he arrives in the subtly American-

izing surroundings of Buenos Aires. If it isn't the new environment that works the transformation, what is it?—and if the same effect is produced at points six thousand miles apart, isn't it fair to call that effect Pan-American? And isn't it fair to consider the viewpoint of the Americanized Latin just as much as that of the Americanized Anglo-Saxon? He is just as much a child of liberty and opportunity as we, and just as worthy of consideration. We hear much of the steadiness and self-control of the Anglo-Saxon, and of the importance that lends to his opinions; when I was in Buenos Aires an anarchist exploded a bomb in the great opera house in the midst of an audience of Americanized Latins. What happened? First, ask yourself what would have happened if a bomb had exploded in the Metropolitan Opera House in New York among us Anglo-Saxons. I fear that all of us who are honest-minded will reluctantly agree as to the probable results. What happened in Buenos Aires? A remarkable scene, which is a glory to Argentine citizenship. No tumult, no undue excitement. The injured were removed while the orchestra played the national anthem. Announcement was made from the stage that the performance was discontinued, and the audience filed quietly out. If you had been there you would have been as proud of those people as I was; as proud of their poise, and of their reserve strength of character, and furthermore as respectful of their viewpoint, as the most enthusiastic believer in the future of our hemisphere could wish. When I reflect upon that surprising scene, I ask myself why have we throughout all our history constantly disregarded the opinion of

our Latin sister republics, and have failed to take them into our councils? I know that they are thoroughly entitled to our confidence. During my residence in Buenos Aires I came into most agreeable relations with its great university and, furthermore, took part in an International Congress of University Students from ten American countries. Because of those experiences I feel especially qualified to say to you that the generation of South Americans now preparing to assume the responsibilities of citizenship are as well equipped and as patriotic as the young men of our country. Moreover, they possess ideals and a sense of responsibility which are, if anything, higher than those of the average university student among us. They can be trusted to guide their ships of state, and the future of their countries is safe in their hands.

I believe and I affirm that we have almost always sought to be not only just in our dealings with those republics, but also have tried to do what we thought was best for them. But why have we so persistently, so ignorantly, so blunderingly disregarded *their* viewpoint, even carelessly neglected to study it?

Of course there have been exceptions, and brilliant exceptions, too, to our rule of careless disregard. One of the earliest is Henry Clay. That great statesman and orator was the leader of the movement to cause our country to recognize the independence of the Spanish provinces of South America. Splendid as was his oratory on their behalf, it pales before his luminous appreciation of how worthy of sympathetic consideration were the South Americans. This appreciation of his was based on a studious examination of

their civilization, and it is nowhere so clearly demonstrated as in the remarkable series of speeches he delivered in the United States House of Representatives between December 3, 1817, and May 18, 1820, advocating the welcoming of our struggling sister republics to the brotherhood of sovereign nations. The best proof of how painstaking was his study of the subject is that nowhere else in any language can there to-day be found so instructive a description of the advanced social conditions and form of thought at that time existing in South America. He pointed out that in the city of Buenos Aires alone there were more and better newspapers, those great vehicles of public thought and education, than there were in all of Spain and Portugal put together. The high standard of journalism noted by Henry Clay has persisted until this day, and it may be confidently asserted that in no city of the United States are there finer newspapers or those better adapted for furnishing a free discussion of public affairs than in that same city in which Henry Clay observed so striking a proof of high civilization a hundred years ago.

Another and more brilliant exception to our general rule of disregarding the viewpoint of South Americans was furnished by Elihu Root. It is a patriotic pleasure to testify to the profound impression created in all parts of South America not only by the official character of his visit, but also and more particularly by the deep interest and careful study which he, as an individual, devoted to their viewpoint on international affairs. It is a matter of congratulation to all of his fellow-countrymen that so completely did his sin-

cerity gain the confidence of those whom he went so far to meet and to learn, that nowhere was there to be found any misunderstanding of his purpose or any imputation of any but the highest motives therefor. While he was studying them, they were studying him, and the effect of such an exhibit of North American manhood as he afforded had, as was but natural, a deep effect upon so keenly and sensitively appreciative a people as those who own the continent to the south of us. Perhaps no statement of his was more warmly received than this: "So I come to you to say, let us know each other better, let us aid in the great work of advancing civilization, let us help each other to grow in wisdom and in spirit, as we have grown in wealth and prosperity." What does this mean? What can it signify, but that the altruistic and enlightened friendship of Henry Clay was by the action of Elihu Root, as Secretary of State of the United States, raised to that highest category of governmental action, the public and solemn endorsement by a sovereign nation of the idea of mutual consideration, an idea which has showed out so admirably in the life and actions of both those great statesmen. What would it not mean to our national repute if those two men personified, not exceptions to the rule of our treatment of Latin America, but an established custom in that regard!

And if we admit, as admit we must, that the viewpoint of the South American is worthy of equal consideration with that of our own people, upon what subject is it more necessary that it should be consulted, than upon the Monroe Doctrine? And what of the Monroe Doctrine in this connection? If a fel-

low-countryman expresses the opinion that it should be abolished, I say to him, "Will you go to the logical conclusion to which that suggestion inevitably leads, and say you are willing that any part of America shall be turned into an Egypt, a Tripoli, an Algeria, or a Morocco?" If he tells me the Monroe Doctrine is good enough as it is, I say to him, "Go and live in one of the great countries of South America for a couple of years, learn their point of view, and then tell me if you are contented that our great country, our dear fatherland should go on being misunderstood as a Monroe Doctrine policeman, a clumsy busybody, when you and I know so differently, and when this misunderstanding can be so easily rectified"! Why should we not meet this misunderstanding now existing in South America with the same splendid directness that President Cleveland used in the Venezuela difficulty, or President McKinley in the Cuban affair. There are friends of mine, dear friends of mine, sleeping beneath the waving grasses on a certain Cuban hillside, and there can be no misunderstanding as to whether or not they laid down their lives for anything else than the highest ideals of Pan-Americanism! I am far prouder of our withdrawal from Cuba, after our two interventions there, than of the most successful war that we ever waged, and I know that all of South America feels that those withdrawals brought more credit to our flag than any other acts in the history of our republic. And what is the viewpoint of the Latin American upon the Monroe Doctrine, and how by frankly meeting it can we stop it from seeming to him unilateral and constabulary, and make it Pan-American in scope?

Last January, on a day when my heart was deeply touched by receiving through the Argentine Minister a gold medal sent me by the Argentine people, I ventured a brief suggestion upon our to-day's subject, prompted by my knowledge of and love for our Pan-Americanized Latin brothers. This suggestion was, thanks to three powerful institutions (one Argentine, and the other two in New York), cabled to nearly three hundred Latin-American newspapers. That they unanimously approved the suggestion emboldens me to quote from it now, since that wide approval indicates that my heart must have helped my head to grasp their viewpoint.

After first strongly opposing intervention in Mexico, I said: "Let us see if this present discussion of intervention may not perhaps afford an opportunity to set us right upon the subject of the Monroe Doctrine in the eyes of all Latin America, and at the same time provide a possible solution of the very question of intervention itself.

"Now, for my new suggestion: suppose affairs should take so serious a turn in Mexico that, either to forestall an armed intervention there by some European power seeking to defend its citizens or else to perform like service for some citizens of our own hemisphere, it finally becomes necessary under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine that the United States intervene, I would suggest that we invite Argentina or Brazil or some other American country to join with us. What would be the result of such an invitation? It would have two marked tendencies, both of which would be highly desirable: First, it would

entirely remove any idea among our South American neighbors that our purpose was land grabbing, because a man does not invite his neighbors to accompany him on an errand intended to benefit him alone. Secondly, and, in my opinion, of equal importance, it would free our Government from the persistent importunities of individuals and corporations urging our sole intervention to benefit their own pockets, but who would not favor a joint intervention by us along with other powers.

"Furthermore it would be the best and most convincing form of invitation to Latin America to participate equally with us in the responsibilities and development of the Monroe Doctrine. The great Doctrine would at once become continental, and cease to be unilateral, which is to-day its one great defect. It is not the duty of the United States to police Latin America, and the sooner we get that idea spread broadcast, not only in South America but also in North America, the better will it be for our international repute. Whenever, under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, an occasion for armed intervention in this hemisphere arises let us, in each and every instance, invite participation in that responsibility from other American countries, all of which are equally concerned in the benefits and responsibilities of that Doctrine."

That was what I said last January, and I feel it even more strongly to-day.

I hope and believe that there will be no armed intervention in Mexico, and in his resolute effort to obviate the necessity therefor, President Wilson deserves the support of every patriotic citizen of our country.

Whatever may be the personal opinion of individuals as to details or methods, this is no time to discuss them, lest the discussion be misunderstood abroad.


I don't claim to know the South Americans better than many others do, but I do claim that no foreigner has ever liked them better than I do, and therefore am I earnestly eager to have their opinion seriously studied, and courteously accorded the consideration which it richly deserves.

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THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

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By

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

President of Columbia University

FEBRUARY, 1914, No. 75

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The Executive Committee of the Association for International Conciliation wish to arouse the interest of the American people in the progress of the movement for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations. To this end they print and circulate documents giving information as to the progress of these movements, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have readily available accurate information on these subjects. A list of publications will be found on page 15.

THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

When it was announced in December, 1910, that Mr. Carnegie had given ten million dollars to serve as a permanent fund, the income of which was to be used to advance the cause of international peace, no little curiosity was expressed as to how so large a sum could be expended in such a cause. After three years of experience, the trustees find themselves quite unable to meet even a small fraction of the demands made upon them for aid from organizations, institutions, and individuals working for the promotion of international peace in all parts of the world. The least of the difficulties confronting the trustees has been to spend their income; the question has been simply how to spend it most wisely. The two Year Books of the Endowment, which are to be found in every library of importance and on the desk of almost every Foreign Office and diplomat, and which may be had for the asking, tell in detail the story of the organization and methods of work adopted by the trustees. No part of this detailed information, so readily accessible, need be repeated here.

When the trustees came to close quarters with their problem, it was quite plain that they were to enter upon no short and easy task. The holding of public meetings attended by considerable bodies of enthusiasts, the passing of resolutions commending the cause of peace and international arbitration and decrying war, and the circulation of the more emotional type of pacifist literature, are all well enough in their way; but they leave the great body of public opinion untouched and the action of governments uninfluenced. To promote the cause of international peace in a way

that shall be lasting and effective means nothing less than to work for the intellectual and moral education of the public opinion of the world.

The principle of nationality is not old as history regards age, but it is very powerful. For fully five hundred years the leading nations in the Western world have regarded themselves as economic and military rivals and have looked upon the rest of the earth's surface as affording them both possible advantage and certain opportunity. Generation after generation has had it borne in upon its consciousness that patriotism meant rivalry, that rivalry implied antagonism, and that antagonism presupposed constant preparation for war. All this was a part—and perhaps a necessary part—of the evolution of civilization. But the prophets and the seers of the race have seen for centuries that such a condition of national antagonism and international strife was not an end with which men could rest satisfied, but only the forerunner of a new and higher development of civilization in which moral conviction and moral principle would take precedence over brute force, and in which coöperation and friendly helpfulness would thrust aside armed rivalry and threats of international violence. The cynic smiles; and well he may. Human nature is not to be made over in a day, or in a year, or in a century. But the man who is clearsighted enough to perceive and to understand the everlasting force of a moral principle will not cease to work for its accomplishment because the time of that accomplishment is in the far distance. Moreover, there are many things within the range of practical international politics that can be begun at once and done speedily.

All this philosophy of civilization was presupposed by the trustees of the Carnegie Endowment when they began their work. They perceived that the minds of men must be convinced that morality is a higher principle than brute force and that it must be proved to the satisfaction of public opinion that the balance of individual, social and political gain is

on the side of peace and international friendship. In the next place, if the principle of nationality is to have superposed upon it a new political structure of internationalism, the way must be prepared, through the evolution of institutions, juridical, legislative, and administrative, to make this possible. International law must be made over so as to rest normally upon peaceful relations between nations and to point to judicial remedies for international wrongs and to judicial methods for the settlement of international disputes, leaving the awful arbitrament of war as the last resort, with its rules a mere appendix to the international code of peace.

To accomplish these ends elaborate and prolonged studies, highly scientific in character, must be made and their results published to the world. For these purposes the Divisions of International Law and of Economics and History were organized by the trustees and given the most competent direction possible. Each of these scientific Divisions has been successful in securing the coöperation of the leading scholars of the world, and today probably not fewer than 200 of the most eminent international lawyers, economists and historians, whether they are to be found in Europe, in Asia, or in the two Americas, are at work in the prosecution of researches and studies for the trustees of the Carnegie Endowment. It will not be long before the publication of the results of these scientific undertakings will begin, and it may safely be predicted not only that the volumes containing them will constitute an indispensable library for the publicist, but also that they will contain material which, in the hands of skilled and experienced propagandists, can be made to count heavily in the enlightenment of public opinion everywhere.

The task of dealing directly with public opinion and with the action of governments was entrusted to the Division of Intercourse and Education. It is the work of this Division which the public can most readily follow, for it deals with the concrete questions and

problems of the moment. The first aim of the Division of Intercourse and Education was to create an international organization and to call into existence a series of international agencies at a number of different national capitals. This was swiftly and quietly done and the coöperation of the most eminent statesmen and leaders of opinion throughout the world was cheerfully and generously given. Through trained and highly competent correspondents, the Division is kept informed regarding international policies and international conduct everywhere. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the most accurate and detailed information to be found in any one place regarding the conduct of international affairs and the progress of events in any specific international episode is to be found in the archives of the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Carnegie Endowment. This Division is doubtless quite as well informed regarding the actual situation in China, the state of public opinion in Japan, the improving relations between France and Germany, and the conditions in the Balkan Peninsula, as is any single Foreign Office in the world. The object of obtaining this accurate knowledge is that the Division may know how and when most usefully to exert influence in behalf of international peace and for the development of what I have ventured to call the international mind. "The international mind is nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regard the several nations of the civilized world as friendly and coöperating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing commerce and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world."

Of some of the important undertakings of this Division it is not wise at the present time to speak publicly, but other of its activities have no confidential character. With a view to explaining the organization and plans of the Endowment to the governments and peoples of the Far East and to the governments and

peoples of South America, as well as for the purpose of ascertaining what undertakings might well be planned in those parts of the world in aid of the objects of the Endowment, Mr. Charles W. Eliot and Mr. Robert Bacon were invited to go as representatives of the Endowment, the one to China and Japan, the other to the republics of South America. The selection of men of the personal distinction and high public service of Mr. Eliot and Mr. Bacon was of itself an indication of the importance which was attached to their missions. The elaborate and striking report on his observations in China and Japan which Mr. Eliot made to the trustees has just now been published with the title, "Some Roads Towards Peace." This report may, without exaggeration, be said to crown Mr. Eliot's long life of eminent public service. From its pages may be gained an accurate and first-hand impression of political conditions in China and Japan, particularly as these relate to international acts and policies. Upon his return, in a few weeks, Mr. Bacon will prepare a similar report on the observations made during his trip through the Latin-American countries. For the purpose of instructing the people of the United States regarding the life and opinions of the people of Japan, and for the purpose of instructing the people of Japan regarding the life and opinions of the people of the United States, an exchange of eminent scholars and men of letters has been arranged which has already produced the happiest results. Professor Nitobe, who came to the United States as the representative of Japan during the year 1911-12, spent six weeks at each of six universities, giving more or less formal courses of lectures; and from these universities as centers he went out to meet boards of trade and chambers of commerce, as well as literary, scientific, and social organizations of various kinds. During 1912-13, Mr. Hamilton W. Mabie spent six months in Japan doing the same sort of service that Professor Nitobe did in the United States. Mr. Mabie was received everywhere not only with courtesy and friendli-

ness, but with hearty enthusiasm. He spoke to large and interested audiences in different parts of Japan and rendered a service which will perhaps be better understood and appreciated a year or two hence than it is now.

The outbreak of the second Balkan war and the shocking reports of the outrages committed in connection with it led to the appointment by the Division of Intercourse and Education, in July last, of an international commission to visit the Balkan States and to study the economic, social and political effects of the war. So far as known, this is the first instance in which it has been undertaken to study the seat of a devastating war by the laboratory method. The smoke of battle had hardly cleared away when the members of the commission appeared upon the scene. They were men representative of different nations and speaking different languages. They were without prejudice or prepossession. Their one object was to make a scientific study of the effects of the Balkan wars in the places where the conflict had been carried on. The report of this commission will be ready for publication in January. When made, it will give the intelligent citizenship of the world an accurate, impartial and thorough account of what happened during and after these Balkan wars to the peoples between whom they were carried on. It is not going too far to predict that the report will make a profound impression on public opinion and that it ought to exert a notable influence in deterring men and governments from like struggles in the future.

The Division of Intercourse and Education found a large number of peace and arbitration societies already in existence, as well as many journals devoted to their interest. The policy was adopted from the outset of not duplicating any existing organization and of not building up any new and complementary undertakings for propaganda under the auspices of the Endowment itself. On the contrary, the policy in this regard has been to strengthen and to help existing

agencies that have been established to work for peace and international arbitration and to hold up their hands. In the United States, the American Peace Society, the oldest organization of them all, has been chosen to receive a large subvention from the Endowment. In Europe, similarly, considerable payments have been made annually to the Bureau Internationale Permanent de la Paix at Berne and to l'Office Central des Associations Internationales at Brussels. Aid has been given in smaller amounts to various other organizations in different countries and to the more important journals issued in Europe in the interest of international peace, particularly to *Die Friedenswarte* published at Vienna and Berlin, and to *La Paix par le Droit*, published at Paris.

The most valuable agency, however, in the work of the Division of Intercourse and Education has been found to be the Conciliation Internationale, with its seat in Paris, established at the time of the first Hague Conference by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. This organization has large and flourishing branches in the United States, in England, in Germany and in Japan, and other branches are in the course of organization in Canada, in Russia, in Italy, in Spain, in Brazil, in Peru, in the Argentine Republic and in Chile. On October 4-6 last, the annual meeting of the German branch, known as *Verband für internationale Verständigung*, was held at Nuremberg, attended by nearly 400 leaders of German business and professional life. The Conciliation Internationale makes appeal to large numbers of persons who are not willing to enroll as members of peace societies. It is the task of the Conciliation Internationale to use all possible means to promote better international understanding by international visits of representative men, by publications, by meetings, and by acts of international courtesy and kindness. The publications of the Conciliation Internationale, now issued in English, in French and in German, have an enormous circulation, that in the United States alone being about 80,000.

The Conciliation Internationale is also the agency used by the Division of Intercourse and Education for work of propaganda of a special kind. For example, during the coming winter, Mr. Mabie will deliver a number of lectures at selected points throughout the country that will give the results of his observations and experiences in Japan. Mr. Langdon Davies, a representative of the Garton Foundation in England, is now in this country addressing large audiences of workingmen, teachers, business and professional men. In January next he will be followed by Mr. Norman Angell, for whom an extensive tour covering three months has been planned. 1,200 selected daily and weekly newspapers receive at stated intervals, through the Conciliation Internationale, carefully written items of international news, the purpose of which is to interest American readers in international affairs and to broaden their field of vision and of interest. Many illustrations of work of this kind will be found described in the Year Books of the Endowment, but of a number of other still more important undertakings it is not judicious at the moment to speak.

In general, such is the organization and work of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It has been in existence less than three years, but its name is already known throughout the world and its activities have touched beneficently almost every important nation.

What of the future? It would be simple blindness to conceal from ourselves the fact that the international situation has in it many points of possible danger. The naval rivalry between Great Britain and Germany, the long-standing antagonism and jealousy between Germany and France, the constant misunderstandings between the United States and Latin-American countries, the open attempts in the United States to secure action that must necessarily produce friction with Japan, and the appalling conditions that have prevailed in the Balkan Peninsula all speak for themselves. Serious as these conditions are, it is with-

in the truth to say that the tension between Great Britain and Germany has notably decreased in the past two years, and that the governments of these two great peoples are now working in closer harmony and with fuller confidence than has been the case for a long time past. As between France and Germany, too, there are signs—and significant signs—that improvement in their relations is under way; and the Balkan war certainly cannot be renewed until the combatants regain some portion of their former military strength and secure fresh foreign loans with which to finance their military organizations and operations.

An object of chief concern is the curious indifference of public opinion in the United States in regard to matters of international policy and international obligation. When John Hay and Elihu Root were guiding the Department of State and were leading public opinion to the highest possible plane in the consideration of international relations, the United States was marching straight toward the post of leadership in the epoch-making movement to put justice above force in dealings between nations. More recently, however, the absence of these strong hands and clear heads has been sadly felt, and today even the most optimistic American must admit that the position of leadership lately held by the United States has passed from it and that it can only be reclaimed by great effort and by new and sincere evidence of the highest moral purpose.

Public opinion in the United States, as too frequently voiced in the newspaper press and on the floor of the Senate, is so careless, not to say contemptuous, of treaty obligations, that we have as a nation lost the respect of men and of peoples that we cannot afford to do without. We have shown ourselves to be the spoiled child of international politics. Whenever a bauble of material gain strikes our fancy we cry and storm until we get it, and then grasp it eagerly regardless to whom it belongs or of what pledges we have made in respect to it. An eminent European statesman once said in my own hearing that never again

would the Government of his nation make, with his consent, a treaty with the United States; and the reason he gave was that the United States had proved itself to be internationally incompetent. He pointed out that the United States had more than once revealed its incapacity to enforce its treaty obligations, and that the Government of the United States was even without the right or power to proceed in its own courts to enforce treaty obligations in case these were violated anywhere in the land.

Moreover, it is established law in this country that a treaty made between the United States and a foreign nation is subject to such acts as Congress may subsequently pass for its modification or abrogation. It is not even necessary to discuss with the other party to the international contract what it thinks of the proposed action of the Congress of the United States. This means that a treaty made by one constitutional agency may be modified or abrogated by another constitutional agency which is quite distinct from the treaty-making power. This unfortunate and crippling doctrine has been laid down by the most eminent judges in the land. It was expounded at length by Mr. Justice Curtis in the United States Circuit Court in 1855, and repeated by Mr. Justice Field in the United States Circuit Court in 1883. The United States Supreme Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Swayne in the Cherokee Tobacco Case, upheld this doctrine in 1870, and again, speaking by Mr. Justice Miller in the Head Money cases in 1884. The highest courts have held, therefore, that, while a treaty and an act of Congress are both binding upon the courts, the one which is later in point of time takes precedence in respect to authority. Whether a treaty has been violated by our domestic legislation so as to be the proper action of complaint by a foreign Government is held not to be a judicial question. To the courts it is simply a case of conflicting laws, the later modifying or superseding the earlier. It is this legal doctrine which, more than we realize, paralyzes the international effectiveness of

the United States and tempts us constantly to acts of international dishonor. If it were the law of the land that a treaty could only be abrogated or amended by the same constitutional agency that made it and in the same way as it was originally made and ratified, the United States would occupy a vastly improved international position. But, the law being as it is, there is a double obligation on the people of the United States and on the Congress to refrain from passing laws that are an infraction of existing treaties. Until the people of the United States and until the Congress of the United States are ready to look upon a treaty obligation as an honorable man does his word or his bond, there is no prospect of our leading the world's opinion in the development of improved international relations. We shall have to learn to refrain from offending and insulting foreign governments and foreign nations, both by legislative acts and by open declarations of opinion, before we can regain the respect which was once ours. In other words, we must form the habit of behaving in international affairs like gentlemen.

To educate American public opinion in this direction is the largest part of the present task of the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Carnegie Endowment, so far as that task has to do with conditions in the United States.

There is no visible evidence that any government or any responsible statesman is taking any interest in the preparations for the Third Hague Conference which should be called to meet in 1915. The express recommendations of the Second Hague Conference as to how this work of preparation should be undertaken have not, so far as is known, been followed. It therefore becomes a very practical and a very pressing question whether those who believe in improved international relations and are working to bring them about, propose to let the Third Hague Conference go by default or meet in pursuance of a belated invitation without a carefully prepared and well thought out program.

Until the United States comes to some agreement

with the Government of Colombia that will make acceptable reparation for the loss of Panama, the relations between the United States and Latin-American countries will continue to be in a state of unstable equilibrium. Until the Congress recedes from its wholly indefensible action in the matter of the Panama Canal tolls, we shall be without moral authority to make appeal to any European nation to stand rigidly by its treaty obligations. With perfect light-heartedness, Congress undertakes either to amend or to abrogate at one stroke all of our commercial treaties, many of them of long standing, for the purpose of enacting certain legislation that is supposed to be in aid of American shipping or that is intended to improve the lot of sailors. These ends could all be accomplished in an orderly and courteous way by negotiation with the other parties in interest. It is simply bad manners to deal with them as we are increasingly in the habit of doing. Our methods give rise to quite unnecessary friction and dissatisfaction and put us, as a nation, constantly in the wrong.

All these things are possible because the great body of the American people do not realize their significance. They do not seem to comprehend the effect of acts of international bad manners and discourtesy upon our relations with the civilized nations of the earth. Here, again, is a great field for public education and public enlightenment. When private citizens and public officials look upon international obligations and international relations as the upright man looks upon his personal promises and his personal relationships, the peace of the world will be secure. The place to make a beginning toward the accomplishment of this end is in the United States.

New York City.

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OUR RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AMERICA AND HOW TO IMPROVE THEM



MAY 15 1914

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

By

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Professor of History, Clark University

MARCH, 1914, No. 76

American Association for International Conciliation

Sub-station 84 (407 West 117th Street)

New York City

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PREFATORY NOTE

George H. Blakeslee was born at Geneseo, New York, in 1871. After graduation from Wesleyan University he studied at Berlin, Leipzig, and Oxford, and in 1903 received the degree of Ph.D. from Harvard. In connection with his Professorship of History he has organized the annual Clark University Inter-racial Conferences with the aim of helping to create a more intelligent and sympathetic appreciation of other peoples and civilizations. Besides editing the volumes containing the Conference addresses, he is (with President G. Stanley Hall) editor of the "Journal of Race Development." To better understand foreign conditions he has traveled extensively in interior Russia, the Far East, and South America, and has embodied his observations and conclusions in various magazine articles.

OUR RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AMERICA AND HOW TO IMPROVE THEM

Some settlement with Colombia for the alleged wrong inflicted by the seizure of Panama is essential in order to win the unqualified respect of the peoples of South America. We need not condemn the past action of our own Government to realize the necessity for this step; for since it is the general belief in every one of the Southern Republics that the United States took Panama unjustly, it is clear that Colombia's claims must either be adjusted by mutual agreement or else the issue must be frankly submitted to arbitration. It is gratifying to know that the State Department some little time ago began negotiations with Colombia with the hope of making some arrangement satisfactory to both countries.

The Panama incident is looked upon as the most striking example of our disregard of the rights of Latin American States, and is even pointed to by some as an indication that the United States plans in due season to conquer and annex all of the remaining countries to the south of us. A prominent Peruvian author recently wrote: "To save ourselves from Yankee imperialism the South American Republics would almost accept a German alliance or the aid of Japanese arms; everywhere the Americans of the North are feared." One of the members of the University of Cuzco, in an address to the Boston Chamber

of Commerce delegation, said with friendly frankness: "You come down here just at the time when some writers or politicians think that the ever-increasing American influence is becoming a terrible danger for the Latin Republics. They fear absorption."

One should not exaggerate this feeling. Although dread of United States expansion is common among the masses of the people, it is probably shared by only a minority of the leading men; and while the fear of our supposed imperial designs is acute in some States, it is slight in a number of others. But there is no country in which misunderstanding of the aims of the United States does not exist in some degree; it is latent everywhere and strongly held by many intelligent and influential people.

This distrust is frequently manifesting itself. The recent incident at Guayaquil is typical. This seaport of Ecuador has long been a pesthole, endangering the health of cities both north and south, including those in the Panama Canal Zone. The United States therefore acceded to the suggestion of Ecuador that Colonel Gorgas be sent from Panama to point out how Guayaquil might be put in good sanitary condition. Arrangements were almost completed for carrying out this work under the supervision of engineers from the United States, when such strong opposition developed among the people, due in considerable measure to the suspicion and jealousy of North Americans, that the entire plan has now been temporarily abandoned.

During the revolutionary troubles in Mexico, the greatest interest has been aroused among South Americans over the possibility of intervention by the United States. As one of the Brazilians expresses it, "They

have not been so much concerned over the deplorable conditions in Mexico as over the question whether the North Americans would send troops across the Rio Grande." Intervention in one Latin Republic would establish a precedent which might be followed later in others farther south; besides, it would bring the United States a long stride nearer South America.

The past few weeks, Señor Manuel Ugarte, one of the leading orators of Argentina, has been touring the principal cities on the West Coast, lecturing to large, enthusiastic audiences upon the necessity of union among the Latin Republics to preserve their Latin culture from overthrow by the political advance of the United States. These addresses of Ugarte have been among the most notable recent events in the Pacific Coast countries; and the fact that his views have often been discussed at length in leading newspapers, and sometimes repudiated, shows both the importance with which this issue is regarded and the division of South American opinion upon it.

But how can South Americans have the least fear of a North American conquest, when the idea of extending our sovereignty over any part of their continent has scarcely occurred to any person in the entire United States? This is the query which at once comes to one's mind when one first learns of the reality of this South American delusion. The explanation, however, is not difficult. The fundamental reason for the existence of this suspicion is the consciousness of weakness, especially with the States bordering on the Caribbean and on the Pacific; the knowledge that they are relatively feeble in comparison with the powerful nation which openly claims a leadership of the whole

hemisphere; and the belief that it is a law of nature that strong countries must expand. As one South American expressed it in a confidential talk, "the big fish eat the little ones."

Besides this, the future action of our Government is often forecast by the light of our diplomatic past. It is a far cry to the Mexican War, but the educated men know the character of it, and frequently refer to it as a warning. They point out that this was subsequently followed by the Spanish War, with its conquest of Porto Rico and its Cuban protectorate; later Panama was seized; and in our own time a constant intervention has been taking place in Central American affairs, especially in Nicaragua, while the independence of Mexico is now threatened, and its virtual absorption frequently discussed in our press.

From this point of view the dread of future conquest does not seem so unreasonable. But there is a further and very important factor—this suspicion is constantly stirred up and kept burning by some (we believe a relatively small proportion) of the British and German merchants in South America. Their purpose is clear enough. Trade competition throughout the continent is especially keen, so these British and Germans say to the South Americans, "You had better give us your concessions, railroads and commerce, for we cannot conquer your territory—the Monroe Doctrine stands in the way—but look out for Uncle Sam; if you give him a foothold, he'll soon take your whole country." As an example of this, the day before the Boston Chamber of Commerce delegation reached Buenos Aires, an English newspaper of that city stated in its leading editorial that, in all

probability, the ultimate purpose of this tour was to lead the way to the eventual annexation of South America by the United States.

Aside from this definite question of conquest, the general attitude of South Americans towards us—always remembering that there are great differences of opinion between different countries—combines intense admiration for our national greatness, rapid progress, and the energy and success of our business life, with a feeling that we fail in general culture, lack ideals and are crude and overbearing. A recent author, F. Garcia-Calderon, defines the United States as “a powerful industrial republic, a vast country of rude energies, of the ‘strenuous life.’” A professor in one of the leading universities said, in a recent conversation, “we know that the United States is stronger and greater than we are, but we don’t like to be constantly told of it; we recognize your superior power, but are also conscious of our own superior culture.”

The naturally sensitive and intellectually refined South Americans of the upper classes have had ample justification for this feeling from the conduct and character of many of the citizens of the United States seen in South America. For years there were no extradition treaties with these Southern Republics, with the result that certain leading cities, such as Santiago and Buenos Aires, were favorite resorts of our criminal classes. Then the conduct of our sailors, when on shore leave, was anything but creditable. The action of American railroad construction men, also, has frequently been disreputable; those working in Bolivia, two or three years ago, when building one of the new railroads, used to “shoot up” the town of

Oruro whenever the inclination moved them. The consular service, until the past decade, was filled with men who as a class were discreditable and inefficient. Many an open grafter, drunkard and roué had a United States consular shield over his door. "Ten years ago," says one of the foremost American business men on the West Coast, "we never thought of going to the American consul with any question of mercantile or international law; we always went to the British consul as a matter of course; but now we are getting into the habit of consulting our own consuls." The agents and drummers of our business houses have until recently been raw and crude, so much so that not many months ago one of our most capable consuls advised the State Department that these men actually did American business more harm than good. These are the types which have given to the peoples of the Southern Republics many of their impressions of the United States.

The supervisory attitude of our Government has been resented. "To live on the shady side of the big stick is not pleasant," as someone expressed it the other day. The best example of "the shady side of the big stick" is the settlement of the Alsop claim against Chile about two years ago. The Chileans were then just getting over some of the earlier unpleasantnesses, such as the "Baltimore incident" of 1891, when Secretary Knox suddenly announced to their Government that if, within forty-eight hours, it did not definitely agree to settle this claim—a complicated claim against Chile over certain nitrate concessions in which some Americans were interested—he would withdraw the American Legation from the

country. This summary procedure was keenly and bitterly resented.

The Monroe Doctrine is an almost constant source of irritation to South Americans. It is generally regarded by the people of every country as an unwarranted assumption on our part of guardianship and superiority over them. They do not recognize the need of protection from Europe, and consider themselves capable of managing their own domestic affairs.

"Dollar Diplomacy," at least the public trumpeting of it, has also done us harm, for it has intensified the suspicion that we are merely a money-making people, ready to prostitute all the resources of the Government to obtain trade privileges and concessions. Among the especially anti-American young men, in one section at least, there are many who cannot speak English, who are yet able to repeat in our tongue such phrases as "The Almighty Dollar," "Dollar Diplomacy," and "Make money honestly if you can, but make money." These expressions are considered to be representative of our national aims and character.

There exists, then, a widespread misunderstanding of us and of our attitude toward South America. This hurts us and should be corrected. Of course, not everyone holds these views, but with varying intensity they are general throughout the continent. Neither should we be so conceited as to think that the South Americans spend all their time in worrying about us and our policies. Their men concern themselves primarily with the local price of wheat and beef, coffee and rubber, and the results of the race track, and the ladies with the most recent French novels and the latest gowns from Worth's. When their thoughts do

turn to other countries, it is more frequently to those of Europe than to the United States, for in culture and education, commerce and finance, South America is more closely bound to Europe than it is to us. But when they think about the United States, their ideas are generally incorrect.

The situation, however, has recently improved. Mr. Roosevelt overhauled the consular service when President, with the result that the existing force is relatively respectable and efficient. Our business houses, especially within the last two or three years, have come to send distinctly better commercial agents and representatives, so that in some places, Rio de Janeiro particularly, the members of the American colony are the equals of those from any foreign country. The fear of territorial aggression from the United States, at least so far as the small states are concerned, is probably less keen than it has been in the past, because of their still greater and growing apprehension of danger from their larger neighbors. Some of the newspapers of La Paz, for example, recently stated that the menace to Bolivia was not from the North (the United States) but from the South (Chile or Argentina).

It is also an important advantage for us, in developing a better understanding, that the two leading members of the new national Administration in the United States, President Wilson and Secretary Bryan, have in a surprising degree the general confidence of the people of South America. This may be accounted for in part by the fact that Mr. Bryan made a tour of the continent about two years ago and spoke in many of the leading cities, creating a most excellent impression.

Notwithstanding this improvement already made, one of our most important diplomatic problems is to place our South American relations upon a really satisfactory basis. The South American peoples will be only too glad to have this brought about. They are generous, open-hearted and particularly responsive to approaches of friendship, if made in perfect sincerity and upon a basis of international equality. But how can this be accomplished? First in importance will be the sending of better representatives from both the Government and American business houses, men who speak the local language, either Spanish or Portuguese, are able to meet the native officials and business people upon a plane of equality in their clubs and families, and have the courtesy to follow the dictates of the social code of the country where they are residing. Some of our present diplomatic representatives, two or three in particular, measure up to the highest possible standard, and have won the respect, regard, and even affection of the people to whom they are accredited. It is almost impossible to overestimate the real service they are doing for the United States. These are the men who should be retained in their present positions or else promoted, not dismissed by a new administration as mere pawns in the game of national party politics. A few of our ministers, however, and a larger number of our consuls are not the type of men to represent adequately the United States in the Republics of South America.

Second, we should become better acquainted with each other. It is a striking fact that practically every South American who has resided for any length of time in the United States is an ardent admirer of

our institutions, culture and ideals; while in our own country the persons who have the highest appreciation of South America are those who have themselves visited the great Republics south of the equator. Our colleges and graduate schools should establish scholarships for South American students, to induce a greater number of them to complete their education in our country. Exchange of professorships should be arranged between the leading universities, and visits of representative men should be encouraged. The people of Brazil, to give but one instance, are just now delighted at the cordiality of the reception recently given in different places in the United States to their Secretary of State, Dr. Lauro Müller.

Third, a better press service should be established, which will give the substantial news of one section to the other. At present there is no regular representative of the Associated Press permanently established anywhere in South America.

Fourth, the diplomatic policy and the diplomatic attitude of our Government should be modified to give full recognition to the fact that the leading countries south of the equator are no longer weak, revolution-tossed communities, but are strong, stable, wealthy, proud, self-conscious nations.

Fifth, the claims of Colombia should either be satisfied or the issue be submitted to arbitration, to prove by action to all South America that our people are in reality what they claim to be, a nation actuated by the highest standards of international honesty and fair dealing.

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COMMERCE AND WAR



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PREFATORY NOTE

Alvin Saunders Johnson was born at Homer, Nebraska, in 1874. He was graduated from the University of Nebraska in 1897, and received the degree of Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1902. From 1902 to 1906 he served as tutor, instructor and assistant professor of economics in Columbia University. Since 1906 he has served successively as professor of economics in the universities of Nebraska, Texas, Chicago, Stanford and Cornell. He is author of an Introduction to Economics, and has contributed numerous articles on economic subjects to technical journals in this field. Under the direction of Professor J. B. Clark he has conducted, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, studies on the Attitude of American Labor Organizations toward Militarism, the History of the American Peace Movement, the Attitude of American Business Classes toward Militarism.

COMMERCE AND WAR

INTERNATIONAL trade, we are often told, is one of the most powerful of the influences making for universal peace. Century by century, decade by decade, the commercial relations between nations become closer. In steadily increasing measure the welfare of one nation is bound up with that of other nations through trade. Statesmen may view with alarm the increasing dependence of their countries upon foreign supplies and foreign markets, and endeavor to check the progress toward world organization through isolating policies of fiscal regulation. In vain. Since the time of Henry Clay we have striven to maintain an "American system" of economic organization; but the importance of our international economic relations has none the less vastly increased. There is no power in national governments sufficiently great to hold in check the modern tendency toward an order of universal economics.

IN THE PAST TRADE A COMMON CAUSE OF WAR

That international trade is destined to increase in importance can hardly be denied. Is it certain, however, that trade between nations tends toward universal peace? Such was not the tendency in past ages. What was it that animated the mutual hatred of the Italian cities in the period of the Crusades? Competition for the trade of the Levant. The East India trade was responsible for a great share of the cruelties perpetrated in the struggle between Spain and the Netherlands. The bloody war between England and Holland in the 17th century was essentially a trade war. Com-

petition in trade kept England and France in arms for one hundred years. The Napoleonic wars were in part, at least, a result of trade rivalries, as was also the Crimean war. The Russo-Japanese war, the Boer war, the war between Italy and Turkey are recent wars in which the trading motive is easily discernible. Even our own Spanish-American war has been ascribed by certain European historians to a desire on the part of the American people for colonial markets.

Alongside of the optimistic view that increasing foreign trade is a force making for world peace, we must place the pessimistic view that all modern wars are essentially commercial, and that war is, in fact, an inevitable concomitant of trade expansion. The latter view appears, indeed, to have the better support from history. The growing dependence of Venice upon trade, in early modern times, made that state not less but more warlike. When the Netherlands began to engage heavily in trade, they also became prompt to accept occasions for war. Most of England's reputation for pertinacious fighting has been established since her assumption of the rôle of a great trading nation.

Accordingly, it is a question of great interest whether a strife-breeding quality is really inherent in trade. If this be the case, the prospect of permanent international peace is remote indeed. There is every reason to believe that for ages to come international trade relations will grow increasingly important; and if trade is naturally bound up with war, this must signify only that the wars of the future will be more calamitous than those of the past.

CHARACTER, NOT QUALITY, OF TRADE BEARS UPON WAR AND PEACE

If we wish to understand the relation between foreign commerce and war, we must inquire, first of all, whether we are justified in treating commerce purely in quantitative terms. Foreign trade manifests a wide

variety, both in the objects that enter into it and in the circumstances in which it is conducted. In either respect it undergoes marked changes from generation to generation—changes that a purely quantitative study does not reveal. And even a very superficial examination of international relations indicates that it is the character, rather than the quantity, of trade that bears upon the question of war or peace. England and Germany compete in the export of textiles to the United States; the trade is an important one, yet it is never enumerated among the causes of the alleged hostility existing between the two nations. Both countries are competitors in the purchase of American cotton, but this competition excites no international animosity whatever. For a number of years Canadian competition in the supplying of wheat to the British market has threatened to confine our own wheat growers to the national market; but it would be difficult to find anywhere in the United States a trace of jealousy of Canadian agricultural development. For the United States, as for many other countries, England is by far the greatest market for exports and imports as well. Yet it has never occurred to our enemies to devise plans for excluding us from the British market, nor has it occurred to us that we might ever have to fight for it.

The markets of North China, on the other hand, are relatively unimportant, if measured quantitatively. Yet there are nations that endeavor to exclude other nations from them; and such exclusion would be regarded as proper ground for serious diplomatic representations, if not for war. Central Africa is worth scarcely anything to the white races except as a market. And, as a market, its power of supplying and absorbing products is low. Nevertheless, great powers have recently been brought to the verge of war by the question of the control of this region.

As the foregoing contrast indicates, there is a kind of trade which involves no warlike element, and another kind that is a natural cause of strife. In what

does the difference fundamentally consist? Not in the kind of objects entering into trade, but in conditions arising in the field of values and determining the possibilities of profit.

TRADE WITH "BARBARIANS" BREEDS WAR

Among nations in the same plane of civilization, already closely related through trade, there exists a fairly uniform scale of values. With due allowance for costs of transportation and customs duties, all movable goods command about the same price in the United States as in England or France or Germany. The American wheat exporter can just afford to send wheat to the British market. The price he receives pays him for his labor and risk, and gives him ordinarily a reasonable profit besides. It gives him no surplus on which to finance a campaign of exclusion against Canadian or Russian wheat exporters. The latter, also, are forced to content themselves with moderate rewards. There are no startling profits to excite international jealousies. Accordingly, there is nothing in a trade of this character that could by any chance lead to international strife. Some ill feeling may occasionally be produced by what appear to be unfair competitive methods, such as "dumping." But this is essentially a matter of industrial rather than commercial competition, and hence falls outside of the range of the present inquiry.

The trade between regions differing widely in civilization, especially if it is a new trade, stands on another footing. Here the most striking fact is discrepancy in the scale of values. In Oregon, one hundred years ago, four leaves of tobacco could command a beaver skin. On the African Gold Coast, in the early 18th century, a lucky trader might occasionally exchange a handful of salt for a handful of gold dust. There was a time when the Japanese ratio of gold to silver was one to four, while that of the Occident was

one to fifteen. From such instances, chosen, it is significant to note, from the more or less remote past, it is easy to reconstruct for ourselves the conditions under which the foreign trader worked. A fortune was easily to be had through the exploitation of existing differences in value scales. In the nature of the case, however, profits of such character could not be permanent. They were essentially similar to those from placer mining: exceedingly remunerative to the first comer, but intolerant of competition.

Monopoly was a normal characteristic of trade between regions with widely varying scales of value. The East India Companies of Portugal, Holland, and England could not tolerate "interlopers," their own nationals not authorized to trade under the laws of the companies. No more welcome were the interlopers in the American fur trade, or in the African slave trade. And if a chartered company could not tolerate the competition of its nationals, what must have been its attitude toward the citizens of other nations that attempted to trade in the territory which it had marked out for itself? History affords us an abundance of information bearing upon this question. Always the foreign trader was regarded with detestation. To mislead him by false information, to place him in the hands of corrupt guides who would conduct him out of the track of profitable trade or even into positive dangers, were among the mildest measures employed. If the foreigner manifested the determination to force himself into the forbidden trade, distrust and ill will ripened into implacable hostility. The history of trade with so-called barbarous races is red with "factories" burned and massacres perpetrated. The nations to which the traders owed allegiance might be at peace; but between the traders themselves there could be no lasting peace. There is scarcely anything in history more barbarous than those wars of trading posts on the coasts of India or Africa or in the forests of America. It was a warfare without rules,

having for its object not subjugation, but utter extermination.

It was inevitable that the bitterness arising from such conflicts should extend, in ever-widening circles, until they colored the whole national consciousness. Spanish cruelty, French chicanery, British perfidy, and the cold greed of the Dutch, were popular concepts originating in the contest for trade on the fringe of Occidental civilization, or, in economic terms, on the fringe of the Occidental value system. And these concepts, if they did not lead directly to international war, none the less afforded a basis for the warlike fervor upon which the statesman relied in his schemes of national aggrandizement.

EXPLOITATIVE TRADE IS DISAPPEARING

For upward of a thousand years trade has been carried on between the commercialized Occident and regions under different scales of values. And in all this period the trader has provided causes of war, or contributed substantially to any other causes that might arise. In this millennium, however, the Occidental value system has gradually extended its borders. At the beginning of the period it included only the central European part of the Mediterranean basin. Trade with Syria, Africa and North Europe was worth fighting for. At the close of the epoch of discovery, most of Europe was under one value system; nations could afford to fight only for the trade of other continents. At the opening of the 19th century the cream of the exploitative trade of America and the East Indies had been skimmed; yet much remained worth monopolizing even there, and Eastern Asia and the greater part of Africa were virgin soil. At present, what remains? Parts of China and Central Asia, the heart of Africa, a few remote districts like the headwaters of the Amazon and the territory around Hudson Bay. For the rest, the world is under a uniform scale of values.

Exploitative trade, which for ten centuries incited the nations to war, has practically completed its mission.

Although the era of exploitative trade is almost at an end, it would be rash to assume that its political influence has vanished. Political systems are constantly adapting themselves to economic conditions, but always lag behind. In this sense, politics is past economics. Especially is this true of international politics, where tradition necessarily plays an exceedingly important part. Domestic policies may change with the rise to power of a new political party, but a nation's foreign policy is expected to remain consistent. Whatever party controls our government, we may be sure that it will cherish the Monroe doctrine with traditional zeal. The British government, whether conservative, liberal or radical, must fix a watchful eye upon the trade routes to India; Russia, whether an absolute monarchy or a constitutional government, must keep alive its traditional yearning for Constantinople and British India. These and similar policies are in large measure the outgrowth of the exploitative trade that is now vanishing from the earth. The trading advantages to be derived from the occupation of India are no longer worth fighting for. With India under British rule the Russian trader finds no obstacles placed in his path; and if India were under Russian rule, its trade with England would not be seriously affected. One hundred years ago India was a rich prize, commercially; it is now merely a region in which men may buy and sell at moderate profits. Russia and Great Britain may yet fight over India, but if they do it will be chiefly on account of memories of economic relations now obsolete.

THE TRADE IN LUXURIES IS CONDUCTIVE TO INTERNATIONAL ILL-WILL

The trade between regions of the same order of civilization has itself undergone noteworthy changes

in character. In early modern times the commodities entering most generally into international trade were luxuries. Spices and gems from the East, amber from the Baltic, silks and other textiles from the Mediterranean cities, arms from Germany and Spain, are typical of the wares that could bear the expense of transportation when carriage by land was laborious and carriage by sea fraught with risks. With the improvement of ocean and land carriage a vast commerce in staples grew up. Along with the commerce in staples has arisen what in default of a better name we may call a specialty trade, of which the automobile and the typewriter may be given as representative objects. The trade in specialties is, of course, still greatly inferior to the staple trade, but it is steadily increasing in relative importance.

These differences in character of trade are not without a bearing upon the questions of international politics. The trader sojourning in a foreign land is an important medium of communication of feeling between nations. According as the treatment he receives is cordial or hostile, he will contribute to international good-will or to international hostility. Now, the trade in foreign luxuries has always been subject, in greater or less degree, to popular condemnation and often to hostile public regulation. The representative of such trade has shared the hostility directed toward it. Some indication of his position in an earlier time is given by the elaborate commercial treaties of the 18th century, designed to secure for the trader such elementary rights as freedom of domicile, security against unlawful seizure of his possessions, etc. The harshness of the laws regulating his business often forced him to employ illicit methods, the success of which was ordinarily assured by the fact that his wares were most frequently articles of fashion, and could therefore make their way to the consumer in spite of the law. We need only to recall the spectacle of a British Parliament debating more stringent rules

for the exclusion of French textiles that fashion nevertheless required the members of Parliament to buy; or the endeavor of the officials of the French Empire to exclude from France the Cashmere shawls that they yet were forced somehow to procure for their own wives and daughters. It is easy to represent to ourselves the feelings that a trade of this character must have excited in the foreign merchants who conducted it. They had every reason for contributing to the mutual contempt and detestation in which 18th century nations held one another.

TRADE IN STAPLES IS NEUTRAL IN ITS EFFECT UPON INTERNATIONAL FEELING

With the trade in staples the case is entirely different. Even in early modern times the export of English wool to Flanders proved a sound basis for harmonious political relations. The exporting nation rejoiced in a steady market, the importing nation in an unremitting supply of a commodity of wide use. The development of a staple trade in the 19th century has nowhere evoked international hostility. We cannot quarrel with Great Britain for taking our wheat and cotton, nor can she quarrel with us for providing them. Merchants and their agents residing abroad in the interests of a staple trade have very rarely been subject to injury or indignity.

A staple trade may, of course, be crippled by adverse customs regulations; but in most instances such regulations concern national rather than international politics. A German duty upon American cotton might be injurious to Americans engaged in the cotton trade, or to the American producers of cotton. Most of the injury, however, must fall upon the German cotton manufacturer and domestic consumer. The Germans may wish to hoist their cotton supply over their own tariff wall; but that is chiefly a matter that concerns them alone. The trade in staples is a powerful force

and succeeds in making its way against even serious obstacles.

On the other hand, the staple trade cannot be said, of itself, to produce a conscious internationalism of feeling. Our exporters ship their cotton to the best market. The buyer nation may detest us, but it will not pay a higher price for cotton from a nation with which it is on better terms. There is, in short, no sentiment in the staple trade. The qualities of goods are known, as are the prevailing prices. The direction of the currents of trade is determined, as nearly as anything human can be, by mechanical laws.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SPECIALTIES IS DEPENDENT ON INTERNATIONAL GOOD-WILL

In the specialty trade a different spirit must prevail. The staple sells itself: the specialty can be sold only through systematic cultivation of the market. No manufacturer of automobiles or farm machinery or typewriters can consign his products to a foreign market, in the confident expectation that they will be taken at remunerative prices. A definite demand for a particular type of product must precede its profitable supply.

In building up a demand for a specialty the exporter may man his foreign agencies with his fellow-countrymen, or he may employ foreign agents for the purpose. In either case it is necessary to cultivate cordial international relations. The French merchant who desires to work up an American market for his automobiles cannot afford to send to this country agents who are strongly imbued with the prejudice that America is a nation of barbarians. Nor can efficient service be expected from resident agents who are wanting in respect for the French. The international specialty trade, as has frequently been noted by observers of commercial conditions, manifests throughout its per-

sonnel a spirit of cosmopolitan good-fellowship. It could not have been otherwise.

STABLE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS ESSENTIAL TO SPECIALTY TRADE

More than any other branch of commerce, the specialty trades stand in need of stable and harmonious international relations. We cannot establish a foreign market for our automobiles or farm machinery without a considerable expense in building up a marketing organization. A severe customs duty directed against us virtually destroys a capital invested. It is not so with a staple trade. The British may levy a duty upon our wheat, and curtail our market in some measure. But we have no capital invested in a wheat-marketing organization that the duty could destroy. It follows, then, that whereas exporters of staples may regard the commercial policy of foreign nations as something with which they need not be greatly concerned, specialty exporters are intimately interested in every change in commercial policy. Of all traders they are least able to survive a customs war or other serious disturbance of international business.

It may perhaps be supposed that the eagerness of the representatives of a foreign trader to cultivate the good-will of the people among whom he hopes to conduct business will be met by hostility on the part of his domestic competitors. This, however, is to misconceive the character of the specialty market. The agents for different types of automobiles are, to be sure, competitors for sales, but they are virtually co-operating in producing a general interest in automobiles. There is excellent warrant for the view, often expressed by automobile dealers, that more machines of American make have been sold in this country than would have been sold if French machines had never been imported. From trade of this character international harmony is the most natural result.

MODERN COMMERCE INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT UPON
PEACE

One of the two great branches into which trade is historically divisible, typified by commerce with colonials, barbarians, infidels, naturally breeds war. This branch of trade has very nearly disappeared through the extension of the Occidental value system to the ends of the world. Of the other great branch, one form, the trade in luxuries, once predominant but now relatively insignificant, has served in its time to produce international discord. The great staple trade of modern times has nothing to gain from international animosities, and the growing specialty trade has everything to lose from them. We are therefore justified in asserting that war and commerce, united through a thousand years, are now in fact divorced, except perhaps in the eyes of the international politician, who still premises his action upon their ancient relation.

ALVIN SAUNDERS JOHNSON.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

May 8/14

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

A PANAMA PRIMER



Reprinted from *The Independent*, March 30, 1914

APRIL, 1914, No. 77

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A PANAMA PRIMER

Much of the present controversy over the question of Panama tolls is a misunderstanding due to ignorance of the factors of the problem. It has often happened that prominent men in speaking on the subject both in Congress and out have betrayed the fact that they had never read the treaties whose interpretation they were discussing. It must be remembered that this is no new question. The Panama Canal has been under discussion for nearly four centuries and the rivalry between Great Britain and the United States for the control of the interoceanic routes began some seventy years ago. Perhaps the best way to present the salient points of this long diplomatic history is in the form of the old-fashioned catechism with proof-texts.

Q. Why can't we do what we like with a canal constructed on our own land?

A. The Canal Zone is not our own land. It belongs to the Republic of Panama. We have "the use, occupation and control" of it for canal purposes. (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, Art. II, III.)

Q. But at least it is our own Canal, for we built it. Why have we not the right to discriminate in favor of our own shipping in the matter of tolls on our own Canal?

A. Because we promised both Great Britain and Panama to open the Canal to the vessels of all nations "on terms of entire equality." (Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Art. III, Clause I; Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, Art. XVIII.)

Q. Has not the change of sovereignty due to the secession of Panama released us from the obligations of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty?

A. No, because that treaty expressly provides that "no change of territorial sovereignty" shall affect its provisions. (Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Art. IV.)

Q. Why did we have to get the consent of Great Britain in 1901 before undertaking the Canal?

A. Because in 1850 the two nations had agreed that neither would obtain or exercise any exclusive control or acquire any dominion or take any advantage over any interoceanic canal or railroad. (Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Art. I, VIII.)

Q. What was the state of affairs at the time when the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was negotiated?

A. Great Britain had control of the Nicaragua route and the United States had control of the Panama route.

Q. How did Great Britain secure control of the Nicaragua route?

A. Because our Government refused to confirm the treaties signed by our envoys, Hise and Squiers, in 1849, by which Nicaragua gave to the United States the exclusive right to construct a canal across the Isthmus of Nicaragua and to protect it by fortifications.

Q. Has such an opportunity come to us since?

A. Yes, a treaty with Nicaragua of even greater advantage to us is now held up in the Senate.

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A DEFENSE OF CANNIBALISM



By
B. BEAU

Translated from LA REVUE of February 15, 1909

By
PRESTON WILLIAM SLOSSON

MAY, 1914, No. 78

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A DEFENSE OF CANNIBALISM

(The following curious argument, which first appeared in *La Revue* of February 15, 1909, over the signature of B. Beau, will remind the reader of certain books and articles now written to prove that war is normal and inevitable and that the hope of international peace is essentially chimerical. The plea of the Caribbean orator in favor of the time-honored institution of cannibalism is forcible and would not be easy to refute on theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, it seems, like other earnest and able arguments, to have somehow become invalidated in the course of time.)

AMONG the papers of a missionary of the eighteenth century we once had the good fortune to discover the following pages. It is a speech that a piai or Carib medicine man addressed to his compatriots in protest against the anti-cannibalistic propaganda that the Christian was making among them. It will doubtless be thought that this piai speaks in a fashion rather academic for a savage. Perhaps he was a relative of Voltaire's Huron. It is permissible to suppose also that the missionary who has reported for us this harangue had been trained in belles-lettres and that he has transcribed into the style of a philosopher the rude language of the medicine man. The form, in any case, matters little. What deserves attention is

the value of the reasons presented in favor of the cannibalistic custom and the energetic conviction with which this Carib affirms that it can never disappear.

This is the plea of the Carib piai as it was pronounced about the year 1750 before the warriors of the Oyampi tribe as they gathered in the center of their village:

A stranger is come among us to teach us a new religion. There are among the doctrines which he preaches a great many things which are indifferent to us, but there are also some very dangerous for the tribe. He declares, for example, that cannibalism ought to disappear from the earth and that it is necessary to renounce our custom of eating human flesh.

There have been in all ages individuals to whose stomach this aliment was repugnant. But this is a rare physiological idiosyncrasy. Even those who suffered from it regarded it as an infirmity. This is the first time that an attempt has been made to make a dogma of this pathological distaste.

The propaganda of this stranger might prove fatal. At the last public feast where ten prisoners were immolated, three of our warriors have refused to touch the flesh. That is why I have resolved to demonstrate to you that this doctrine is absurd and that those who permit themselves to be seduced by it will be traitors to their tribe.

I

In all ages, as far back as the memory of the oldest men can reach, enemies killed in battle have been eaten and prisoners have been fattened into proper

condition for killing. When a custom is so ancient it is not dependent upon the will of men. It is not an accident of their history, but a law of their nature, instituted by the gods themselves. Hearts too tender may deplore it, but against natural fatalities it is vain and puerile to wish to fight.

The necessity of this law will, besides, be clearly apparent to every unprejudiced mind. Suppose, for instance, that the tribes, refusing to eat one another, engaged to live in peace, each upon its own territory. What would happen? All those whom our incessant wars cause to disappear would continue to live; the number of those having children would be incomparably greater than at present; the leisure afforded by the abandonment of warlike pursuits would incline still further the hearts of men to the pleasures of love. Because of all this the population would increase to proportions hitherto unknown. However fruitful might be our soil, however industrious might be our women, the country would soon become incapable of supporting all its inhabitants.

What then could be done? Expel from the tribe a part of its members? Who should choose those condemned to exile? Would they accept the decision of the tribe? Rather than risk the adventure of emigration to unknown lands where they would doubtless fall a victim to enemies or wild beasts, would they not sooner proceed to the last extremities? Civil war would break out in all parts of the country at once. Foreign war is a hundred times preferable.

Would they sacrifice the old people and a certain number of children in order to preserve the food sup-

ply for the adults? We are told that formerly this custom existed in certain tribes. One of our poets, speaking of his ancestors, has said:

They cheerfully murder and afterwards eat
Their infants malformed and their grandsires effete.

But how choose those who are to be immolated? It is impossible to find a just principle by which to make such a choice. The caprice of judges and chiefs would have free scope; the opportunities of injustice would be multiplied and with them the germs of civil discord.

There are doubtless certain clear cases where it would be easy to decide that a child is sickly and would always be for the tribe a useless mouth and an unworthy member. But many doubtful cases would be determined by corrupt influences; tender-hearted parents might purchase with money the indulgence of the judges for a malformed child, while others through egotism or love of comfort would bring their robust children to the sacrificial knife.

And how about the aged? Would there be established a legal age for death? That would be unjust; some men although old in years may be still young from the standpoint of intellectual and physical value. Could the judges be left to determine in any particular case the moment when old age had arrived? Beware of arbitrariness and corruption, fomenters of discord. Theoretically the best solution would be to leave to the aged themselves the duty of determining the hour of their sacrifice. This solution would, perhaps, have been possible formerly when love of the tribe was

more fervent. But these heroic times are past. Egoism has grown in our hearts and it would be in vain to hope to see the men of to-day offer themselves upon the altar of the tribe.

Let us add that if such a solution were reached joy would henceforward be lacking to our feasts. There are many stomachs that find the flesh of old people too tough and that of children too insipid. If this last consideration appears materialistic, there are those among us to whom it will certainly not be indifferent.

In a word, those who protest against the custom of eating our enemies are blind if they do not see that the success of their doctrine would unchain civil war and condemn the members of the same tribe to eat one another.

II

I think I have demonstrated that cannibalism is a necessity. But I will not confine myself to that. I assert that it is a beneficent necessity which must be accepted with a tranquil heart and revered as instituted by the gods themselves. It is this indeed which corrects in the most equitable fashion possible, all the evils which are engendered by peace and superstitious respect for human flesh.

It is because we wish to eat the flesh of our enemies that every spring our warriors go forth to war. If we renounced this custom, wars would become infinitely rarer and the virile virtues would perish. It is in view of imminent and certain conflict that we cultivate in our souls courage and subtlety and in our bodies strength, endurance and agility.

On the other hand, these incessant combats accomplish among us every year that elimination of the feeble which the law would never be able satisfactorily to achieve. Upon the field of battle there are no intrigues, no base bargains. He whom infirmity or age renders inferior to his adversary falls, struck down by him; his death is the proof that he does not deserve to live. There return from the combat only the strongest and most robust, that is, those who are truly worthy to live and perpetuate themselves.

Who cannot see all the advantages which result from this beneficent selection? This pitiless elimination of old and feeble men keeps the population within suitable limits. There is always then an abundant food supply for all members of the tribe without the warriors being condemned to servile tasks. Those who are dead enjoy the peace of the great sleep; those who see the light enjoy life in prosperity.

III

With our neighbors these reasons would be sufficient; they are barbarous and without culture. We Oyampis are not solely concerned with material well-being. True civilization recognizes the value of the Good and the Beautiful. Now from this point of view also cannibalism is beneficial.

Whence comes the beauty of our warriors and our children? Why is it that in our war dances all eyes are entranced with robustness, agility and grace of body? It is because, every year, war eliminates the feeble. This it is which has made and conserves the beauty of our race. It is like a watchful surgeon who

ceaselessly labors to relieve the body of all that deforms or enfeebles it.

If we lost our taste for the flesh of the vanquished, wars would become rare; the sick, infirm, and aged would continue to live in the pullulating population. The race would soon become ugly and the day would arrive when fine specimens of humanity might easily be numbered among us.

Think, besides, of the immense mass of affliction which would then burden mankind. All handicapped individuals preferring a long and painful agony from maladies and privations to a liberating death! They talk of the cruelty of incessant war, but really it is merciful and good. It permits life only to those to whom it is a joy; and, when it deprives them of it, it is not slowly with refined torture, it is at a single stroke in the intoxication of battle giving them the supreme joy of the deadly blow. Is it in the name of pity that they wish to destroy our cannibal customs? Woe to those who experience this sort of pity! It blinds them. They do not see that far from diminishing the evils of mankind, their cowardly sensitiveness would multiply them infinitely.

Which are, in short, the tribes best fitted to survive? If in any tribe the warriors allow themselves to forget the virile virtues and lapse into indolence and cowardice, if corruption and injustice incite them against their chiefs or against one another, is it not just that they should contribute to the support of a better tribe where all the virtues are practiced that they have forgotten? It is the right and duty of the strongest, most intelligent and best disciplined of the tribes to nourish

themselves upon the inferior tribes. It is only in this way that men have continually grown in strength, in beauty, and in virtue.

I conclude: it is the liking for human flesh, the cause of wars, which keeps men up to the mark. It allows life only to the most valiant and enduring. It can be regarded therefore as the mainspring of human progress.

IV

For completeness' sake I ought to mention another idea, although its absurdity is quite evident. We are told: "It is war which exercises this salutary function of elimination and education. It is not necessary for the purpose that the victors should feed upon the flesh of the vanquished. Why not allow the corpses to decay instead of eating them? The horrible thing is not war itself; it is the abominable custom of making food of human flesh."

This, I confess, is incomprehensible to me. To believe that after having endured the fatigues of battle the victorious warriors would renounce the immediate benefit of the victory is to have completely lost the sense of reality and of life. Here is revealed most clearly the intellectual feebleness of the adversaries of cannibalism and the puerility of their doctrine.

Why should we wage war if we lose the taste for carnage and human feasts? In order to get corn and meat? But that is only an additional advantage of conquest that our feasts do not interfere with. To believe that men who can have more will content themselves with less is mere folly.

Besides, it is often very difficult, even after a victory, to get possession of the herds and crops. The enemy will have hidden his wealth in inaccessible retreats. The bodies of the dead and wounded, on the contrary, are an immediate and certain prey. What sensible man has ever advised abandoning the prey that is in hand for an uncertain booty of inferior quality?

But what reasons can be given, if, as is admitted, war is good, for the proscription of feasts of human flesh? Killing off the wounded spares them prolonged sufferings. Do the bodies of the dead experience any further suffering by serving as a feast to the victor? Is it preferable to rot in the earth or to become the food of crows? There is, on the contrary, for the fallen warrior a supreme consolation in the thought that his flesh will never meet the hideous fate of animal carion but will serve in all its strength and beauty, still palpitating with the ardor of the conflict, for the nourishment of men.

There is more to add. How can war be carried on if there is no means of restoring strength after a battle? Must warriors be condemned to bear upon their backs the provisions for their families? This is an indignity to which they would not submit. All great military leaders have said that war ought to support war, that the warrior ought to live upon the enemy. The most direct and assured application of this maxim is to eat the vanquished. So the battle itself prepares for the warriors the feast which will restore their strength. The valiant never need fear famine. They receive at once in the form of abundant food supply the reward of the blows that they have given.

It is, therefore, absurd to pretend to preserve war while proscribing cannibalism, for this is at once the principal cause, the necessary condition and the real justification of it.

V

I must add that those who preach such a doctrine are not merely perverse minds susceptible to deception, they are—whether they realize it or not—traitors to their tribe and deserve punishment.

The essential difference between a compatriot and an enemy is that it is a right and often a duty to eat the latter. To suppress this difference is to enfeeble the bond which unites the tribe. It will be still further enfeebled if we are made to believe that the day will come when one can go among strangers without risk of being eaten by them. If this doctrine spreads it will, therefore, be at the expense of the love that is due to the tribe.

It will also be at the expense of its power. Who cannot see that in a war we would be in a position of inferiority in comparison with our adversaries if while they remain cannibals we have renounced this manly, ancient and profitable custom? Enfeebled even by victories we would become, sooner or later, their prey.

This is indeed the final result of an absurd doctrine. It is always fatal in the end to those who adopt it. Ignorance of reality sooner or later brings its own punishment. Even desiring to renounce, under the pretext of humanity and pity, the custom of our ancestors would bring destruction upon us. Our women,

our children, we ourselves, would contribute to the feasts of neighboring tribes.

Repudiate then, Oyampis, these new ideas. Anti-cannibalism is a doctrine essentially chimerical. Men have always eaten one another; they will continue to do so in the future as they have in the past. And the best way to avoid being eaten ourselves is to enfeeble neighboring tribes as often as possible by liberal bloodletting.

* * *

When the medicine man had finished, the warriors shouted their approval. The missionary, on account of this reaction in favor of the ideas he had combatted, feared that he might be made to contribute to a feast of reconciliation, so he took flight. It was to his prudence doubtless that we owe the advantage of having read the argument of the cannibal.

Besides, could he have made a decisive reply?

Nevertheless, the Caribs themselves no longer eat one another.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.

68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, July, 1913.

69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima, August, 1913.

70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne, September, 1913.

71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot, October, 1913.

72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane, November, 1913.

73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton, December, 1913.

A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, December, 1913.

The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy, Reprinted from The Congressional Record, October 29, 1913. December, 1913.

74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried, January, 1914.

Wanted—A Final Solution of the Japanese Problem, by Hamilton Holt, January, 1914.

The South American Point of View, by Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, January, 1914.

75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas Murray Butler, February, 1914.

76. Our Relations with South America and How To Improve Them, by George H. Blakeslee, March, 1914.

77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson, April, 1914.

A Panama Primer, Reprinted from *The Independent*, March 30, 1914. April, 1914.

78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from *La Revue* of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson, May, 1914.

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
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THE TRADITION OF WAR



By
RANDOLPH S. BOURNE
JUNE, 1914, No. 79



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THE TRADITION OF WAR

ONE of the most important things that we can learn in regard to this world about us is that ideals and institutions are far less rational than they generally purport to be. And in no field is this more obviously true than in that of war and the preparation for war. There is always a tacit assumption made by militarists that armaments have their origin in an imperative national need, and that the sole reason for their maintenance and increase is the fact that they are the only insurance a nation has against dishonor and ultimate annihilation. The workers for peace are jeered at as sentimentalists who will not see things as they are, and who are trying to substitute impractical feeling and good wishes for the stern exigencies of a practical adaptation to a world of force and fraud. In other words, the constant assumption is made, often by peace-lovers as well as militarists, that militarism is wholly rational, that statesmen and governments have built up their armies and navies in hard-headed practical answers to definite dangers which threaten their country or to the requirements of growing industrial strength or "national dignity." When we consider these needs, however, we shall find certain curious paradoxes that grow out of the rationality of militarism, and we shall be led to believe that there is a large element of the irrational and the naïvely unconscious in the sternest schemes and the boldest poli-

cies of our "hard-headed" generals and militaristic classes. We shall find, in fact, that it is they who are the sentimentalists and that they are adapting themselves to ghosts which have long since ceased to inhabit the corporeal bodies of facts.

THE OSTENSIBLE REASONS FOR MILITARISM

The reasons generally given by the great powers of the world to-day for the maintenance of great armaments are two: to protect the homeland against aggression, and to keep open the trade-routes abroad which are necessary for the sustenance of the nation's life. The strengthening effects of war, its usefulness in keeping the character of the nation "virile," is not heard of so much to-day since the deadly work of novelists and artists has shown us how war actually eliminates all the "fit." But the emphasis to-day is all upon the "defensive" character of armaments and war. No nation dares give to-day as a reason for its vast armaments the desire for aggrandizement at the expense of its neighbors. It would be well if militarists would pause and consider the full significance of this fact. For it amounts to a substitution of a negative character for a positive character of war. Not much more than half a century ago it would have been considered foolishly hypocritical for a great nation to disclaim *in toto* any purpose of aggrandizement. The game of war was all too universally understood as one whose prime purpose was the elevation of a nation's power, and the acquisition of territory or indemnity. France and Prussia, for instance, before the war of 1870, were like hounds held in a leash,

eager to be at each other and prove for all time which was the dominating power on the Continent of Europe. This swing of international opinion from the tacit conviction that armaments were for offence, to the general assumption that armaments are for defence merely, is tell-tale evidence of an enormously significant character that militarism itself has been gradually forced back, since the growth of the Peace Movement, to a defensive position, to a trial for its own life. Militarism itself has awakened to the fact that it needs apologists, and it is setting itself to work thus to make itself respectable.

THE PARADOX OF MILITARISM

But this particular apology leads the militarists into a very curious paradox. For if each nation were sincerely armed only for defence and never for aggression, it is obvious that armaments would be useless, for none would attack—and there can be no defence without an attack. Any danger from small uncivilized countries who have not reached this stage of militarism would be quite negligible and could be easily repulsed. If the Powers are really to stand about, armed but entirely passive, as they purport to be doing, they are in the ridiculous position of never getting a chance to use their arms, for none will attack them. And military equipment and training become, what pacifists have long suspected them to be, the basis for a great toy-game of the mimic war of manœuvres at which every year kings and generals play. But indeed a costly game and one which a rational world, emancipated from the “tradition of war” would soon put an end to!

That then is the paradox of militarism, and it can only be avoided by the remark, which any militarist would make, that this perfect security of defence would only exist if all the nations kept faith, and it is the risk of the bad faith of one of the nations that keeps all the others in arms—though they all purport to be arming only for defence. But it is exactly that growth of international good faith, of an international public opinion, almost of an international honor and etiquette which we have been witnessing in the many triumphs of diplomacy and arbitration during the last forty years. So that this risk of bad faith is one which is constantly lessening; and just as far as the new international honor operates, just so far will sincerity be effective, and just so far will it be possible, progressively, to reduce armaments.

THE IRRATIONAL FACTORS

But the paradox is, of course, that along with this growth of international understanding and honor there has gone not a reduction but a mutual increase in armaments, and we must begin to suspect the accuracy of that perfect adaptation to hard cold facts which the militarists pride themselves upon. For a growing internationalism and interweaving of national economic and spiritual interests is an undoubted fact of the last forty years, and yet militarism has made no adjustment to this palpable world-situation, but indeed has made an adaptation to quite the reverse condition of affairs. Only one conclusion can be drawn, and that is, that there must be a very large and unusually

tenacious factor of irrationalism in the militaristic propaganda, and that it rests not on any real sensitiveness or adaptation to a modern world-situation but upon unconscious forces of tradition, social habit and prejudice. It would be surprising if this were not so, for all institutions have a continuity and run uninterruptedly back to long buried epochs and social conditions. And militarism, being one of the most hoary, as well as the most "respectable" of our institutions, must of necessity have the largest element of the traditional within its forms and ideals. Like all institutions which come down from a venerable past, it continues more and more to live upon that past and clings blindly and stubbornly to life, on the plea that it does represent a real response to present pressing needs, when actually the social needs to which it is a response are already a thing of a past era. And it is the duty of every intelligent person to separate out this irrational traditional factor in every institution—and imperatively in the institution of militarism—from the factor of rational adaptation to a world of the present with its problems of social adjustment and control. For all progress, international as well as national, public as well as individual, consists simply in this, the substitution of conscious rational control of environment for the unconscious yielding to the traditional forces of inertia and habit. The Peace Movement represents exactly this substitution—of rational conscious arbitration for blind instinctive war—in the momentous field of international relations, the most comprehensive sphere of human activity. The Peace Movement therefore represents enlightened

awakened progress, while militarism merely represents the unawakened forces of prejudice and outworn tradition.

THE STUBBORNNESS OF MILITARISM

Having discovered the fact that the militarists, in attempting to justify war on the new defensive basis to which they have been forced have revealed the irrational factors which enter into their philosophy, we must now try to estimate the size of those factors and ask ourselves why militarism, though placed on such an obviously irrational basis, should yet have survived and can appear to-day so menacingly strong.

It is strong, in the first place, because it has the support of a venerable military caste, with a definite body of military science and codes of behavior and etiquette and drill, and a powerful esprit de corps. The history of many religious bodies shows that almost any institution whose organization is based on the principle of sharply graded authority and rigid obedience will have an enormous power of self-preservation, even long after its ideals and dogmas have come to be generally regarded as utterly fantastic. Their long survival was proof of their rigid capacity for organization and in no sense a proof of their inherent worth. So militarism has its schools, its discipline, its quasi-hereditary organization—all that is needed to give it a solidity of front against the most momentous of social changes or public opinion. In addition, it enlists the support of the State and is mixed up in the political life of the nation, and so enjoys a protection which is denied less fortunate institutions like the

Church in America. And the militarists have cleverly used this connection to befuddle the wits of masses of people with shibboleths of "patriotism," identifying the war ideals with love of country, and representing hatred of militarism as in a way synonymous with disloyalty to country; though any intelligent person will recognize in an instant that the power for war is one of the least of the glories of the State, and that one's country is worthy of love and loyalty in and for itself, quite apart from its military or naval power; it is its national character and its prosperity which to-day enlist the true patriotism and not the ability to be a bloody braggart.

ANOTHER REASON

In the second place, militarism, at least in the leading European powers, is linked up with the interests of the most powerful economic and landholding classes of the country. I do not here refer to the scandalous activities of the great steel and armor-plate firms like the Krupps, who are accused of systematically and artificially creating European war-scares, although these revelations are wonderfully significant in showing up the desperate and laborious measures which are necessary to-day even to work up war-feeling in this modern natural situation of world-peace. What I mean here is the fact, often pointed out by European Liberals, that militarism works in the interest of the aristocratic classes, against whom the masses interested in social reform are beginning to make headway, by keeping popular attention centered on the bugaboos of "the foreign devil." Among the most useful and

industrious classes in England to-day, for instance, one of the fears expressed with regard to the return of the Conservative Party to power is that they will be inclined to stir up foreign war. For as long as the nation can be kept seriously alarmed about "foreign invasion" and seriously concerned for "home defense," it will not seem safe to dislocate social conditions at home, and the resources which should go to imperative social reform will seem to be demanded for bigger and bigger armaments. The war-scare then is a spiritual asset of privileged classes who are fighting to preserve that citadel from which they have so often been threatened with dislodgment during the last half-century.

THE FICTITIOUS POETRY OF MILITARISM

And militarism is stubborn, in the third place, because it has got itself enhaloed with an unreal aureole of romance and poetry. But one has only to know a little of war to feel its dreary horror. Only an incorrigible sentimentalist can make the one moment of flashing charge on the battlefield cover up all the meanesses and anguish of the rest that war involves. Let the enthusiast turn over the pages of the "Photographic History of the Civil War"—one of the greatest books of peace propaganda in existence—and try to extract some glory from this monotonous succession of listless soldiers about a campfire, of wagon-trains crossing a ford, of heaps of gunny-sacks that once were men, piled in ditch or field, of little bands of men running up a primitive village street, of little clustered towns destroyed by shell and fire. For this is what the re-

morseless eye of the camera tells us war really looks like—enormous futile labor, sordid tragedy, listless despair. Or let the enthusiast for war as a science or a game read Tolstoi's "War and Peace," and see depicted there the helplessness of even the greatest generals in the grip of elemental forces and uncontrollable masses of men, and the pure fortuitousness of battle.

THE TRADITION OF WAR

War, entrenched in social caste and class-interest and poetized with fictitious glamor, has been kept alive from eras when its need was genuine, and vital to our present age when it is both an anomaly and a curse.

No one can deny that the Middle Ages in Europe presented a theatre prepared for war, perhaps the most fitting the world has ever seen. With the shattering of the Roman Empire and the invasion of hordes of semi-barbarous people, European society fell apart into chaos, only to be reorganized, as the invaders were gradually assimilated, into small bits of sovereignty, into thousands of small manors and independent principalities. In such a chaos of independent rulers, quarrelsome, bent only on increasing their land and influence, war was the inevitable state. With the gradual extension of the King's authority, and the gradual process of nationalization, these small sovereignties were merged into a larger whole and the area of war immensely restricted. War within nations now ceased to be the normal state, and became possible only between nations themselves. But with the process of nationalization has come a change from a

feudal to an industrial society which is made for peace and depends upon peace, just as the feudal society was made for war and depended upon war. Through these two processes, the meaning and usefulness of war have been gradually restricted. From being a real response to the necessities of the state of civilization it has become more and more a tradition, surviving, as we have seen, through its cunning linking-up with class-interest and sentiment—a parasite, living not because of its own ability and worth, but because it has been able to live upon other movements and interests which were vital and genuine.

WAR UNIMAGINABLE

Indeed to the normal vision of most of us war is almost unimaginable; even in Europe none of the great civilized nations has seen war within its boundaries for more than forty years. And it is significant that the press dispatches of the recent wretched Balkan conflict spoke far more of its physical horrors than of its dramatic glories. The signs seem to indicate that the world is losing both its imagination and its taste for war. Here in America, it is true, our comic-opera Spanish War did excite martial fervor for a time, but it was too fantastic to last. The Dewey furor seems almost grotesque now in the light of the complete oblivion which has descended upon the leaders of that war. In a military age, they would have been called to places of honor and power in the State, but the hollowness of it all was too much for our common sense. It was not our national ingratitude that we displayed in forgetting them, but rather

the most healthy and genuine of instinctive realizations that war was out of date, that our modern civilization with its international interweaving bonds of financial and economic dependence is a civilization organized for peace and for peace alone. Our forgetfulness was the best proof that we realize in our heart of hearts that the change from a feudal society based on isolation and force to an industrial creative society based on co-operation and exchange has definitely and for all time relegated war to the dusty limbo of the past. Even in Europe, with its war-memories and Balkan turmoil, the difficulty of arousing conscription sentiment, the demonstrations held in Germany and France by large sections of the workers—all bear witness to the same thing. The fact can no longer be blinked at; the military game is up.

THE TRADITION MUST GO

Militarism, then, continues to exist only as a tradition, a superstition which has survived after its reason has departed, after the epoch to which it was a normal adaptation has utterly passed away. If there remain reasons why nations should watch one another with jealous eye, the basis for those reasons is being rapidly done away with, through the strengthening machinery of international conciliation. But the fact that war is a superstition does not mean that there is no work left for the Peace Movement to do. For it is characteristic of all institutions and large ideas, that, in proportion as they become traditional and lose their vitality, their supporters become more fanatical in their belief. And it is exactly this outburst of supersti-

tious fanaticism, which the present craze for armaments in Europe and America represents. As the ground slips under their feet, militarists outdo themselves in efforts to reinstate their position. If they yield a little in theory, they redouble their activity in practice.

So that this fanaticism can only be overcome by the cool persistent reason of the peace propaganda, by a resolute insistence upon seeing things as they are, unblinded by sentiment or class-prejudice. To understand the true modern world-situation and then adapt international policy to it in such a way as to get completest control of it and completest prosperity for all the nations—this is the task of the statesman. And can we think of those statesmen and leaders of public opinion who still support militarism, who still live in an antiquated world of national “dangers” or “glory,” and prepare for war in a world whose whole functioning is peace, whose whole inner soul cries out for peace,—can we think of them as anything other than deluded victims of the hypnotic power of tradition, posing as clear-sighted men of affairs and responsible arbiters of nations, but actually swayed by ghosts of a historic past when war was the law of the world,—a past projected into a modern world whose prosperity in everything depends on the abolition of strife?

RANDOLPH S. BOURNE.

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WAR AND THE INTERESTS OF LABOR

By Alvin S. Johnson

ACCORDING TO LABOR THEORY, THE BURDEN OF WAR
RESTS UPON LABOR

WAR, to the modern industrial laborer, is stark calamity and nothing more. It is a trade in which the price he pays may include pain of body and anguish of spirit, wounds, disease, and death, distress to his family and perhaps its dispersal and utter ruin. And the things thus dearly bought, national victory and national aggrandizement, are of no profit to the industrial worker. His private possessions are not increased; his toil is not lightened, his life is not made brighter. War may increase his country's dominions, but the extension of boundaries offers no wider prospect to the worker or to his children. Grant that they participate in the feeling of enlarged personal significance which accompanies national greatness: it is a feeling that does not often kindle a consciousness dulled by toil. The luxury of the large map,—what a thing for a wage-worker to die for!

To the exposition of such a doctrine of war in its relation to labor, thousands and tens of thousands of socialistic writers and lecturers are devoting much of their energies. The doctrine may sound strange to many of us, but among the eight or ten millions of Socialists there can hardly be one to whom it sounds strange, and very few who would consider it false. Although the Socialists are most active in its promulgation, we should be greatly in error if we supposed that it is taught by Socialists alone. Organized labor everywhere hears it repeated, not by revolutionists, but by the most conservative labor leaders. Others may win or lose through war; the laborer can

only lose. It is a theory; but it is a theory more widely held and more unreservedly accepted than many other theories which have played an important part in the history of the world.

Much turns upon the question whether this theory is true or false. For if it is true that, whether his country is victorious or suffers defeat, the laborer necessarily incurs heavy losses and gains nothing at all, we are justified in looking upon the gathering force of the labor parties as a powerful factor making for universal peace. In former times disastrous wars were sometimes fought over trifles; both parties to the conflict in the end laid down their arms exhausted by losses from which they recovered only after generations. Such wars, it would seem, have been possible only in default of an active political party opposed to war. If modern warfare is inevitably disastrous to the workingman, the labor parties of the several powers will furnish such a continuous, organized criticism of policies likely to lead to hostilities that no group of international trouble-makers, however active, can seduce a nation into undertaking a serious war.

In earlier times there have been, it is true, wars of sentiment and of principle, holy wars, race wars, wars of independence, conflicts of competing civilizations. Such wars we may have in the future also. In the case of wars of this character, calculations of cost and gain are beside the point. Racial existence, political freedom, immunity from religious oppression, are values to be won at any cost. There can be no question of the distribution of these values among the several classes in society. Most wars, however, in all ages, have been fought over questions of material interests. Goods and lands, concessions and markets, have been the prizes of victory. These are measurable values, comparable with the costs of winning them. They are capable of distribution among the different social classes. It is the contention of the labor theorists that these values are not as

a fact impartially distributed; that the working class gets none of them. Our present task is to determine the validity of this contention.

EARLIER WARS HAVE AFFORDED GAINS TO THE WORKING CLASS

No extended study of history is required to prove that the doctrine of the profitlessness of war to the working class is not valid for all times. From a successful campaign the warrior of antiquity returned well provided with slaves or loaded with booty. The inhabitants of a conquered state and all they possessed, chattels and land, were free prizes, and there is no reason for doubting that the common soldier—the working-class representative—shared in the distribution of such gains. War, to men born in poverty, was a trade, like husbandry or the handicrafts. It was fraught with greater risks than these, but its prizes were far more attractive. In the Middle Ages the looting of captured cities appears frequently to have enriched common soldiers as well as officers. The better share of the winnings fell naturally to the men of higher rank, but no military leader could have retained his popularity without granting even the lowest class of his followers a share in the plunder.

In comparatively recent times, also, the material gains from war have been shared by the common soldier and his class. In our own colonial period, for example, the backwoodsman fought the French and Indians partly for patriotic reasons, but partly also for the sake of the hunting grounds and rich valleys to the westward which should provide him and his children with homes and means of livelihood. The Texan heroes fought no doubt for Anglo-Saxondom and liberty; prospective “headrights” were, however, something also well worth fighting for. A square league of rich land, to be selected in the vast territory cleared of Mexicans—such was the prize that even a private soldier might win.

THE CHANCE OF WORKING-CLASS GAINS HAS BEEN DESTROYED BY THE EVOLUTION OF THE
PROPERTY CONCEPT

Almost unnoticed, however, a profound change has taken place in the institutions regulating the conduct of wars. In the last two hundred years the concept of private property has undergone a notable extension and intensification. The lands of the world which are fit for homes of men of the expanding races are almost all private property—the private property of civilized men. And gradually the idea has become fixed in the modern consciousness that such property is to be held inviolable, even through conquest. The clearing of a conquered province of its inhabitants, and the distribution of the land among the soldiers of the victorious army, is now unthinkable. Movable goods are still liable to seizure, under the laws of war; but on land they are not, in fact, seized without compensation, except in so far as they may be regarded as instrumentalities of war. When Germany wrested Alsace-Lorraine from France, the German soldier gained neither land nor loot. On the sea, since 1854, the enemy's goods under a neutral flag have been exempt from seizure; and the public opinion of the world is almost ripe for the establishment of the general principle that private property at sea must be held inviolate.

There is only one way for a citizen of the conquering nation to secure land or chattels within the borders of a conquered province: to buy it. And this he could have done as well without the costs of conquest. For the same social process which established the inviolability of private property has erected into almost universal law the freedom of migration and freedom in the buying and selling of goods. Before the Franco-Prussian war German citizens were privileged to migrate to Alsace-Lorraine and acquire property there; they have no greater privileges now. Capitalism, or the social order dominated by the property

concept, has practically removed struggles for land and goods from the field of international conflict. Under our existing economic system there is nothing to prevent a race from steadily extending its actual borders. The Irish are free to win back the whole soil of Ireland, if they can develop a superiority to English landholders in industry, thrift, and perhaps craft. The Slavs may advance upon the Teutons unchecked by military force, provided that they are economically the better race. In the United States we accept as a matter of course the supplanting of the original Anglo-Saxon population by Germans, Slavs, Hungarians or Italians. All the prejudices created by wide differences in race and in culture are required to arouse us to action against the conquest of land by the process of infiltration of population.

Public property is still subject to seizure by a conquering nation; but such property is seldom of a character to yield profit even to the state; it never yields rewards to the common soldier. Indemnities may be levied; and these, theoretically, may benefit the common soldier and his class through relief of taxation. The benefits from indemnities, however, are intangible, and it would be difficult to produce instances of men enlisting in the army for the purpose of securing them.

COLONIAL ENTERPRISE UNPROFITABLE TO LABOR

There is no material interest of the working class that can be furthered by the conquest of a state in the same stage of civilization, but are there not profits to be gained through the subjugation of states in a different cultural stage? The partition of Africa and the scramble for position in China indicate that statesmen believe that their respective nations have, as a whole, much to gain from the control of such states. Has the working class, as such, anything to gain?

The land in the greater part of Asia, and in a considerable part of Africa, is already private property; native titles would hardly be disturbed upon the assumption of control by a colonizing power. The land

not now occupied is desert or swamp or jungle, and is inaccessible to members of the working class. The building of railways, the exploiting of forests and mines, offer valuable opportunities to some of the citizens of the ruling nation, but these are not members of the working class. The flotation of a company to construct a railway in a Chinese province may yield large profits to its promoters. The enterprise may offer attractive investments to capitalists. The business class will be drawn upon to provide managers, the professional class to provide engineers. The road will be constructed, however, with native labor, and native labor, chiefly, will be employed in its operation. The services of the working class of the colonizing nation may perhaps be drawn upon for steel and other supplies. But it stands to lose through the draining away of capital which would otherwise have financed a local venture.

Such enterprises, if successful, establish in the imperial nation a class of persons who draw their incomes from the toil of half-enslaved colonials. It is such a class that most accentuates the differences between the men who toil and the men who possess. The magnate with fortune securely invested in colonial railways or rubber or sugar is likely to be a convinced adherent of the doctrine that the employing class is also the ruling class, whose determinations it is treason to oppose. Colonial exploitation, however much it may enrich certain members of the property-holding class, can hardly fail to be a disadvantage, both material and moral, to the working class.

COLONIAL MARKETS ARE NOT WORTH THEIR COST TO LABOR

Colonial dominion, it may be urged, carries with it the control of markets; and the workingman, as well as the capitalist, profits from an expanding market. The colonial market may even be an exceptionally profitable one; it is almost certain to be such if an

exclusive commercial policy is pursued by the colonizing nation. The true measure of the value of a branch of trade to the working class is not, however, its lucrativeness. A better measure is its volume. It is of more importance to labor to export a hundred millions' worth of products at an advance of ten per cent. than to export fifty millions at an advance of fifty per cent. The best measure of all is the amount of wages represented by the goods exported; and this amount is likely to be in inverse ratio to the lucrativeness of a branch of trade. Our export of wheat to England is not very lucrative; for every dollar we receive from it, about seventy-five cents has been paid out in wages to the laborers employed in producing and transporting the wheat. Our export of cigarettes to a Chinese province—if we possessed one—would probably be very lucrative; of every dollar received seventy-five cents would represent rent, good-will, business profits and other property income. But our workingmen are interested in exporting, not good-will, but labor "embodied" in goods and paid for. It is therefore not the closed colonial market, where monopoly profits are to be secured, that is most advantageous to the workingman, but the great, open markets of the world where business is conducted on small margins of profit. A working-class commercial policy would concentrate its action upon the latter field, and would look askance at any tendency in the direction of diverting the national capital and enterprise to the former field.

It is not to be denied that some gain may accrue to the laborer from the colonial market, provided that it can be secured without injury to the larger and more advantageous open trade. If even twenty-five per cent. of the price of cigarettes for China represents the wages of labor, this is in itself a gain to the working class. But the nation that sets about to develop a closed market is almost certain to neglect the open markets, if not to place barriers in the way of those who wish to resort to them. All through the eighteenth century the interchange of goods between France

and England was practically prohibited, largely as a result of jealousies originating in the colonial trade. We have no reason to question the justice of Adam Smith's observation that freedom of trade would have been of inestimable advantage to both nations. It certainly would have been worth more to the workingmen of both countries than the colonial trade to which it was sacrificed.

Preoccupation with a closed colonial market is at best a source of inefficiency in a nation's commercial policy. Almost inevitably the exclusion of other nations from a given country's colonial possessions leads to retaliation, and the retaliatory policy never confines itself to colonial affairs. We may exclude Japan from the Philippines by heavy tariffs; Japan may exclude us from Korea and Southern Manchuria by similar means. The matter does not end here; ultimately the direct trade between the United States and Japan, which is far more important to labor than the Philippine or the Korean trade, is impeded by restrictive legislation. On the whole it is doubtful whether a closed colonial trade is ever worth so much to labor as it costs, in terms of open trade alone. If it is necessary to subjugate the colony by arms, the necessity is excessively paid for twice over. And if finally the colony must be defended in a war against a great power, the price labor pays for the share in the venture becomes colossal in its extravagance.

THE TECHNIQUE OF MODERN WARFARE CLOSES THE ROAD TO PROMOTION FOR THE COMMON SOLDIER

Modern warfare offers no increase of wealth to the members of the working class; the acquisition of markets through war is of no value to the workingman. This fact does not, however, preclude the possibility that war may offer a powerful appeal to the working class, and thus command its political support. In past wars there have been brilliant prizes for the brave and fortunate. After the Civil War almost every com-

munity, North or South, had its instances of men who had fought their way up from the ranks to titles of great popular esteem. The war had bestowed upon them distinction through life, such as they could never have gained in times of peace. A brigadier-generalship won by a man of the people was a stimulus to thousands. It is beside the point to say that the prize was not worth the cost incurred by all those who sought it. Actuarial computations of gains and costs have never governed the actions of masses of men, and probably never will. So long as war remained a lottery, offering splendid prizes to some, the mere fact that its blanks were disproportionately numerous was not sufficient to check the spread of war sentiment.

War, however, becomes less and less of a lottery with every advance in its technique. The training needed by a general to-day is highly specialized. That it may be acquired by a man from the ranks in the brief and sanguinary campaigns that characterize twentieth-century warfare is possible, indeed, but only in rare instances. The European nations which prepare seriously for war provide themselves with trained and competent officers for every emergency. It is these officers, men from the upper and middle classes, who will gain whatever distinction a war may offer. The man who enters the army as a private, at the beginning of a war, will remain a private to the end of the war. The working-class soldier who rises to a position of high command is destined eventually to take his place alongside of the mythical wandering youth, elevated by freak of fortune to a kingship.

THE ROMANCE OF WAR IS YIELDING TO THE ROMANCE OF CIVIL LIFE

Promotion, however, is only a part of the romance of war which lures men of the working class to the colors. Adventure, new scenes, new experiences, how much these have meant to the young men of

restless disposition to whom the environment in which they have been bred seems tame and tedious! Such were the youths who used to run away to sea, or to swear additional years upon themselves in order to be accepted as soldiers. They were once numerous enough to form large armies, and the bellicose statesman could always count upon them as eager to fight in any cause. They seem not so much in evidence now; at any rate, we have difficulty in recruiting men enough even for our small army, and our navy is never too fully manned. There is a consensus of opinion among those who urge political measures for the rehabilitation of our merchant shipping that special inducements will be needed to tempt men to enter the sailor's life. And the British mercantile marine is remarkably dependent upon Las-cars and other foreign sailors.

What has become of the adventurous youth of earlier generations? They are largely on the railroad, which sends its spurs into every valley, offering a ready means of escape to the young man who finds the rural quiet intolerable. Or they are in some one of the other wandering occupations which have developed to such extraordinary proportions in these days of expanding trade relations. It is no longer necessary to go to war in order to see the world or to experience life.

And as civil life becomes richer in variety and in romance, war becomes poorer. The military campaign of to-day does not consist, as formerly, of long marches over a strange territory, leisurely sieges, interminable garrisoning of captured cities. The modern campaign is short and sharp; the armies are hurried on fast trains to battle, like cattle to the abattoir. The private soldier's game of life and death is played quickly to its end, and he returns half-dazed to his home, or returns no more. Warfare is becoming mechanical, like a large-scale industry. Its chief distinction is its appalling accident rate. Accident? How does death on the battlefield, nowadays, differ from

death in a mine explosion or a railway collision? Bulgars and Turks may still strive with bayonets and sabres; but Germans and French would meet death unromantically, at long range.

Like material gain, glory and adventure are rapidly withdrawing themselves from the reach of the common soldier, if they are not already unattainable. Their tradition remains, however, not without potency. In reality men who enlist may be destined to be mowed down ingloriously by machine guns; but among the motives which appeal to the imagination of the recruit are atavistic yearnings for the excitement of the hand-to-hand conflict. The Scottish fighting tradition is still alive, although two centuries have passed since Scot and Saxon were reconciled, and since the Lowland kine that were once the spoil of the Scottish clansmen came to be vested with the sanctity of "capitalistic" private property. The war-like tradition, however, cannot forever survive the reality of the personal prize. The statesman of to-day wisely bases his hopes of military predominance upon universal service. The conscript must serve the purposes of national aggrandizement, since volunteering cannot be relied upon to provide sufficient men for a great war. And with conscription official recognition is given to the fact that war is no longer worth while, from the point of view of the class that furnishes the private soldiers—the working class.

WAR A MORE SERIOUS HARDSHIP TO THE WORKING CLASS THAN FORMERLY

While the gains from war to members of the working class are dwindling to the vanishing point, the costs of war to be borne by labor grow steadily heavier; so at least it is often asserted. If by the costs of war merely the losses and suffering in the field are meant, the assertion is probably not true. The campaigns of the future, to judge from the results of the Russo-Japanese and the Balkan wars, will be

more sanguinary than the campaigns of the past, but war will be less protracted. We shall have no future Seven Years' War, much less a Hundred Years' War. Furthermore, if a greater number of soldiers die in battle than formerly, fewer die from disease. It is also to be borne in mind that losses in battle are distributed more impartially than formerly among all classes; mortality among officers in the Boer and Russo-Japanese wars was at least as heavy as mortality among the common soldiers.

But the costs of war do not rest exclusively upon the soldiers at the front. The working population at home has to bear the burden of war-taxes, the hardships attendant upon commercial and industrial disturbances, and the loss of the services of many of its most productive members. These costs, it would appear, are growing heavier. That this is true of the financial burden of war is matter of common knowledge. That it is true of the other incidents of war also follows naturally from the fact that the moderate state is coming to be prevailingly urban. An urban state is less fitted than a rural state to bear the strain of war.

One hundred years ago only 45 per cent. of the population of England, already a highly developed industrial country, was found in cities and towns. To-day the urban population forms a higher percentage than this in Germany (54), and in the United States (46.3). In France the percentage is only slightly less (41). In England to-day 77 per cent. of the population is city-dwelling.

As a consequence of the concentration of population in the cities the economic life of a nation has come to be very delicately balanced. Food, fuel, and materials must be supplied to the cities with the utmost regularity; the products of the city must find an unobstructed outlet; otherwise a crisis is inevitable, with its attendant unemployment and distress. Even were a nation practically self-sufficing, it could hardly engage in a great war without a serious disturbance of its economic balance.

Few modern states, however, are self-sufficing. The United States is perhaps less dependent upon foreign supplies and foreign markets than any other great power. Yet half a million men in the United States earn their living in the production of goods for Great Britain alone. A war with Great Britain would force all these men to seek new fields of employment. A considerable period of time would elapse before the readjustment of industry could be completed. During the process, our whole economic organism would be seriously disturbed in its functioning.

The city-dwellers, as we have seen, already represent a very large percentage of the population of the modern state, and this percentage is everywhere increasing. If we confine our attention to men of military age, we can see at once that the percentage of this class found in the cities must be even greater. Young men, and men in the prime of life, flow steadily to the city; the aged and the very young remain in the country. Accordingly, the great war of the future, if such a war ever occurs, will be fought largely by city industrial workers, drawn to the standards under some form of universal military service law. Not merely those who are without dependents, but those who have wives and children, parents and sisters, relying upon them for support, will be required for national defense.

It has been just as true in the past that a great war has required the enrollment of those who had families dependent upon them. When the head of a rural household, however, enlists in the army, he leaves his family with a roof of their own for shelter and with cleared fields which will afford means of subsistence, although the labor of tillage may fall heavily upon them. The industrial worker possesses, as a rule, neither roof nor means of production. When he is drafted into military service his wife and children must fall back upon employment in the factory or the sweat-shop. And such employment is not to be secured with certainty, especially if war is attended, as

is almost inevitably the case, by commercial disturbances.

It is doubtful whether, in the whole history of the world, the secondary hardships of war ever rested so heavily upon any class as they would rest upon the industrial working class of the present day. The industrial workers live from hand to mouth; war strikes off the hand. Yet there are persons who would have us believe that working-class anti-militarism is merely a surface phenomenon, which would disappear with the first call to arms.

THE FINANCIAL BURDENS OF WAR REST HEAVILY UPON THE WORKING CLASS

An aftermath of war is the heavy addition to the national budget: interest on the war debt and payments on the principal, compensation for property destroyed, and military pensions. There is a belief widely held that this country, at least, is rich enough to accept the financial burden, even of a great war, without serious injury to its people. In an ultimate sense the United States, like all other countries, is poor. It is too poor to meet the obligations that the current formulation of political ethics imposes upon it. Current political ethics requires the state to free its citizens from the costs of epidemic disease; to segregate from its life-stream the elements carrying mental and moral degeneracy; to educate its children properly so as to bring to light all their hidden resources for work and life. These obligations the state does not meet, or it meets them inadequately; it lacks the means to do more. From the point of view of current political ethics, the modern state is an honest and well-meaning bankrupt, meeting some of its obligations in full, others in part, and repudiating still others altogether. Saddle the state with the additional and preferred lien of a war debt, and its moral obligations to its people will be more sadly neglected than they now are.

It is obviously the common people, the working class, whose interests are most seriously prejudiced by any neglect by the state of its social obligations. It is the working class that suffers most severely from faulty sanitation and inadequate hospital service; from contamination of blood through the presence in society of defective strains. It is the children of the working class whose education is most likely to be neglected, and whose chances in life are consequently impaired. Accordingly it can hardly be denied that there is at least a modicum of truth in the statement that, whoever pays the war taxes, it is upon the workers that the whole burden finally rests.

Occasionally one hears the assertion that war is worth its cost because of the quickening of the national life which follows it. The "national life," of which much of the conscious life of the individual is a part, is no doubt a social product, and is capable of undergoing rapid and profound changes. Were a great war to sweep over the modern world, it would affect in some measure every expression of thought and every manifestation of feeling. Nationally and individually, we should be transformed, perhaps. Possibly we should have a richer literature and art, a more significant social and political life. These, however, are not working-class values, and it is in working-class values that our present interest lies.

WAR DELAYS THE SOLUTION OF THE LABOR PROBLEM

The most significant interest of the working class is involved in the readjustment of the relations of labor and capital. In every industrial state, labor and capital present conflicting economic interests; they present, further, conflicting conceptions of rights and duties. Employer and employee are far from an agreement as to the meaning of a "right to a job," or of a right to a continuous income from invested capital. Of the two systems of asserted rights, that of the employer is the more intelligible to the general

public. It is nothing but a transference to the employment of labor of the principles long accepted as properly regulating the purchase and sale of commodities. The laborer's system of rights is something new in the world, and therefore not readily understood.

The laborer would convince the general public—the ultimate arbiter in this as in other matters—that the labor contract differs materially from other contracts, and should be interpreted in the light of a special tradition. Although the public accepts free competition as a satisfactory principle governing the purchase and sale of commodities, the laborer would have the public accept the principle of the closed shop as regulative of the labor contract. An agreement of dealers and producers to raise prices is a conspiracy against the public; an agreement of laborers for the purpose of raising wages is not a conspiracy, according to the advocates of the labor programme. A merchant who should post a clerk at the entrance to a competitor's place of business, to dissuade prospective customers from entering, would very quickly feel the whole weight of the law. The laborer who "pickets" an "unfair" shop, feels that he is quite within his rights, so long as he limits himself to peaceable persuasion. The laborer, evidently, is attempting to introduce a new system of rights. Possibly the system is sound, and conducive to the public welfare. But the burden of proof is upon those who introduce new systems.

Of this new system the general public has already accepted some elements. The right to organize is generally granted. The principle of collective bargaining rules in an extensive part of the modern industrial field. The labor contract is being differentiated from other forms of contract: this is already evident. The process is a slow one, however, and makes head only as a result of persistent efforts on the part of the leaders of labor. But persistence alone would accomplish little; the support of the public is essential; and the cause of labor is greatly strength-

ened if the more broad-minded and generous employers regard it sympathetically. If, for example, labor can convince the more liberal employers that an eight-hour day is desirable, the public is likely to regard with favor a strike to force other employers also to limit the working day to eight hours. The strike will receive wide popular attention, and, if successful, will be credited with the victory. The preliminary work of preparing the public mind, and winning a certain amount of support among employers, although indispensable, remains unrecorded. Hence the progress of labor is likely to be regarded as the result of a series of struggles between employers and employees. But it is just as truly the outcome of a conflict of principles in the social mind.

Peace, domestic and international, is a prerequisite to the working out of this conflict of principles, and to the social validation of the laborer's scheme of rights. A war in progress distracts the public attention; its influence is inevitably reactionary. Further, the conclusion of the war injects into civil life large numbers of men who have been trained to drastic action upon quick judgments. The industrial world is filled with little Alexanders, slashing away with their swords at apparent Gordian knots that civilian patience might have unraveled. Let it be granted that the warlike ex-officer, in the rôle of employer, is no more of a menace to the interests of the working class than is the warlike ex-private in the ranks of labor to the interests of capital. It is none the less the laborer's interest which is most seriously prejudiced by the substitution of the spirit of war for the spirit of peace. The influence of strife and turmoil is reactionary in the end. It strengthens, rather than weakens, the hold upon the social mind of the employer's ethical formulation.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT A GUARANTY OF PEACE

The interests of industrial labor are bound up with peace. Recent historical tendencies, we have seen,

have steadily encroached upon the field of possible gain to labor from war, until that field has practically disappeared. Recent tendencies have also steadily increased the weight of the burdens imposed by war upon labor, until these burdens have become intolerable. The hopes of labor for general social recognition of its claims, and for their realization through appropriate institutions, can prosper only through the spirit of peace. All these things the men of the working class are beginning to realize. They are therefore justified in their claim that the labor movement throughout the world is the best guaranty of peace.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.

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78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from *La Revue* of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson, May, 1914.

The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint from the *New York Times*, April 27, 1914. May, 1914.

79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne, June, 1914.

80. War and the Interests of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprint from the *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1914. July, 1914.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

FIAT PAX



By

GEORGE ALLAN ENGLAND

AUGUST, 1914, No. 81

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PREFATORY NOTE

George Allan England was born at Fort McPherson, Nebraska, in 1877. He is Master of Arts, Harvard University, and has been engaged for the past ten years in literary, political and editorial work. In 1912 he was the candidate for the Socialist party for Governor of the State of Maine. The subject of anti-militarism, from the Socialist viewpoint, has long been of special interest to him; and for the purpose of study and observation of this and other social phenomena he makes periodical trips to Europe. The present article embodies the results of long investigation along the lines of Socialism as a potent factor in world-peace.

The nature and extent of the influence which the Socialists throughout the world exert in the direction of international peace is not always clearly recognized and, for this reason, the American Association for International Conciliation is glad to reprint from the organ of the Socialist party in America, the *New York Call*, an article by George Allan England.

FIAT PAX

THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT AS A FACTOR IN WORLD-PEACE

 HE world-wide protest against war at the time of the Balkan struggle, raised by the International Socialist Party, and the vigorous measures adopted by that body to limit the extension of hostilities, have brought the Socialists into the foreground as a factor definitely to be reckoned with in the maintenance of world-peace. Delegates representing a constituency of some 30,000,000 Social-Democrats and sympathizers met in Basel, Switzerland, in November, 1912, all crying "*Fiat Pax!*" And oil spread over the troubled waters, and "the captains and the kings" took second thought—*et pax fiebat*.

Thus we see a new world-power at work, which by a simple show of hands, without discharging a single gram of powder—a power without a king, an army or a navy—can exercise wide influence for international conciliation. Its "Thou Shalt Not Kill!" has already become a potent force and one definitely to be reckoned with.

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY

This party, overwhelmingly of the working class, ramifies into the most remote corners of the world. As regards militarism, its policy is explicit. Everywhere and at all times Socialists covenant to use all means within their power—including political action, the general strike and, if necessary, revolution—to abort warfare and render nugatory the armed exploits of governments and rulers in search of glory or commercial and territorial expansion. If fight they must, they refuse to consider as enemies the working class of other nations, but merely the ruling, capitalist class

of their own and other lands. They recognize no antagonisms of race, creed or color. For them the abstract dream of the brotherhood of man has assumed so tangible a reality that to-day they are actually at work to force the ruling classes into a recognition of its claims.

This stand they take through a lively sense of ethical values and self-interest combined. They recognize that the proletariat always furnishes the cannon-fodder and the cash, while the ruling class reaps the rewards. For many years this fact has been a prime tenet of Socialism. The voice of Socialism has always been raised against the social wastes and horrors of warfare. Its spirit has everywhere been the same, voiced in the passionate cry, "No War!"

This spirit is crystallized and made coherent by the International Socialist Bureau, at Brussels. Through its mediumship concerted international action is rendered possible. Let us examine some specific results of its action.

DEFINITE RESULTS

As far back as the days of '70 and '71, the French and German Socialists sought to bridge the bloody chasm with a fraternal handclasp, but failed; for their paucity of numbers rendered them impotent. In the cannon roar of Metz, Sedan and Paris, their voices were drowned. But the blood-soaked soil of France revitalized the ideal. And not once, since then, have the dogs of Mars bayed, without a sturdy contra-bass from the Socialists: "Thou Shalt Not Kill!"

At the time of the Russo-Japanese war, Socialists from those two countries met and interchanged pledges of peace. In the days of greatest stress and hostility between the ruling classes of England and Germany, English and German Socialists exchanged fraternal greetings and promises of "immediate action" in case of war. Many well-informed students of political economy believe that this action poured much oil on the stormy seas.

To quote from my article, "International Socialism as a Political Force," *

"In time of war, the Brussels Bureau has several times put a damper on hostilities by proclaiming the identity of interests between the working classes of the countries involved. Once this work can be thoroughly completed, war will end; for without the proletariat to fight, war becomes a physical impossibility. This is Anti-militarism—the thing which ranks on a par with Socialism itself in Kaiser Wilhelm's denunciation as 'an international pest.'

"From the viewpoint of royalty, the Bureau is without doubt very troublesome. At the time of the Algeciras affair, the Kaiser was summarily plucked back from what might have been a decidedly glorious and successful war with France by the stand taken at Brussels—the threat of a general strike if hostilities began—and the war talk had to be abandoned.

"Norway and Sweden effected their recent separation without bloodshed, through the intervention of Brussels, '*cette main de fer dans un gant de velours*.' And when the Czar begged men and money from his cousins of Germany and Austria to crush revolution within his borders, he ran fair into an effective, organized opposition from Brussels which immediately cooled the good offices of his confrères. The argument of the general strike proves a most effective deterrent of the war spirit of the ruling classes."

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Since these words were written, Spain has been engaged in a filibustering North African expedition, as has Italy; and the Balkan-Turkish war has been fought. In all three cases the Socialists have been busy, making war upon war. Their activities have distinctly limited the scope of hostilities, and have inhibited the far-reaching complications that, three decades ago, would have been sure to follow. Many thousands of Europeans, I believe, are to-day alive

* "Review of Reviews," May, 1908.

and whole, many thousands of families still have bread-winners, and sundry national debts are smaller than they otherwise would have been, because the Social-Democracy has peremptorily set its face against war.

As I write these lines, the United States and Mexico are involved in an imbroglio, in which many lives have already been lost. The Socialists of this country, co-operating with such Socialist sentiment as can be found in Mexico, are holding numerous protest meetings, publishing many articles, and in general exerting themselves to proclaim the real character of the struggle as one affecting only Capitalism, and are calling on the working class *not* to fight battles in the interests of the capitalist class. The National Office of the Socialist Party has issued a stirring anti-war proclamation. The *Appeal to Reason* alone, reaching more than a million readers a week, is having wide influence in pacifying working-class "jingoism"; and added to this are the admonitions of countless other Socialist papers and speakers. Any dispassionate judgment must admit that this influence is having due weight in allaying the irritation and in keeping the peace. The contrast between the war fever in 1898 and the present public apathy is marked. Socialists claim, I believe with justice, that their long years of peace propaganda have been a factor in the change of sentiment.

THE ANTI-MILITARIST PROPAGANDA

All over the world Socialists are constantly preaching against war in general and against its various phases in particular. This agitation stresses the class character of society, and informs the workers regarding two fundamentals: (1) The fact that the proletariat does the fighting and the paying, and (2) the fact that the plutocracy stays at home and reaps the "glory" and the dividends.

The anti-militarist propaganda has broken national barriers and beaten down race prejudices; it has

honeycombed and disorganized the armies and navies of even major states ; and, on the whole, has injected a new issue into the whole matter of martial activities. I understand that something like one-third of the German army is now Socialist, or in sympathy with that cause. In Europe the anti-militarist poster is a commonplace. The peace propaganda meetings of the workers are now almost matters of routine. All European capitals are to-day familiar with them. On the Butte Chaumont, in Paris, not long ago, 100,000 workers congregated to listen to this gospel, and Paris sees many such assemblages. When the recent three-year military service law was passed in France, anti-militarism flared high, numerous disorders took place and much propaganda was made.

The Berlin Socialists often turn out 200,000 or 300,000 strong in Treptow Park and elsewhere, and in perfect order listen to their orators denouncing mass-murder, i. e., war. The recent exposures of the Krupp and other scandalous activities involving machine-made, press-fomented hostilities, for the purpose of stimulating the sale of armaments, has given the anti-militarist movement a tremendous stimulus.

Spain, Austria-Hungary, Scandinavia and the lesser countries are all likewise active in their own way. Sweden, in particular, has recently rebuked the anti-Russian "jingoists" by having, as a result of free discussion of the subject, materially increased its Socialist representation in the Riksdag. The anti-militarist propaganda goes on, by "underground" means, in Russia. Even the Balkan States have felt the thrill of this new inspiration: "No War!" And in the midst of wars and rumors of wars the voice of the peacemaker is heard, arising from the proletariat.

INTENSIVE CULTIVATION

The German Socialists, most thoroughly constructive of all, work intensively among the youth of the nation, beginning with the boys and young men before the age of military service. Through the Young

Socialists' League, anti-militarism is taught while the mind is still plastic and open. This in a way offsets the Boy Scout movement—which Socialists all over the world denounce and combat as a “feeder” for militarism. While the young German is under the colors, Socialist discipline prohibits him from indulging in open propaganda; but each Socialist is instructed to make as many friends as possible.

Prison sentences for the leaders in this peace work in Germany, France, Italy and other lands seem only to stimulate them to greater activities. The Socialists are in deadly earnest. They intend to put an end to war, once and for all. Like the Irishman in the story, “they are going to have peace, even if they have to fight for it.” The 4,250,000 or more German Socialists openly affirm that if Wilhelm ever declares a war, it will be his last act as Emperor; and Wilhelm trembles to accept the gage of battle with them.

“A NEW SPIRIT” *

“There comes a change in the air to-day; a new spirit breathing over the face of the world. Europe is alive with a strange, new idealism—I mean the militant spirit of peace, which at length is going to be had at all costs, not now through ‘diplomacy,’ but through the laying down of arms by the common folk themselves.

“France is tired of war; France, the people; France, the proletariat. Mass-murder, the people declare, they will no longer tolerate. Led by Gustave Hervé, Hervé the intellectual, the orator, the dogged and incorruptible Breton, whose life has been a long checker of prison sentences on this account, millions of Frenchmen are learning to sing ‘L’Internationale’:

* From my article in “Lippincott’s,” May, 1910. Since these words were written, Tom Mann and other labor-leaders and Socialists have served prison sentences in England, as a result of their anti-militarist propaganda, and the movement is rapidly growing in that country. In America, Waldo H. Coffman and some other soldiers have been imprisoned for similar Socialist activity in the army. The Coffman case was carried by the Socialists up to President Wilson, himself, and Coffman was released. The United States army and navy to-day contain a large number of Socialists, all advocates of peace.

*"Les rois nous soulaient de fumées;
Pais entre nous, guerre aux tyrans!
Appliquons la grève aux armées,
Crosse en l'air, et rompons les rangs!"*

"Germany, too, is humming the same air. For there Karl Liebknecht and many others alternately sit in jail and mount the rostrum to proclaim: 'No War!' The Kaiser, amazed and helpless, denounces them as '*Vaterlandlose Gesellen*!' to which the anti-militarists merely reply with fresh propaganda and new platoons of recruits.

"Italy is agitated with the same question. In Russia it is permeating the army. England is beginning to feel it. The declaration of war would to-day arouse oppositions undreamed of a decade ago. Spain has recently learned what the anti-militarist agitation of the past few years can do toward crippling wars of aggression and exploitation. For the first time in her history, a foreign war against a pagan people has failed to stimulate enthusiasm—nay, on the contrary, has loosed the bonds of social order and all but over-set the throne.

"To give in detail all the specific cases of averted war, waste and bloodshed, through the intervention of the Brussels Bureau, would far exceed our limits. Let just this be said, and driven well home, that only through the now crystallizing refusal of the common people to be taxed, suffer, march, shoot and die for their masters' benefit—alias 'the flag'—will permanent world-peace ever come. This is anti-militarism!"

THE GREAT NOVEMBER, 1912, DEMONSTRATIONS

By far the most striking example of the pacifying power of Socialist objection ever given took place during the fall and early winter of 1912, when prompt Socialist action summarily put an end to the talk of a general European war.

When it became evident that the Balkan struggle might flare into conflicts between some of the greater

powers, all eager for territorial or commercial advantage, the Social-Democracy took immediate action. First came a great international series of protest demonstrations in all the principal cities of Europe. Second, an extraordinary session of the International Socialist Congress was held at Basel, for instant and drastic measures.

The protest meetings, synchronized by the Brussels Bureau, all took place on Sunday, November 17, 1912. They were held in every country of the continent, except in Russia. Stupendous masses of workers came together. The general strike and stoppage of the national food supplies and means of transportation formed the keynote of the retaliative measures to be initiated in case of a spread of the Balkan war.

This program was affirmed at vast meetings in Berlin, London, Amsterdam, Budapest, Madrid, Milan, Strasburg and Christiania, with smaller ones in many lesser cities. The calming effect upon the various monarchs and chancelleries was astonishing and instantaneous. And a greater bolt was yet to be sped from the Socialist bow.

I mean, of course, the extraordinary International Socialist Congress at Basel. Ordinarily these Congresses are held every three years, in some large capital, to discuss various matters of principle and tactics. The pressing danger of war resulted in the call for a special Congress. The United States, because of its distance, was represented merely by telegraphic communications of adherence and support from the Socialist Party in America.

The Congress was held on November 24 and 25, with 518 delegates present from practically every European state. Its purpose, as defined by the Brussels Bureau, was twofold: first, to reassert the uncompromisingly anti-militarist attitude of the International Socialist movement; and second, especially to prevent the embroilment in war of those nations hungering for Balkan and Turkish spoils.

A TREMENDOUS OUTPOURING

Some of the most prominent figures in the Socialist world attended the Congress and delivered addresses, among them the late August Bebel; Edouard Anseele, of Belgium; Jean Jaurès, long conspicuous in the French *Chambre des Députés*; Emile Vandervelde, of the Belgian Parliament; Victor Adler, Socialist leader in the Austrian Reichstag; J. Kier Hardie, from the House of Commons, and very many more.

The opening of the Congress was preceded by a great parade, in which more than 15,000 persons took part. The sessions themselves were held in the Cathedral.

At once the Congress declared itself ready to order the most drastic measures on the part of the Socialists to avoid any further extension of the Balkan imbroglio. It delivered, in fact, the ultimatum of the working class of the world.

Any detailed account of the proceedings would vastly exceed our space. Reports of anti-war demonstrations, strikes and so on were presented, grimly worded plans were formulated to stop the spread of the war, and a manifesto was drawn up. This manifesto like the speeches made very thinly veiled threats of revolution in case of war. It gave detailed instructions to the Socialists in the various countries, laying down specific courses of action to delimit the spread of hostilities, and concluded with these pregnant words:

"The Congress invites the workingmen of all countries to oppose against the might of capitalist imperialism the international solidarity of the working class. It bids the ruling classes in all countries put an end to the economic misery produced by the capitalist system, and not increase it by warlike action. It insists on the demand for peace. Governments must not forget that in the present condition of Europe and the present feeling of the workers, war will not be without disaster to themselves.

"They must remember that the Franco-German war resulted in the revolutionary movement of the Commune, that the Russo-Japanese war put into activity the revolutionary movement in Russia, and that the competitions of rival armaments have, in England, increased class conflicts, and on the continent brought about enormous strikes. It would be madness were the governments not to comprehend that the mere notion of a widespread war will call forth the anger and protest of the workers. The latter consider it a crime to shoot each other in the interest and for the profit of Capitalism, for the sake of dynastic honors and for diplomatic secret treaties.

"If the governments interrupt the . . . development of the people and thereby provoke desperate steps, they will have to take the whole responsibility. The international organization will redouble its efforts to avert such a crisis, and will keep in close touch with developments everywhere." *

THE END OF WAR

The Basel Congress is destined to go into history as a gathering which has radically changed the course of European events, and which forecasts greater developments than can be definitely grasped at this time. Never before have kings and cabinets been so swiftly and entirely checkmated by the working class. The celerity with which the gold-laced jingoes abandoned their war talk was all but ludicrous. They had learned their lesson—and swiftly.

The end of war, for all time, is now definitely in sight. The working class has at last felt its power;

* For a more complete account of the Congress, with ample quotations from the speeches and the manifesto, see my article in the *New York Sunday Call*, for Nov. 16, 1913.

Speaking of the Congress, Charles Edward Russell says: "The real power of the world had spoken, that was all. Wonderful lesson! You get a glimpse of new things possible and impending, such as were never hoped for except in dreams. One word from the International Socialist Party, and reason resumes her reign in the excited brain of every statesman in Europe. . . . This Congress voiced the final determination of millions of workers; and before that power, all other power crumpled up. The Prime Ministers and Chancellors and other gentlemen that usually live in the limelight became some absurd kind of puppets or lay figures."

and that power is steadily growing. I now express my firm belief that, through the well-formulated and coherent anti-militarism of the rapidly increasing Socialist Party all over the world, Mars has already received his deathblow.

Many competent thinkers doubt that monarchs, and capitalists behind them (as also behind all the world's so-called "republics"), will ever again be able to hurl the workers of one nation blindly against those of another for power and profit. Such wars as may yet take place will occur between nations in one or both of which the Socialist movement is still weak and undeveloped. Year by year, even day by day, the potential war theatre is narrowing. It shrinks in proportion with the spread of proletarian education along Socialistic lines; the two social factors occupy an inverse ratio to each other.

The whole puppet system of dynasties and monarchs, of strutting "heroes" and brass-buttoned "patriots" is fast becoming an absurdity, a survival, an anachronism. War will perish with it and with Capitalism. The workers will have none of any of these things. By the end of the present century they will all have become obsolete. Our great-grandchildren can hardly be made to believe that human beings ever actually killed each other in masses at the command of entrenched Capital.

The Socialists of to-day always and everywhere protest against the killing of human beings, whether that killing be gradual, as by starvation or in sweat-shops, mills and factories; whether it be sudden, as in mine explosions; whether it be legalized, as in the electric chair or on the gallows; or whether it be done on the field of battle by men in uniform who, at last analysis, have no quarrel with each other. "Thou Shalt Not Kill!" is, to them, a very real and binding imperative.

Ingersoll's tremendous "Vision of the Future," in which he foresaw "a world at peace . . . a world

where thrones have crumbled and where kings are dust," is fast becoming solid fact. And not from above is this new ideal being handed down. It is being thrust up from below, from the world's disinherited, from the till now unheard and socially unconscious millions. This New Spirit, leading on to peace, is to-day the most vital, supremely the most significant moving force at work among mankind.

A new spirit, indeed, has breathed over the face of things. Vast readjustments have already taken place, presaging others still to be, others still more revolutionary, still more magnificent in their promise of Peace on Earth, Good-will to Men. A world emancipated from the thrall of war, long only the speculation of philosophers, is growing real and tangible; for the nations, the common people of the earth, are beginning to share that dream—and "the dreams that nations dream, come true."

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.

68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, July, 1913.

69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima, August, 1913.

70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne, September, 1913.

71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot, October, 1913.

72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane, November, 1913.

73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton, December, 1913.

A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, December, 1913.

The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy, Reprinted from The Congressional Record, October 29, 1913. December, 1913.

74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried, January, 1914.

Wanted—A Final Solution of the Japanese Problem, by Hamilton Holt, January, 1914.

The South American Point of View, by Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, January, 1914.

75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas Murray Butler, February, 1914.

76. Our Relations with South America and How To Improve Them, by George H. Blakeslee, March, 1914.

77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson, April, 1914.

A Panama Primer, Reprinted from *The Independent*, March 30, 1914. April, 1914.

78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from *La Revue* of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson, May, 1914.

The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint from the New York *Times*, April 27, 1914. May, 1914.

79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne, June, 1914.

80. War and the Interests of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprint from the Atlantic *Monthly*, March, 1914. July, 1914.

81. Fiat Pax, by George Allan England, August, 1914.

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THREE MEN BEHIND THE GUNS



By

CHARLES E. JEFFERSON, D.D.

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THREE MEN BEHIND THE GUNS

CHARLES EDWARD JEFFERSON

HRISTENDOM is bristling with guns. There were never so many as to-day. There will be still more to-morrow, for the orders are already in. Day after to-morrow their number will be yet further increased, if present plans do not miscarry. The need for them is urgent.

To the man in the street this is perplexing. Repeated assurances have been given him that the cause of Peace is advancing. He has heard the good news in speeches, and read it in papers. Books written by well-informed authors have filled his ears with peals of triumph over the progress of the cause of international good-will. The evidences of progress are many. Peace organizations multiply amazingly. Arbitration treaties spring up like mushrooms on both sides of the sea. The exchange of friendly visits between representative citizens of various countries goes merrily on. The exchange of University professors has become an established feature of the educational system of the world. Never have rulers and statesmen made so many loving speeches as within the last dozen years. The nations have met in two Hague Conferences, and a third Conference is contemplated. A palace of International Justice has been erected and dedicated. Munificent foundations have been established to make the world's calling and election to Peace doubly sure. Groups of enthusiastic workers toil in season and out of season to tighten the bonds of international friendship. Nothing has so flourished within the present generation as the Cause of Peace—except the manufacture of guns. To the man in the street the millennium seems

almost at hand ; but when he turns to look for it he finds himself staring into the muzzle of a gun. Peace and guns have formed an alliance. They flourish side by side around the world. The lion and the lamb lie down together, and for the first time in history the lion is inside of the lamb. The lion is now covered with wool, and the name of this beast is "Armed Peace." Centuries ago the Scythians stuck up an old scimitar as a symbol of deity, and to this they offered the main wealth of their country. The world has advanced. The Christian Nations have set in their midst a battleship as the symbol of national glory, and around this they sing hymns of praise to the Prince of Peace. The first article in their creed is, "We believe in peace, and therefore we prepare for war." It is generally conceded that the surest evidence of sane and fervent devotion to the cause of Love is unwavering confidence in the beneficent potency of guns. When nations, therefore, sign arbitration treaties they proceed forthwith to lay in a new stock of ammunition. When a ruler delivers a speech which has in it the note of a dove, his neighbors hasten to make a new inventory of their military wardrobe. One almost dreads to see a new arbitration treaty signed, or to have the Hague Conference meet again, for hitherto every such treaty has been followed by the launching of additional battleships, and each of the Hague Conferences has sent the nations home, eager to increase the weight of their armor, and to whet their swords to a finer edge.

ARMED PEACE IS OUR PROBLEM

The problem to-day, then, is not war but Armed Peace. He who stops to declaim against war is belated. War is conceded to be hell, and by common consent is taboo. But in consecrating itself to Armed Peace, many are beginning to wonder whether mankind has not jumped out of the frying pan into the fire. At any rate the wealth

of Christendom is being consumed. A volume setting forth the cost of armies and navies reminds one of a book on astronomy. The only figures used are millions and billions. All figures, after they pass a certain limit, cease to make a definable impression on the mind. The imagination is first dazed, and then paralyzed. When one scrutinizes for an hour the tables compiled by the statisticians showing the cost of Armed Peace, the mind is stupefied and the heart benumbed. The gold is flowing in a widening stream and to squander a people's money is to squander their blood. Governments are to-day not only impoverishing the living, but hanging millstones of debt around the necks of generations yet unborn. Guns are bought with borrowed money. The house is being mortgaged that the foolery may go on. All schemes of internal improvement are curtailed and embarrassed, and every program of social betterment is handicapped or postponed. Militarism blights like a pestilential wind the higher life of nations, and eats like a gangrene into the vitals of civilization. The very sinew and bloom of humanity are going into this expanding establishment of gold braid and steel, and the end is not yet. One thing is certain, the world cannot go on indefinitely in the direction in which it is now moving. Something is going to break. "I tremble when I remember that God is just," exclaimed an American statesman when he looked out across the tragedy of slavery, and well may any man who believes that nations, as well as individuals, are in the grip of inexorable moral law, tremble when he beholds the satanic heartlessness with which the peoples of Christendom are being plundered and oppressed by the ever accumulative expenditures for the enginery of slaughter.

THE POWER OF THE MILITARIST

One is dumbfounded by the impotency of every force which has thus far been called into play for the checking

of this militaristic movement. Every sane-minded man confesses that the present policy of the great Powers is folly, wickedness, madness. Before the bar of reason, Militarism stands assuredly condemned. The economic argument against it is unanswerable, the ethical argument is irrefutable, the religious argument is conclusive to any one who knows what the religion of Jesus Christ is, and yet not all these arguments massed together have been able to check the militarists, even for a moment within the last thirty years, in their devastating and magnificent advance. "Neither fact, nor argument, nor counsel, nor philosophy, nor religion" has availed to stay the spreading plague. The optimists who supposed that guns would cease to multiply after the signing of a few arbitration treaties, and after a few Hague Conventions had been agreed to, did not know the temper or resources of the hosts with whom they have to deal. It has been commonly assumed that huge armaments are the inevitable outgrowth of present-day commercial and political conditions, the creation of a lofty patriotism, disinterested and holy. It now begins to look as though they might be rooted in other soil. The suspicion is abroad that they may possibly be the elaborate handiwork of selfishness and cunning. If they are, perchance, a modern manifestation of the ancient mystery of iniquity, then they are not likely to vanish simply because, by the perfecting of international legal machinery, the need for them has disappeared. Profitable humbuggeries do not collapse in the presence of sound reason. Vested interests do not voluntarily surrender. Inherited privileges and favors are not in the habit of signing their own death warrant. No demon has ever yet been exorcised from mankind without tearing it. The downfall of human slavery is sufficiently recent to furnish lessons which it may be profitable to ponder. When our Republic was founded, slavery was in a state of decadence. It was so out of harmony with the ideals of Democracy and the

spirit of Christianity, that many imagined it would gradually disappear. There were evidences that the years of its life were numbered. Near the end of the century a change took place. The cotton-gin was invented. Other inventions followed. Slavery became profitable. Cotton was crowned king. Slavery and cotton formed an alliance. This alliance became aggressive. It was not content that slavery should be confined within its ancient limits. It coveted new kingdoms. It pushed its way into territory consecrated to freedom. It seized upon the political machinery. It dictated national legislation. It influenced the Supreme Court. It finally tore down the flag—with what result all the world knows.

WHY MILITARISM IS MIGHTY

Thirty years ago, Militarism to most of us seemed doomed. It was considered by Americans an anachronism, a survival of barbarism. It was one of the old-world follies and burdens which we thanked God we had escaped. And then something happened. A new invention came. Others followed. By these inventions ambitions were kindled to experiment with costly machinery in playing war games on the sea. Other inventions came, and with them came feverish desires to play war games in the air. Military life took on at once new attractions. Numberless new positions were opened for men who did not like to dig and who were ashamed to beg. For many, Militarism became enormously profitable. Professional ambition and commercialism formed an alliance. The alliance became aggressive, insolent, insatiable. It early laid its hand on legislation. It began to manipulate the machinery of government. It stationed its agents at the doors of parliaments, and its servants became the counsellors of Kings. The result was a world-wide recrudescence of the military spirit, a fresh coronation of military ideals. Recent history is illuminating reading. New

areas have been invaded and captured. Our own nation was one of the first to fall. Brazil and other South American republics speedily succumbed. Australia next fell into line. In the countries of Europe the old burdens have been systematically and mercilessly increased. The word has just gone forth that the whole world must be converted into an armed camp. Mighty standing armies must cover the land. Mighty fleets of Dreadnoughts must cover the sea. Mighty fleets of airships must darken the sky. Every strategic point must be fortified. Nations are not expected to fight, but they must keep the fighting edge. The way to keep it is to whet the mind constantly on thoughts of war. The instruments of destruction must never be out of sight. National rank is determined by Naval tonnage. The foundation of National greatness is military power. This is the new gospel and it is preached with a rage of eloquence unknown since the days of the Crusades. The attack is being made all along the line. Daily papers and pictorial magazines are pressed into service. New publications are launched to set forth this advanced and better way of life. While one corps of militants organize new raids on the treasury, another corps engage in a campaign to capture the schools. There must be military drill in the colleges, and also in the High Schools. Boys must be trained to shoot.

THE WORLD AT SCHOOL

In fact the entire world is now put to school, and we are all being systematically instructed by Colonels and Commodores, Admirals and Generals, in the ways of national safety and glory. One cannot help admiring the consummate ability and skill with which the whole movement is engineered. We are a refractory and stiff-necked people. Militarism is alien to our blood. But patience and pains can accomplish much, and already

multitudes of our citizens have learned to worship before the fetish of Sea Power, and to gloat over the distinction of possessing next to the greatest navy in the world. The policy of the Big Stick, in spite of the warnings of the founders of the Republic, is slowly making its way into popular favor. A Dreadnought is now launched with the imposing solemnity of a religious ritual, and the elite of the land are invited to look on with awe-struck and rapturous hearts.

THE NEXT STEP

Has the time not arrived when merchants and farmers, bankers and scholars, professional men and artisans, should begin to ask seriously, "Whereunto is this thing going to grow?" On her recent visit to this country the Baroness von Suttner confessed she was disappointed to find that the mass of the public seemed surprisingly uninformed when the peace movement was mentioned. The fact is that the average American has given the subject scant attention. He is preoccupied and is willing to leave all questions of national defense to the experts. His mind has been confused by sophistical talk of "police force" and "national insurance," and he has never really penetrated the problem, because his way has been blocked by assumptions and fallacies, which he could easily see through if he once gave them his sustained attention. Played upon by vague tales of hypothetical invasions, he has become a fatalist, accepting the notion that huge armies and navies have got to be. Their enormous cost appals him, but he accepts it along with other bitter and unescapable things. Swollen armaments, he is forced to conclude, are a natural product of evolution. He rails at them, but submits to them. Some day perhaps, he will take time to ask himself why evolution has taken this curious and disastrous twist. He might find that it is not in our stars but in ourselves that we are

underlings, peeping about the huge legs of the militaristic giant, which like a Colossus bestrides the world. Guns are not spontaneous freaks or accidents of nature. They are the expression of an ideal ruling in certain human minds. They exist only by the deliberate thought and premeditated act of men. We have too long berated and lamented them. The next step in the Peace Movement is the disclosure of the men behind the guns.

THE FIRST MAN IN THE TRIUMVIRATE

At one time in Roman history, the Empire was under the domination of three men. The governments of Christendom have fallen into the clutches of a triumvirate, whose power must be broken before the nations can free themselves from the bondage under which they now groan.

The first man of the three is the military-naval Specialist, the expert in the science of warfare. War is more and more a fine art, and years of technical training are needed to fit a man to deal with its problems. The modern fighting machines are intricate masterpieces of human genius, and only men of high scientific attainments can make use of them. The military expert must be proficient in mechanics and mathematics, chemistry and engineering and a dozen other sciences. He must know how to calculate the curves of projectiles, the force of explosives, the resisting power of metals, and the range and destructiveness of guns. In his own province, he is undisputed master.

This has given the military specialist of a certain stripe his opportunity. He has taken advantage of his acknowledged superiority in technical knowledge, to play upon the credulity of the people. I do not speak of all military specialists, but of one type only, the man who has the ideals of Cæsar, and who is ambitious to stamp his ideals on the policies of nations, This man, not con-

tent with fulfilling the duties of his own office, has little by little usurped the functions of other servants of the government, until he has become a foremost figure in the diplomatic world. His first move is to suggest a Council of National Defense, of which he shall be the head, thus acquiring a potent influence over the expenditure of national treasure. He is made a member of numerous commissions, and is sent on important diplomatic missions, becoming one of the nation's leading representatives in the realm of international affairs. In Europe one cannot go far in any direction without coming face to face with one of these uniformed guardians of the national interests and honor. He takes an upper seat in all peace conventions, for he is a stalwart advocate of peace as well as an expert in war. Although he believes that war is the mother of all virtues, he is willing to kill her in the interests of armed peace. There is no place he likes better than membership on the Committee which determines what subjects shall be discussed at Hague conferences. Wherever international policy is in the making, he is on hand.

OUR MODERN SIR ORACLE

The distinctions showered upon him feed his self-esteem. His haughtiness increases and he grows ever more domineering. He acquires the Olympian tone. His words are oracles. He looks down upon civilians as men of lesser breed. He poses as the anointed custodian of national honor, and is the only man who knows how this honor can be safeguarded. He alone is an expert in national perils. He often knows more than he will tell. When asked to state his reason for additional battle-ships or battalions, his reply is that he cannot make his knowledge public for fear of causing fresh international complications. He becomes a High Priest of the mysteries in the temple of international life. In this way

he adds new cubits to his stature. One must cross the ocean to see this gentleman full grown. Things are yet in the green tree here.

THE LIMITATIONS OF EXPERTS

But although somewhat snobbish, he has his virtues. He is not a barbarian or a charlatan. He is a patriot and a gentleman. He has not consciously entered into a conspiracy against humanity. His misfortune is that his ideal is pagan. His education has given his mind a bias which makes him a dangerous counsellor. He is a specialist, and, like many another specialist, he is expensive and has a knack of suggesting elaborate and costly methods of treatment. He is prone to diagnose along the line of his specialty. He can see what he is looking for whether it is there or not. Prolonged application to a narrow set of phenomena has destroyed his perspective. He is apt to see everything through the bore of a gun. Brooding over battles has turned the whole earth into a battlefield. Looking for enemies he has found them on every side. Dreaming of possibilities, he has reached the astounding conclusion that every conceivable contingency must be provided for. So long as he deals with matters within the scope of his knowledge, he is a man to be relied on. The moment he attempts to deal with questions of national policy he is to be feared. Of all the servants of the government he is the last to be entrusted with the responsibilities of statesmanship. He is peculiarly unfit to say how a nation's money shall be spent. National finances are in a muddle wherever he has his way. Because he is an expert in the firing of shells, it does not follow that he knows how many shells the people are able to buy. A knowledge of the force of explosives fits no man to deal with the tangled threads of international business. Sailing a battleship is one thing, and sailing the Ship of State is another. He evi-

dently knows nothing of the value of money, or of the danger of turning the screws of taxation until the people rise in revolt. He has never once in any land during the last thirty years suggested retrenchment. His one cry is ever, "More! More! More!"

THE PEN IS MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD

This man has set himself up as an instructor of nations. He is writing for many papers. A long list of books is down to his credit. His literary fertility is amazing. No one realizes the extent of his industry till one consults the catalogues of the last twenty years. His purpose is ever the same—to extol the glory of military ideals and to show how urgent is the need for more guns.

It is here that we face one of the features of Armed Peace, too generally overlooked. In time of war the energies of army and naval officers are absorbed in the task of fighting, but the prolonged leisure of armed peace gives them opportunity to become instructors of the youth of the land. Latent energies are thus set free whose full power for mischief we are not yet able to compute. Who dare say what a great company of able writers, salaried by the government, can accomplish in shaping national character and destiny, if they spend their days and nights in writing their conjectures of the motives and intentions of neighboring nations, and vivid descriptions of the way in which suppositional invasions can be most successfully repelled. There are in Christendom over two hundred thousand commissioned officers in army and navy, eating at the government table, and when one takes into account how many of these are constantly engaged in laying before the public horrifying descriptions of imagined complications and conflicts, every description taking on the solemnity of prediction, and every prediction being followed up with a plea weighted with the authority of official knowledge, for more

guns, one cannot wonder that the world is where it is. Military and naval officers are retired from active duty in the prime of life, their ripest years being thus entirely free for the unhampered use of the pen. After the experience of the last thirty years, no one would care to dispute the old adage that the pen is mightier than the sword. By the pen, the doors of national treasuries have been forced wide open, and the stream of national revenue has been turned into a new channel. It is sometimes said that army and naval officers want to fight. This is calumny. They want to write. More things are wrought by printers' ink than bullets. The first man of the triumvirate is the literary expert in the science of war.

THE SECOND MAN OF THE TRIUMVIRATE

The second man is the Contractor, the man who makes ships and armorplate, cartridges and shells, swords and rifles, the man who supplies coal and oil for the ships, food and harness for the horses, provisions and clothing for the men, powder and ammunition for the guns, the ten thousand things which go to the upkeep of a great army and navy, and which cost hundreds of millions a year. He is a loyal comrade of the specialist. The specialist tells him what is needed, the contractor supplies it, and the government pays the bills. The contractor's job is a big one, and it pays. His prices are enormous, and government does not inquire into them too closely. Some of his guns bring a hundred thousand dollars a piece. He builds dreadnoughts at fifteen millions each. The prices go up every year. The dividends are large, and the contractor, in the generosity of his heart, allows prominent members of the aristocracy and wealthy legislators to become directors and stockholders of his company. In recent investigations in England, the most interesting fact brought to light was that a surprisingly large number of nobles and members of Parliament are

stockholders in the great armor-making plants of that country.

A BUSINESS THAT PAYS

In many lines of business, it is difficult to keep up a steady demand for the goods produced, but the military contractor suffers no such embarrassment. By keeping a large force of inventors at work he is able to bring out each year new patterns in sufficient number to coax from the government increased appropriations. It is natural that a government in constant peril of overthrow should want the very latest and deadliest of defensive weapons, and these the contractor is each year fortunately able to supply. There is no limit to the ingenuity of inventive genius, and so long as governmental gold is abundant, the stream of military and naval inventions is not likely to fail. The contractor is peculiarly fortunate in that his costliest creations soon become antiquated. Battleships which cost millions are used as targets at the end of a few years. Beginning with 1884 Great Britain in twenty years spent two and a quarter billion dollars on her navy, and in 1905 the British admiralty admitted that much of this expenditure was then represented mainly by scrap iron, one hundred and fifteen vessels being condemned as useless.

Aided by the Specialist, the Contractor publishes from time to time lists of the fighting vessels of the various nations, the comparison always bringing out the fact that his nation is in danger of losing its place in the race for naval supremacy. An open-eyed man is the contractor, and a busy one. He is everywhere. Through the rifts in the clouds which have hung recently over the far east, we have caught glimpses of him now and again, with bags of money to loan and hungry as usual for fresh contracts. His present ambition is to equip all China with guns. He is to-day undoubtedly one of the most forceful figures on the stage of the world's life.

WHY ARMED PEACE IS BETTER THAN WAR

Like the Specialist the Contractor believes in peace, and he wants it armed. Peace without armor would be to him ridiculous. Wars gigantic and terrifying loom in the near future, but he is ever optimistic, knowing that if government does not become parsimonious, he can supply the apparatus which will keep these wars indefinitely away. It has been said that the Contractor loves war. This is a slander. Armed peace is far more to his liking. War comes seldom, is full of uncertainties and is soon over; whereas armed peace goes on forever. Battleships burn as much coal and oil in peace as in war, soldiers eat as much and wear as much, and are therefore as desirable customers for a contractor. In sundry ways armed peace is more profitable than war. In war only a few shots are fired; in peace the target practice must never cease. When four hundred pounds of powder are used at one charge of a single gun, continuous target practice becomes glorious. In war a nation knows how many battleships it needs, whereas in peace nobody knows, and the number to be ordered is limited only by the gullibility of the government. In war the value of airships could be speedily determined, but in peace their value is conjectural, and hence government can be induced to go on buying them at fabulous prices. These two men, the Specialist and the Contractor, sit side by side at the door of the national treasury in every land. Professional ambition and commercial acquisitiveness make a strong team, not strong enough, however, to pull the militarist chariot along the upward way.

THE THIRD MAN OF THE TRIUMVIRATE

A third man is needed and at the call of the specialist and contractor he appears. He is the man who is scared. He is a patriot, but he is timorous. He is sensible. but

panicky. He knows all about his own business but nothing about guns. Whenever he is nudged he is ready to sign petitions for more battleships. He has been told on the highest authority that his country is in danger, and his heart is in a flutter. With a beautiful humility, he accepts whatever the experts have to say. He listens like a three years' child, and the experts have their will.

The triumvirate is now complete, and it is time to organize a military and naval league. Without the third man such a league is impossible. It is through the man who is frightened that the Specialist and Contractor work their miracles. This third man is a man of light and leading and is known to be disinterested, and hence he and his friends are much in evidence in the Leagues' literature and at all the Leagues' public meetings. But the core of the League is made up of the specialist and contractor along with their brothers and cousins and their wives' relations. The driving forces of the league are the first two members of the triumvirate. Professional ambition, commercial greed, and terror, welded together, constitute one of the most formidable alliances known to history. It is impossible to account for the phenomenal expansion of the military and naval establishments in recent years without taking into consideration the military and naval leagues. Such a league when full grown can play with a government as a cat plays with a mouse. Its methods in Europe are so effective that they are almost certain to be copied in time everywhere. The words with which it conjures are patriotism and peace. Everything it does is done to safeguard the vital interests of the country and to avert the horrors of war.

AN ADEQUATE NAVY AND ARMY

Its one and only aim is to secure an "adequate" army and navy, and of this aim every sensible man must heartily approve. The word "adequate" is peculiarly serviceable,

for nobody is able to find out what it means. When applied to an army or navy it means one larger than the one already on hand. Germany, for instance, has the mightiest of the world's armies, but the military specialists of Germany have recently admitted that their army is not adequate for Germany's needs. Great Britain's navy is the mightiest of the world's navies, but the naval Lords of Great Britain are convinced that it is far from adequate. We are forced then to conclude that there are at present no adequate armies or navies on the earth. To secure them is the avowed object of all military and naval leagues. The nations occasionally grow weary in their arduous quest, and these leagues are organized to spur them on.

THE POWER OF FEAR

The most effective spur thus far discovered is fear. Wherever one of these leagues exists the nation is in constant peril of invasion. Far-off nations hitherto friendly grow lukewarm or positively hostile, and the danger of losing valuable national possessions becomes imminent. Men rise, as if by enchantment, all over the land to warn the people of their complacency and blindness, and showers of letters fall on the desks of legislators written by voters who desire to throw light into the darkened legislative mind. Sunday newspapers and magazines blossom in gorgeous pictures of battleships, and in vivid descriptions of pressing military and naval needs. Fear is the blindest and mightiest of all passions, and nations, when dominated by it, become insane. Future generations will look back on our time as a period in which Christendom went mad. Nations were scared into insanity by the clever machinations of men who kept themselves out of sight. It is in a manufactured atmosphere of suspicion and terror that the militarist rides on to victory. In a world knit together by electric wires in which every whisper can be heard through mountains

and over seas, and in which rumor works like magic and panic runs like fire; in a world piled high with explosives and in which mischief-makers in the press and jingoes in public office are ready to egg on any enterprise however diabolical, if it only promises excitement, there is no limit to the power which can be wielded by an organization which, clothed with the garments of patriotism and working ostensibly for peace, has for its supreme end and ambition the further multiplication of guns. Through its salaried agents and still more through its uninvited and irresponsible coadjutors, it can keep a nation in a state of chronic alarm, and stampede statesmen again and again into courses of inconceivable folly. Who knows but that the time may come when the nations of Christendom may be driven in sheer self-defense to outlaw all such organizations as incorrigible fomenters of suspicion and discord, and insurmountable obstacles in the path of brotherhood and peace.

The hope of the future lies in the man who is scared. It is he who pays the taxes, and if his pulse can be calmed the world will be saved. When his eyes are once opened, and he discovers how egregiously he has been duped, his indignation will drive out his fear, and in his wrath he will grind the God of Armed Peace to powder.

Where shall we look for him? First in the United States. He is less intimidated here than anywhere else. In Germany he is apprehensive, in France he is excited, in England he is in hysterics, in America he is somewhat shaky, but not beyond the hope of speedy recovery. Once get the facts fairly before him, and we shall have reached the edge of the dawn of a new day.

THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE UNITED STATES

What the world is waiting for is a strong voice to cry a halt in armaments. The time is not ripe for disarmament, nor even for a reduction of armaments. The step

for which humanity waits is an arrest of armaments. Why should the United States not take that step? What is the use of being a great world power if we have not the strength to do a beautiful and original deed? In all dark situations the only way out is an act of heroism. In the present world crisis nothing less than magnificent and unparalleled courage will avail. When the nations are confessedly moving along a downward way, why should not the Republic of the West sound a note which will brace all forward-looking hearts everywhere? Is it a risk? Why not take it? It is not so great a risk as the risk we run in building up in our National capital a military-naval oligarchy which may some day prove our undoing. All history testifies that a Republic has no peril so insidious to fear as the growth of military power within its own borders. The military ideal and the ideal of Democracy cannot survive together. Why not adopt a naval policy which all the world can understand? Why not say in a tone audible around the world,—“We will go no further in this business! Hereafter there shall be no increased expenditures for shells and guns, but ever increasing appropriations for the warfare against poverty, disease and ignorance, and for the strengthening of those social and humanitarian agencies which will make us more and more a prosperous, happy, and mighty people.”

It is in this way that America will most surely enlighten the world.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.

68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, July, 1913.

69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima, August, 1913.

70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne, September, 1913.

71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot, October, 1913.

72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane, November, 1913.

73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton, December, 1913.

A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, December, 1913.

The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy. Reprinted from The Congressional Record, October 29, 1913. December, 1913.

74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried, January, 1914.

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77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson, April, 1914.

A Panama Primer. Reprinted from *The Independent*, March 30, 1914. April, 1914.

78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from *La Revue* of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson, May, 1914.

79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne, June, 1914.

The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint from the *New York Times*, April 27, 1914. June, 1914.

The Japanese in California, June, 1914.

80. War and the Interests of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprint from the *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1914. July, 1914.

81. Fiat Pax, by George Allan England, August, 1914.

82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D., September, 1914.

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OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS BEARING UPON THE EUROPEAN WAR

- I THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERVIA
- II THE SERVIAN REPLY
- III THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER
- IV THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK



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American Association for international Conciliation
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The Executive Committee of the Association for International Conciliation wish to arouse the interest of the American people in the progress of the movement for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations. To this end they print and circulate documents giving information as to the progress or interruption of these movements, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have readily available accurate information on these subjects. A list of publications will be found on page 124.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S APPEAL FOR IMPARTIALITY AND RESTRAINT IN DIS- CUSSING THE WAR

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself during the last troubled weeks what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say or do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what our ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinions, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such diversions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraint which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?

I

NOTE ADDRESSED TO THE SERVIAN GOVERNMENT BY THE AUSTRO- HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT ON JULY 23, 1914

On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

"Servia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers Servia undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last Autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter."

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the monarchy and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and

functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and, finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the Magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its Official Journal of the 26th June (13th July) the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—i. e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction

tion, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.

II

REPLY OF SERVIAN GOVERNMENT TO AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupshtina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighboring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighboring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial

and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromise the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavor."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupshtina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present time, at the inquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the latter inquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile toward the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above

heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

III

“THE WHITE PAPER”

Issued by the British Foreign Office on August 5, 1914

PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

COUNT BENCKENDORFF	Russian Ambassador at London.
COUNT BERCHTOLD	Austrian Foreign Minister.
SIR F. BERTIE	British Ambassador at Paris.
SIR G. BUCHANAN	British Ambassador at St. Petersburg
SIR M. DE BUNSEN	British Ambassador at Vienna.
M. CAMBON	French Ambassador to Germany.
MR. CRACKANTHORPE	First Secretary in British Diplomatic Service at Belgrade.
SIR E. GOSCHEN	British Ambassador at Berlin.
SIR EDWARD GREY	British Foreign Secretary.
PRINCE LICHNOWSKY	German Ambassador to Great Britain.
COUNT MENSENDORFF	Austrian Ambassador to Great Britain.
SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON	Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
SIR R. RODD	British Ambassador at Rome.
SIR R. RUMBOLD	Of the British Diplomatic Service.
MARQUIS DI SAN GIULIANO	Foreign Minister of Italy.
M. SAZONOF	Russian Premier.
M. SUCHOMLINOF	Russian Minister for War.
COUNT SZAPARY	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Russia.
PRINCE TROUBETZKOY	General attached to the military household of the Czar of Russia.
SIR F. VILLIERS	British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Belgium.
M. VIVIANI	Premier of France.

No. 1. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.

Sir: I asked the German Ambassador today if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be made known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 2. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 22, 1914.

Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had, therefore, considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, how-

ever, on several occasions in conversation with the Servian Minister emphasized the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted toward Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

No. 3. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

London, Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.

Sir: Count Mensdorff told me today that he would be able tomorrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia today by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me tomorrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with, a time limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time limit could always be introduced afterward; that, if the demands were made without a time limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favor of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an inquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909 Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighborhood

with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favorable recently,

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 4. Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff

(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, Vienna, July 24, 1914.)

(Translation.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:

I have the honor to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:

Already printed, see pages 5--7.

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members Generals and diplomatists, Government officials and Judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighboring monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude toward the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandizement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neighboring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that in taking this step it will find itself in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the imperial and royal representatives accredited to the other signatory powers.

You are authorized to leave a copy of this dispatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

ANNEX

The criminal inquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last, has up to the present led to the following conclusions:

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voijs Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez, by the man Milan Ciganovic and Commander Voijs Tankosic at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades, coming from the arms depot of the Servian Army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to insure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Topstider.

5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organized by Ciganovic.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic of Loznica, with the assistance of various individuals.

No. 5. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Note addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Serbia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part.

I said that if Serbia had procrastinated in replying a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless

Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably tomorrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack upon Servia by Austria would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war, if it did break out; we

should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped his Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

No. 7. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia indifferent.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 P. M. tomorrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any power.

No. 8. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that his Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

No. 9. Note Communicated by German Ambassador

London, July 24, 1914.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realize them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed toward the detachment of the southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the great powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a great power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfillment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localization of the conflict, because every interference of another power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

No. 10. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Sir: After telling M. Cambon today of the Austrian communication to Servia which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it: but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible for the four powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Servia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 11. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Servia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands in toto. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Servia; a reply favorable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

No. 12. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favorably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that his Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

No. 13. Note Communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25

(Translation.)

M. Sazonof telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:

"The Communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.

"M. Sazonof hopes that his Britannic Majesty's Government will share to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna."

No. 14. Sir Edward Grey to F. Bertie and to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the

time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris, (St. Petersburg,) you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

No. 15. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 25, 1914.

I learn from the Acting Political Director that the French Government has not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram today.* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade, of yesterday.†

* See No. 14. † See No. 12.

No. 16. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 25, 1914.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favorable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

No. 17. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of today to Paris,* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.†

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is

* See No. 14. † See No. 12.

too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, that Serbia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and withdraw their forces into the interior while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favor of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed then now rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend, who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram of the 24th July * acted on.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately

* See No. 11.

instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localized. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand and that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had, in fact, had no such knowledge.

No. 19. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Secretary General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia became menacing. In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

No. 20. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced

that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P. M. today.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl today to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

No. 21. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the Official Gazette. The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of inquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

No. 22. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I have seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

No. 23. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Minister left at 6:30.

The Government has left for Nisch, where the Skupshtina will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the Vice Consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

No. 24. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of his Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian démarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

* See No. 6.

No. 25. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilization before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed.

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilization of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia* and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but that once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favorable to this suggestion.

* This is apparently a misprint and should read "Italy."

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

No. 26. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram, which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning."

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

No. 27. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of today.* I have said

* See No. 21.

that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favorable view of it.

No. 28

(Nil.)

No. 29. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Sir:—The Italian Ambassador came to see me today. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 30. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Sir:—The Servian Minister called on the 23d instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the inquiry at Serajevo—an inquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organizing plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavor to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 31. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Rumanian, and Persian questions, being brought into the melting pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Serbia. One naturally sympathized with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Serbia. Serbia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretense of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Serbia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Serbia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy

the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

No. 33. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Emperor returns suddenly tonight, and Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on his Majesty's own initiative. They fear that his Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

No. 34. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favorable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram No. 52 of 25th July.

Under Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

No. 35. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 26, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference and will instruct Italian Ambassador tonight accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

No. 36. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold and Sir R. Rodd

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg could be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

No. 37. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Berlin telegram of 25th July.*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four powers if necessary.

* See No. 18.

No. 38. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

Rome, July 23, 1914.

Sir: I gather that the Italian Government have been made cognizant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusiones which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, &c.,

RENNELL RODD.

No. 39. Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note

(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

Already printed, see pages 8-11

No. 40. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Telegraphic.)

(Received July 27.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant, *(last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris† arrived I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being

* See No. 26. † See No. 36.

an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Telegraphic.)

(Received July 27.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of his Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

No. 42. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 27, 1914.

Your proposal as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

* Nos. 36 and 37.

No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Your telegram of 26th July.*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called

* See No. 36.

together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was no intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments..

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilizing against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution, seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of his Majesty's Government in my

conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps toward mobilization could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

* See No. 6.

No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of today,* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

* See No. 44.

No. 46. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences

that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localized, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

No. 47. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

See my telegram of today to Sir E. Goshen.*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

* See No. 37.

No. 48. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

Sir:—Count Mensdorff told me by instruction today that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending toward continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many

years endeavored to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbor, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to every one what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced, and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defense. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest, such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localizing the fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time pacify Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed

out that our fleet was to have dispersed today, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 49. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

Sir:—The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson today that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would inquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 50. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honor to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

I have, &c.,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 50.

Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial

and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who had just addressed to Servia a formal declaration, in conformity with Article I of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia.

In bringing the above notice of his Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Servia.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

No. 51. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

Paris, July 27, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honor to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I have, &c.,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 51.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.

(Translation.)

In a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim has the honor to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorized M. Paul Cambon

to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austro-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council ad interim takes the opportunity, &c.
Paris, July 27, 1914.

No. 52. Note Communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914

(Translation.)

The Government of the Republic accepts Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorized M. P. Cambon to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

No. 53. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff

(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)
(Telegraphic.)

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossi-

ble, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff

(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)

(Telegraphic.)

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914.

My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favor of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt to Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

No. 55. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

With reference to my telegram of yesterday,* I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and inquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had

* See No. 44.

expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

No. 56. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador had today a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Serbia it would be impossible to localize it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Serbia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Serbia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behavior. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Serbia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 27, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the confer-

ence, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but he believes that if Serbia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favorably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he had expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again today, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Serbia.

No. 58. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I communicated to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram * to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

* See No. 46.

No. 59. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs today of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday * to St. Petersburg.

He is grateful for the communication and quite appreciates the impossibility for his Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

* See No. 47.

No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

Secretary of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday * to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found, that while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

* See No. 43.

No. 61. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

No. 62. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in the sense of your telegram of 27th July * to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech, † which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared today, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that

* See No. 46. † "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Cols. 931, 932, 933.

must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement and which could no longer be postponed.

No. 63. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

Your telegram of 25th July to Paris.*

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

* See No. 27.

No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you:

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under Article V. and Article VI., Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Serbia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Serbia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Serbia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial

or administrative measures. Serbia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

No. 65. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

I have urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made toward a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged and two Servian merchant vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

Telegram received here that war declared by Austria.

No. 67. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.†

* See No. 43. † See No. 46.

No. 68. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

German Government having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

No. 69. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.*

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

* See No. 55.

**No. 70. Telegrams Communicated by Count Benckendorff,
July 29, 1914**

(1) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, the Imperial Government will announce tomorrow (29th) the mobilization in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2) Telegram to Count Benckendorff.

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Serbia.

No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of

general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would, in his opinion, have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided," were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me today that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram * to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached his Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Serbia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangements for averting a European war would be welcomed by his Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Serbia were attacked, Russia would not be satisfied

* See No. 46.

with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilization against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

No. 73. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I have received note verbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23d July * in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration, according to Article I of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from today in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.

* See No. 4:

No. 74. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorized accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

No. 75. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was sent for again today by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to accupon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, dispatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Serbia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I found Secretary of State very depressed today. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French

colleague said to Under Secretary of State in course of conversation that seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned today and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilizing in four southern governments.

No. 77. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I much appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of today.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

* See No. 75.

No. 78. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

Partial mobilization was ordered today.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant* to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilization which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilization, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors, either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept.

* See No. 67.

Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realized by the British public that it was not fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections, if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of 27th July,† which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers, provided it was acceptable to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant‡ was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me today. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian Consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colors, that Austria had already partially mobilized, and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crises, she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilizing shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation, it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

† See No. 57. ‡ See No. 69.

No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

There is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people, which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

In your telegram of the 27th instant* to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant† from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,† but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin tonight, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if the direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.

* See No. 46. † See No. 43.

No. 81. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday.*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favorable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

* See No. 64.

No. 82. Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 29, 1914.

I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered

this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

No. 83. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 29, 1914.

I have been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.

No. 84. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavoring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government had declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorized to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilize. The German Government had said that they were favorable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation, or discussion, or even conversations à quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor tonight. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of today* to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

* See No. 77.

No. 86. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made today by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilization. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

No. 87. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—After telling M. Cambon today how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador today that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that the public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honor and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance, France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 88. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—I told the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her

mobilization. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff, that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared today. Today the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters and give Austria time to crush Serbia. It was of course too late for all military operations against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed Berlin what I had said to him this morning,

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 89. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should under certain circumstances intervene.

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved prac-

tically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 90. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—In addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July* to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's telegram of the 28th July† and of my reply to it.‡ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found for preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

* See No. 84. † See No. 64. ‡ See No. 81.

No. 91. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—The Austrian Ambassador told me today he had ready a long memorandum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Servia toward Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Servia. The news today seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff said that the war with Servia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilizing again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandizement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 92. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—The Italian Ambassador made me today a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favored by Italy, might be removed by some change of the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

**No. 93. Telegrams Communicated by Count Benckendorff,
July 30, 1914**

(1.) Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonov

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

I spoke to Count Berchtold today in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how

desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Servian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future.

(2.) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

The German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there has been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favor of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

(3.) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébeko's telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The telegram reports the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in the steps which they may consider advisable.

No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I learn that the mobilization of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realized, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilization will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him today. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favorable spirit; if approached in a proper manner he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilization will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be con-

sulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he indorses every line of it.

No. 96. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilized, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversation, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumor that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilization. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian

vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A. M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that if Austria refuses to make a concession Russia cannot hold back, and, now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilization.

No. 98. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilization against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilized against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilized they would have to mobilize on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly

with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier, Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.

No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 30, 1914.

President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stopped her mobilization Germany would mobilize. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilization. The answer is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia, and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for his Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilization so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep his Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

No. 100. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador told me last night that he thought that Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Serbia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula

might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

No. 101. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

Your telegram of 29th July.*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for trying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

* See No. 85.

No. 102. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

I have warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.*

* See No. 98.

No. 103. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further while Powers endeavored to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would, of course, be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,* and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* See No. 97.

No. 104. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of today,* and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

* See No. 103.

No. 105. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

Sir:—M. Cambon reminded me today of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I inclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also inclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet tomorrow morning, and I would see him again tomorrow afternoon.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 105

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon

London, Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador:—From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 105

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey

(Translation.)

French Embassy, London, Nov. 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward:—You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22d November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. If those measures involved action the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 105

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon

(Translation.)

The German Army had its advance posts on our frontiers yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilometers from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilization, whereas we have not called out a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done it. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

Paris, July 31 [sic.], 1914.

No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

I learned from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that did not imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favor of continuing an exchange of views with his Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

No. 107. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

I do not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London, asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. Today, in reply to an inquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

*See No. 84.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

No. 108. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenseless while time was being utilized by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, today perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I read to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

*See No. 101.

No. 110. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna

between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilizing eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show good will in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learned that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia.

No. 111. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Serbia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

According to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian Army and Fleet are being mobilized. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr" will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed. Mobilization would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr" signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilization.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

No. 114. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I still trust situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French Government). It is important to have an early answer.

No. 115. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

No. 116. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I have received your telegram of yesterday's date.*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

*See No. 99.

No. 117. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilization of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilized.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilization of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and inquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminate. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs tomorrow (Saturday) at 1 P. M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilization of the Russian forces having taken place.

No. 118. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I am informed by Count Forgach, Under Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilization, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilization was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilize, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognize such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Serbia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Serbia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counseled Serbia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

No. 119. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

Sir:—M. Cambon referred today to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would

intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France it would decide the German attitude in favor of peace. I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that if France and Germany became involved in war we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet today that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 120. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram

of 30th July* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.† He trusted it would meet with your approval:

Translation.—“If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude.”

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilization which was already to progress.

M. Sazonof said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favorable and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

* See No. 103. † See No. 97.

No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Your telegram of 31st July.*

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically toward your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of today; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in south as well.

* See No. III.

He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favorable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continued discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.

No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.*

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency tomorrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me today the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

* See No. 114.

No. 123. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Sir:—I told the German Ambassador today that the reply* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it,

* See No. 122.

it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 124. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

On the receipt at 8:30 tonight of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10:30 tonight at the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the inquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilization of her army if Russia do not demobilize at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by his Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

* See No. 114.

No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

My immediately preceding telegram.*

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to your inquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has

* See No. 124.

been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs today.

No. 126. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

I have had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilization in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilization and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilize if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

No. 127. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, Aug. 1, 1914.

General mobilization of army and fleet.

No. 128. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 1, 1914.

Belgian neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday* have been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of

* See No. 115.

the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

No. 129. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914.

The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways, which are leased to the Empire.

No. 130. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

No. 131. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension.

His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

No. 132. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Following telegram from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff of the 31st July communicated to me today:

Translation.—“(Urgent.) Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: ‘If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.’”

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

No. 133. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

M. De Etter came today to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:

“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declares the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.”

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

No. 134. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

President of the republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilization had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilization; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilization, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilization will become necessary in self-defense, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the

French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilometers so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilizations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

No. 135. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that, though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of Russia, they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favorably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military countermeasures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government.

No. 136. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

Minister of War informed Military Attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3:40 for a general mobilization of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand," the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he said, being tantamount to mobilization, is mobilization under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of ten kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes.

No. 137. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

I saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandizement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the Sanjak.

Count Mensdorff called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold, and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburg had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

Your telegram of today.*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany.

* See No. 131.

She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, Aug. 1, 1914.

My telegram of 31st July.*

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonof had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation toward a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Serbian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonof informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former

*See No. 120.

was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavors he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilization, and the mobilization of Germany had created a desperate situation.

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,* had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilized on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

*See No. 120.

No. 140. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

The Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom. which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavors to commit no provocative act.

No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, Aug. 1, 1914.

I am to be received tomorrow by Minister of Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilize within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilize if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that mobilization is too expensive to be kept for long. Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilization of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension

between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again today to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably colored his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs today on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

No. 142. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Telegraphic)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the navy and army, the first day of mobilization to be 2d August.

No. 143. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

Detention of British merchant ship at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August* acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

* See No. 130.

No. 144. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 2, 1914.

Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

No. 145. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 2, 1914.

My telegram of Aug. 1.*

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favor to his Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

* See No. 143.

No. 146. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 2, 1914.

The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 2.)

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914.

I have the honor to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts:

On Sunday, the 2d August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly toward the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armored trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of his Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

No. 148. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 2, 1914.

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations

against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany tomorrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament tomorrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

No. 149. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 2, 1914.

Your telegram of 1st August.*

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship *Sappho* at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August, † I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships cover also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

* See No. 143. † See No. 130.

No. 150. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Telegraphic.)

(Received August 3.)

Berlin, Aug. 3, 1914.

Your telegram of 2d August.*

Detention of British ships at Hamburg.

No information available.

* See No. 149.

No. 151. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 3, 1914.

French Government have offered through their Military Attaché the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been received today:

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take."

No. 152. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 3, 1914.

Sir:—On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied:

"The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral."

In making this communication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 153. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

No. 154. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received Aug. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.

German Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

No. 155. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

No. 156. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

I continue to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky

(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

Please dispell any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively

formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

No. 158. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.

Military Attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

No. 159. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning* be received here by 12 o'clock tonight. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

* See No. 153.

IV

GERMANY'S "WHITE BOOK"

Given out by the German Foreign Office on Monday, August 3

MEMORANDUM AND DOCUMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

Denkschrift und Aktenstücke zum Kriegausbruch

On June 28 last the successor to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by the revolver shots of a member of a Servian band of conspirators. An investigation of the crime by Austro-Hungarian officials has revealed that the plot to take the life of the Archduke was planned and promoted in Belgrade with the co-operation of official Servian individuals and was carried out with weapons from the Servian Government depot.

This crime was bound to open the eyes of the whole civilized world, not only with regard to the object of Servian politics as relating to the existence and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also with regard to the criminal means that the Pan-Servian propaganda did not hesitate to employ in order to attain these ends. The ultimate object of these policies was to revolutionize gradually and finally to bring about a separation of the southwestern region of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy from that empire and unite it with Servia.

The repeated and formal declarations of Servia to Austria-Hungary to bring about good neighborly relations did not change this trend of Servian politics in the least. For the third time in the course of the last six years Servia has brought Europe to the verge of a world war in this manner. She could only do this because she believed herself supported by Russia in her endeavors.

As a result of the developments of the year 1908 growing out of the Turkish revolution, Russian policies had begun to organize a league of the Balkan States directed against the existence of Turkey, under Russian patronage. This alliance of the Balkan States which was successful in crowding Turkey out of her European possessions in 1911, came to grief over the question of the disposition of the spoils. Russian policy was not, however, frightened by this failure. It was the idea of Russian statesmen that there should be formed a new Balkan League under Russian patronage, whose activities should be directed this time not against Turkey, which had been driven from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The idea was that Servia

should cede to Bulgaria the section of Macedonia that she had won in the last Balkan war and offset the loss by the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the expense of the Monarchy of the Danube. For this purpose Bulgaria, by her isolation, was to be made pliable, Rumania, as the result of a propaganda undertaken with the aid of France, was to be chained to Russia, and Servia was to be referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duty as an ally. However, recognizing the vital interests of Austria-Hungary which were at stake, we could neither advise our ally to a compliance that would have been inconsistent with her dignity, nor could we deny her our support in this great hour of need. We were all the more unable to do this inasmuch as our interests also were seriously threatened as a result of the continuous Servian agitation. If Servia, with the help of Russia and France, had been allowed to imperil the existence of the neighboring monarchy any longer, this would lead to the gradual downfall of Austria and would result in submission to Slavic sway under the Russian sceptre, thus making the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe untenable. A morally weakened Austria breaking down as the result of the advance of Russian Pan-Slavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could count and upon whom we could rely, such as we need in view of the attitude of our eastern and western neighbors, which has constantly grown more threatening. We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand in her action against Servia. We have taken no part in the preparations.

Austria chose the way, laying before the Servian Government in detail the immediate relation between the murder and the general Servian movement, not only tolerated by the Servian Government, but supported by it, which an investigation of the murder at Serajevo had established. At the same time Servia was asked by Austria to put an absolute end to these activities and to allow Austria to punish the guilty parties. Austria demanded as a guarantee for the carrying out of the proceedings participation in the investigation on Servian territory and the definite dissolution of the various Pan-Servian societies carrying on an agitation against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government set a time limit of forty-eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of her terms. One day after the Austro-Hungarian note had been handed to it the Servian Government began mobilization. When, after the expiration of the time limit, the Servian Government made a reply which, while satisfying the demands of Austria-Hungary on certain points, made known emphatically with regard to the essential ones its intention to refuse the just demands of the monarchy by means of temporizing and the introduction of new

negotiations, Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia without having recourse to further negotiations or allowing herself to be put off by Servian assurances, the value of which she knows well enough—to her sorrow.

From that moment Austria was actually in a state of war with Serbia, which was publicly proclaimed by means of the official declaration of war on the 28th of the month.

From the very beginning of the conflict we took the stand that this was an affair of Austria which she alone would have to bring to a decision with Serbia. We have therefore devoted our entire efforts to localizing the war and to convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary was compelled to take justified defensive methods and appeal to arms. We took the stand emphatically that no civilized nation had the right in this struggle against lack of culture [Unkultur] and criminal political morality to prevent Austria from acting and to take away the just punishment from Serbia. We instructed our representatives abroad in that sense.

At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government informed the Russian Government that her (Austria's) move against Serbia was entirely a defensive measure designed to put a stop to Servian agitation, but that Austria-Hungary was compelled by necessity to demand guarantees of a continued friendly attitude on the part of Serbia toward the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Austria-Hungary, the note to Russia stated, had no intention of bringing about a disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans. Both the French and the English Governments, replying to our explanation that the German Government wished and was trying to localize the conflict, promised to work in the same interest. In the meantime these efforts did not succeed in preventing Russia's interference in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

The Russian Government issued an official communiqué on July 24, according to which it would be impossible for Russia to remain indifferent in the Servian-Austrian conflict. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sazonof, made this position known to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtales. On the afternoon of July 26 the Austro-Hungarian Government again explained through its Ambassador in St. Petersburg that Austria-Hungary had no plans of conquest, but only wished to have peace at last on her frontiers. In the course of the same day the first reports of Russian mobilization reached Berlin. On the evening of the 26th the Imperial Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were directed to call the attention of the English, French, and Russian Governments energetically to the danger of this Russian mobilization. After Austria-Hungary had officially declared to Russia that she did not seek the acquisition of any territory in Serbia, the decision for world peace lay entirely in St. Petersburg. The same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was directed to make the following statement to the Russian Government:

The military preparatory measures of Russia will compel us to take counter-action which must consist in the mobilization of the army. Mobilization, however, indicates war. Inasmuch as we know France's obligations toward Russia, this mobilization would be directed simultaneously against Russia and France.

We cannot assume that Russia wishes to let loose such a European war. Inasmuch as Austria-Hungary will not impair the continuance of the Servian Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can adopt a policy of waiting. We shall be all the more able to support Russia's wish not to allow the integrity of the Servian Kingdom to be called into question, since Austria does not call this integrity into question herself. It will be easy to find a basis of agreement in the further course of the affair.

On July 27 the Russian Minister for War, Suchomlinof, gave the German Military Attaché his word of honor that no mobilization order had as yet been issued. He said that for the present preparatory measures were being taken, no horses being levied and no reservists being called in. In case Austria-Hungary were to cross the Servian boundary, the military districts facing Austria, those of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, would be mobilized. Under no circumstances would there be a mobilization of the districts lying on the German front: St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. In answer to the Military Attaché's question as to what was the object of mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian War Minister shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. Thereupon the Military Attaché indicated that measures to mobilize against Austria-Hungary were also decidedly threatening to Germany. In the following days reports concerning the Russian mobilization followed each other in quick succession. Among these were reports concerning preparations on the German border, such as the declaration of a state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. On July 27 the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived. The Fourteenth Corps discontinued its manœuvres and returned to garrison duty.

In the meantime we continued to exert our most energetic influence on the Cabinets to insure the localization of the conflict.

On the 26th Sir Edward Grey had suggested that the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia be laid before a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy, with himself presiding over the sessions. To this suggestion we replied that, while we approved his tender, we could not take part in such a conference because we could not call upon Austria to appear before a European court in her controversy with Servia.

France agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, but it was finally brought to naught because Austria, as was to be expected, held herself aloof.

True to our conviction that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair, but would have to take into consideration only the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our efforts to bring about an understanding between these two powers. We were also willing, after declining the conference idea, to transmit a further proposal by Sir Edward Grey to Vienna, in which he urged that Austria-Hungary either agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations. The Austro-Hungarian Government, in full appreciation of our mediatory activity, replied to this proposal that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, it was too late.

In spite of this we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy. Unluckily, all of these mediatory acts were soon overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France. On July 29 the Russian Government officially announced in Berlin that it had mobilized four army districts. At the same time additional reports reached us of rapidly progressing military preparations by France on land and sea. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning which he reported as follows by telegraph:

The Minister tried to persuade me to agree in behalf of my Government to a conversation of four parties to devise means of moving Austria-Hungary to give up those demands touching on the sovereignty of Servia. While I agreed to a complete transmission of the conversation, I took the stand that, since Russia had decided on the ominous step of mobilization, it was difficult for me to exchange any opinions on this subject, and it almost seemed impossible to do so. I said that what Russia now demanded of us in respect to Austria-Hungary was the same thing of which Austria-Hungary was accused regarding Servia—a usurpation of the rights of sovereignty; that Austria-Hungary had promised to be considerate of Russian interests by declaring her territorial disinterestedness, a great concession on the part of a nation waging war. For this reason, I said, an opportunity should be given the Dual Monarchy to settle her dispute with Servia alone. There would be time enough to come back to the subject of safeguarding Servian sovereignty when peace terms were to be concluded.

I added very earnestly that at the present moment the Austro-Servian affair was secondary to the danger of a European conflagration, and I made every effort to show the Minister the greatness of this danger.

It was impossible to change Sazonof's mind on the point that Russia could not desert Servia now.

Similarly the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg reported by telegraph on the 29th as follows, regarding an interview with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army:

The Chief of the General Staff asked me to call and informed me that he had just come from His Majesty. He stated that he had been instructed by the Minister for War to assure me again that everything had remained the same as it had been explained to me by the Minister two days ago. He offered me a written confirmation and gave me his word of honor in the most formal manner that mobilization had begun nowhere, that is to say, not a single man or horse had been levied up to that hour, three o'clock in the afternoon. He stated that he could not answer for the future, but he could declare most emphatically that no mobilization was desired by His Majesty in the districts touching

on our boundary. However, many reports have reached here and also Warsaw and Vilna of the levying of reservists in various parts of the empire. I therefore told the General that I was confronted with a riddle as the result of his announcements to me. On his word as an officer he repeated, however, that such reports were untrue; that a false alarm may have been raised here and there.

In view of the positive, numerous reports before me of actual levying, I am compelled to consider the conversation as an attempt to mislead us with regard to the extent of the measures that have already been taken.

Inasmuch as the Russian Government, in reply to the several inquiries regarding the reasons for its threatening attitude, several times alluded to the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had not yet begun any conversations in St. Petersburg, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, at our request, was directed on July 29 to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof. Count Szapary was authorized to make known to the Russian Minister the contents of the note to Servia which had been, as it were, overtaken by the declaration of war, and to receive any suggestions that might still come from the Russian side, as well as to discuss with Sazonof all questions touching directly on the Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we continued to work without cessation for mediation, and supported every suggestion in Vienna which we believed showed hope of the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As late as the 30th we transmitted an English proposal to Vienna which established this basis of negotiation, that Austria-Hungary, after succeeding in marching into Servia, should dictate her terms there. We had to assume that Russia would accept this basis.

While these efforts of ours for mediation, supported by English diplomacy, were being continued with increasing urgency in the time from July 29 to the 31st, there constantly came new and increasing reports concerning Russian mobilization measures. The assembling of troops on the East Prussian border and the declaration of a state of war in all important places on the Russian western boundary no longer left any doubt of the fact that Russian mobilization was actively going on against us, while at the same time all such measures were denied anew on word of honor to our representative at St. Petersburg. Even before the reply to the last English-German mediation proposal, the basis of which must have been known in St. Petersburg, could reach Berlin from Vienna, Russia ordered a general mobilization. On the same day an exchange of telegrams took place between his Majesty the Kaiser and King and Czar Nicholas in which his Majesty called the Czar's attention to the threatening character of the Russian mobilization and to the continuance of his own activity as mediator.

On July 31 the Czar directed the following telegram to his Majesty:

I thank you from my heart for your mediation, which permits a gleam of hope that everything can yet be settled peaceably. It is a technical impossibility for us to halt our military preparations which became necessary through Austria's mobilization. We are

far from desirous of war. So long as the negotiations continue with Austria concerning Servia, my troops will not undertake any challenging action. I solemnly pledge you my word as to that. I am trusting in the grace of God with all my might and hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe. Your sincerely devoted

NICHOLAS.

To this his Majesty the Kaiser replied:

Upon your appeal to my friendship and your plea for my help, I have undertaken a mediatory action between your Government and the Austro-Hungarian Government. While this negotiation was under way your troops were mobilized against Austria-Hungary, which is allied with me, as a consequence of which my mediation was almost made illusory, as I have already informed you. Notwithstanding this, I continued it. Now I am in receipt of reliable reports of serious preparations for war on my eastern boundary also. Responsibility for the safety of my empire compels me to take counter defensive measures. I have carried my efforts for the maintenance of world peace to the utmost limit. It is not I that bear the responsibility for the calamity that now threatens the entire civilized world. Yet at this moment it lies in your power to stave it off. No one threatens the honor and might of Russia, which might have awaited the result of my mediation. The friendship for you and your empire which was bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed has always been sacred to me, and I have been faithful to Russia when she was hard pressed, especially in her last war. It is still possible for you to maintain the peace of Europe if Russia will decide to put a stop to the military measures that threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Even before this telegram reached its destination the mobilization of the entire Russian fighting force, which had been ordered in the forenoon of the same day, openly directed against us, was in full swing. The Czar's telegram, however, was sent at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

After the mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was ordered on the afternoon of July 31 to advise the Russian Government that Germany had declared a state of war as a counter move to the mobilization of the Russian Army and Navy, which would have to be followed by mobilization unless Russia ceased her military preparations against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and so advise Germany.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador at Paris was directed to request an explanation from the French Government within eighteen hours as to whether, in the case of a Russo-German war, France would remain neutral.

The Russian Government destroyed the painstaking mediatory work of the European State Chancelleries, shortly before its successful outcome, by her mobilization, which endangered the safety of the German Empire.

The mobilization measures, concerning the seriousness of which to the Russian Government no doubt was allowed to arise from the beginning, together with her continued denial, show clearly that Russia desired the war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered the message that had been given to him for Mr. Sazonof on July 31 at midnight.

After the expiration of the time limit set for Russia without the receipt of an answer to our inquiry, his Majesty the Emperor and King ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and the Imperial Navy at 5 P. M. on Aug. 1. In the meantime the imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to hand a declaration of war to the Russian Government in case no favorable reply was issued before the expiration of the time limit. However, before a report regarding the execution of this order arrived, Russian troops crossed our border and advanced on German territory, namely, as early as the afternoon of Aug. 1.

By this move Russia began the war against us.

In the meantime the Imperial Ambassador at Paris put the question that he had been ordered to present before the French Cabinet at 7 P. M. on July 31.

To this the French Prime Minister made an ambiguous and unsatisfactory reply at 1 o'clock in the afternoon of Aug. 1. This does not give a clear picture of the French position, since it was limited to the statement that France would do what her interests seemed to warrant. A few hours later, at 5 in the afternoon, the complete mobilization of the entire French Army and Navy was ordered.

On the morning of the following day France opened hostilities.

Concluded on Aug. 2, noon.

The Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia

From the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 25, 1914.

Berlin, July 24.

The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade at 6 o'clock last night handed to the Servian Government a verbal note with the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government. In the note the answer is requested by 6 P. M., July 25. It reads as follows:

Already printed, see pages 5-7.

The Fremdenblatt writes, among other things, as follows: "The crime of Serajevo has revealed to the whole world the dangers that threaten us, and has directed our attention to the pressing need of insuring quiet and safety to ourselves at any cost. The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade today made known to the Servian Government the demands which we must make to it today. It is the result of long, careful consideration and does not go any further than absolutely necessary. We must insist on the demands as they stand; for this is a matter of underground passages extending from Serbia directly to the heart of our South Slavic territories. Conditions that we cannot allow to continue have made themselves apparent on the threshold of our house as a result of the encroachment

of the Pan-Servian idea. Servia has covered herself with a network of societies which, with the pretext of fostering culture, preach the doctrine of hatred of us throughout the country. Emissaries are sent out to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia to incite the populace to revolt and to picture to them an imminent union of those territories with the Servian Kingdom. The Servian Government, in spite of its emphatic declaration, has done nothing to stop this movement; its tolerance has had the effect of silent consent. Anything that has been done has been done only for appearances. There are many persons of high military rank, or professors or teachers in the service of the State, who are among the leaders of these societies. If one group hopes to attain its end by means of pacts and war, the others express their conviction that a terroristic and revolutionary stage must precede the diplomatic and military action. The event of Serajevo has demonstrated that this plan of campaign is being waged against us with terrible emphasis. It has been proved that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife was carried out with the support of officials of the kingdom. We have to deal with an irreconcilable, bitterly hostile movement, which shows itself in most varied forms, but which, in its entirety, keeps our border populace in a state of excitement, shatters the confidence of the various races in our monarchy as to our ability to maintain peace with the outside world, and is the main point for the beginning of all efforts against us, and causes much precious blood to flow on our territories. The results of this agitation have frequently been felt in our economic life. Thousands of careers have been blasted as a result of the alarming crises following the constantly recurring Pan-Servian scare. Were we to endure all this without stepping in to take decided action against it, the same agitators who continually, for the sake of rhetorical effect, accuse us of the misuse of power, would call this a sign of weakness, lack of will, and fear. They would state that we do not dare to defend ourselves, and in that way they would find new supporters and would feel encouraged to a doubly strong attack. While we are making our will felt, we are bringing the Servian people themselves to a realization of their position. They will see that they have been deceived, that the movement for a greater Servia will break against an iron wall, that the monarchy is determined to spurn them. The feeling that we have to deal with a condition that has become unbearable, that a stop must be put to it, is so strong among our people that complaints concerning the long delay in dealing with the situation are getting louder. This impatience and criticism can be understood. But the Austro-Hungarian Government did not wish to act in anger, not without the most careful testing of every circumstance, not without making absolutely certain what demands must be made. Servia has been allowed a brief time in which to comply with our demands. We do not wish to lengthen the period of the crisis that weighs down our economic life and is making all Europe uneasy. We want to adjust an untenable relation as quickly as possible, convince public opinion in Servia of our determination, and finally come to a settlement. We hope that Servia will bow to the desires that we have expressed within the time set. There is no more reason to doubt our determined will to maintain our position under all circumstances than to doubt our sincere wish that better relations may be developed in the future between Servia and Austria-Hungary."

VIENNA, July 24.—The newspapers declare that the note to Serbia is the beginning of a defense and is not an attack, that it shows the strong will of the monarchy, but demands nothing from Serbia except what should have been done long ago for the maintenance of its respect before Europe. The entire press expresses the hope that Serbia, by prompt acceptance of Austria-Hungary's terms, will remove the suspicion of partnership with the murderers, and that she will be far-sighted enough to choose peace and not war.

Austria-Hungary and the Servian Note

From the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 29, 1914.

VIENNA, July 27.—The note of the Royal Servian Government of July 25, 1914, reads as follows:

The Royal Government has received the notification of the Austro-Hungarian Government of the 10th inst., and is convinced that its answer will remove every misunderstanding that threatens to disturb the pleasant neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Servian Kingdom.

The Royal Government is certain that in dealing with the great neighboring monarchy those protests have under no pretext been renewed which formerly were made both in Skupshtina and in explanations and negotiations of responsible representatives of the State and which, through the declaration of the Servian Government of March 18, 1909, were settled; furthermore, that since that time none of the various successive Governments of the kingdom, nor any of its officers, has made an attempt to change the political and legal conditions set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Royal Government is certain that the Austro-Hungarian Government has made no representations of any kind along this line except in the case of a textbook concerning which the Austro-Hungarian Government received an entirely satisfactory reply. Serbia, during the Balkan crisis, gave evidence in numerous cases of her pacific and temperate policies, and it will be thanks to Serbia alone and the sacrifices that she alone made in the interest of European peace if that peace continue.

On this the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy comments:

The Royal Servian Government limits itself to the statement that since it made the declaration of March 18, 1909, no effort has been made by the Servian Government or its officers to alter the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby it consciously and willfully evades the grounds on which we base our course, since we did not make the claim that it and its officials had undertaken anything of an official nature along this line.

Our grievance rather is this, that it failed to suppress movements directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy in spite of the pledges made in the note in question.

Its pledge consisted of this, that the entire trend of its policies was to be changed and pleasant, neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy brought about; not merely to refrain from officially taking up the question of Bosnia's belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Servian note thereupon continues:

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for utterances of a private character such as newspaper articles and the peaceful work of societies, utterances which are quite ordinary in almost all countries and which are not generally under State control, especially since the Royal Government, in the solution of a great number of questions that came up between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, showed much consideration as a result of which most of these questions were settled in the best interests of the progress of the two neighboring countries.

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

The contention of the Royal Servian Government that utterances of the press and the activities of societies have a private character and are not under the control of the State is contrary to the practice of modern States, even under the freest interpretation of the rights of the press and societies, which are of public legal character and both subject to State supervision. Moreover, Servian practice is to exercise such control. The charge against the Servian Government is that it has entirely failed to inspect its press and societies whose acts hostile to Austria-Hungary were known to it.

The Servian note continues:

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised to hear the contention that Servian subjects had taken part in the preparations for the murder committed in Serajevo. It had hoped to be invited to co-operate in the investigations following this crime and was prepared, in order to prove the entire correctness of its acts, to proceed against all persons concerning whom it had received information.

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

This contention is incorrect. The Servian Government had been carefully advised as to certain definite persons who were suspected, and it was not only in the position but bound by its internal laws to begin an action spontaneously. It did nothing at all along these lines.

Servia's note continues:

In conformity with the wish of the Austro-Hungarian Government, the Royal Government is prepared to turn over to the court, regardless of station or rank, any Servian subject concerning whose participation in the crime at Serajevo proofs may be given to it. The Government pledges itself especially to publish on the first page of the official organ of July 26 the following declaration:

"The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda that may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all efforts designed ultimately to sever territory from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the sad consequences of these criminal machinations."

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

Our demand read as follows: "The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda that is directed against Austria-Hungary * * * ." The change made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us infers that such a propaganda against Austria-Hungary does not exist or that it is unknown to the Royal Government. This formula is not sincere, and conceals something in order that the Servian Government later may reserve an avenue of escape, saying that in its declaration it did not disavow the existence of the present propaganda, and did not recognize it as inimical to the monarchy, whereupon it could mislead further to the contention that it would not be pledged to suppress a propaganda like the present one.

Servia's note continues:

The Royal Government regrets that, in accordance with advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries are taking an active part in the present propaganda and that they have thereby jeopardized the pleasant neighborly relations to the maintenance of which the Royal Government was formally pledged by the declaration of March 31, 1909.

The Government (what follows here is similar to the text demanded).

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

The formal declaration demanded by us was as follows: "The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries * * * took part in * * * ." Also in this choice of words and in the additional clause "in accordance with advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government," it is shown that the Servian Government is carrying out the object indicated above—to allow itself free rein in the future.

Servia's note continues:

The Royal Government further pledges itself:

1. To introduce a provision in the press law on the occasion of the next regular session of the Skupshtina, according to which instigations to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as any publication directed in general against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary, shall be punished severely.

The Government pledges itself, on the occasion of the coming revision of the Constitution, to add to Article XXII, a clause permitting the confiscation of publications, the confiscation of which, under the present Article XXII of the Constitution, would be impossible.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

We had demanded:

"1. The suppression of all publications that arouse people to hatred and contempt for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and whose tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy."

We thus wished to obligate Servia to take measures for having such attacks

in the press cease in future; we wished, therefore, to be sure that we had won certain success in this direction.

Instead, Serbia offers to make certain laws that may lead to the above result, to wit:

(a) A law by which the individuals may be punished for above-mentioned statements of the press hostile to the monarchy. This is nothing to us, especially, as it is well known that the punishment of individuals for press misdemeanors is possible only in very rare cases, and, under a correspondingly lax handling of such a law, even these few would not be punished. Thus this is a suggestion which in no wise answers our demand, and therefore does not offer us the slightest guarantee of the result desired by us.

(b) An addition to Article XXII of the Constitution to the effect that confiscation be allowed—a suggestion that likewise must fail to satisfy us, since the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us. What would be of use would be the promise of the Government to enforce it, which promise is not made to us.

Therefore these suggestions are thoroughly unsatisfactory, all the more so as they are of an evasive nature, since we are not told within what space of time these laws will be enacted, and since if the enactment of the laws should be refused by the Skupshtina—to say nothing of the possible resignation of the Government—all would remain as it was.

Servia's note continues:

2. The Government possesses no proof—and the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government provides it with none—that the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and other similar associations have up to the present committed any criminal acts through any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Austro-Hungarian Government and dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society, as well as all societies that may work against Austria-Hungary.

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government:

The anti-monarchical propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and the associations affiliated with it fills all public life in Serbia; it is therefore a quite unreliable statement on the part of the Servian Government to maintain that it knows nothing about this society.

To say nothing of the fact that the demand made by us is not entirely granted, since we furthermore demanded:

That the means of propaganda of these associations should be confiscated.

That the reorganization of the dissolved associations under other names and in other forms should be prevented.

Concerning these two points the Belgrade Government preserves complete silence, so that we have no assurance, in the partial agreement given us, that an end will be put to the anti-Austrian associations, especially of the "Narodna Odbrana," by their dissolution.

Servia's note continues:

3. The Royal Servian Government agrees to eliminate forthwith from public education in Serbia everything that might help the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, provided that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives it actual proof of this propaganda.

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government:

Upon this point also the Servian Government demands proof that, in the public instruction courses of Serbia, there is an anti-Austrian propaganda,

although it must be aware that the books employed in the Servian schools contain such matter, and that a great part of the Servian teachers are in the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated associations.

Moreover, in this case also, the Servian Government has not met a part of our demands, since, in its text, it left out this addition desired by us, "as well as the body of teachers and the means of teaching are concerned"—an addition which clearly shows where the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian schools is to be sought.

Servia's note continues:

4. The Royal Government is also ready to discharge from military and civil service such officers—provided it is proved against them by legal investigation—who have implicated themselves in acts directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; the Government expects that, for the purpose of instituting proceedings, the Austro-Hungarian Government will impart the names of these officers and employes and the acts of which they are accused.

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government:

In view of the fact that the Royal Servian Government makes the discharge of the officers and employes in question from military and civil service dependent on whether they are found guilty after trial, its accession to our demand is limited to those cases where such persons have committed acts laying them open to legal penalties. Since, however, we demand the elimination of those officers and employes who are making an anti-Austrian propaganda, which in Servia is not usually punishable by law, it would seem that in this case also our demands have not been met.

Servia's note continues:

5. The Royal Servian Government must confess that it is not quite clear as to the sense and scope of the desire of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the effect that the royal Servian Government bind itself to allow the co-operation within its territory of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government, but it nevertheless declares itself willing to permit such co-operation as might be in conformity with international law and criminal procedure, as well as with friendly neighborly relations.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

International law has as little to do with this question as criminal procedure. The question is purely one of national policing, to be solved by special agreement. Servia's statement is, therefore, incomprehensible and, on account of its vague form, would give rise to insurmountable difficulties if an endeavor were made to arrange the agreement.

Servia's note continues:

6. The Royal Government naturally holds itself bound to institute an investigation against all such persons as were concerned in the plot of June 15-28, or are supposed to have been concerned in it, and are on Servian soil. As to the co-operation of special delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government in this investigation, the Servian Government cannot accept such

co-operation, since this would be a violation of the laws and criminal procedure. However, in individual cases, information as to the progress of the investigation might be given the Austro-Hungarian delegates.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

Our demand was perfectly clear and not to be misunderstood. We wished:

(1) The institution of a legal investigation against those implicated in the plot.

(2) That Austro-Hungarian representatives should take part in the investigation, ("recherche," in contradistinction to "enquête judiciaire.")

(3) We did not desire that Austro-Hungarian representatives take part in the Servian legal proceedings; all we wished them to do was to co-operate in the police preliminaries, and help get together and corroborate the evidence for the investigation. If the Servian Government misunderstands us it does so purposely, since the difference between "enquête judiciaire" and the simple "recherches" must certainly be plain to it. Since it wished to be free of all control in the proceedings to be instituted, which, if properly conducted, would have results highly undesirable for it, and as it has no loophole for plausibly declining our co-operation in the police proceedings (analogous cases for such police intervention exist in great number) it has taken a ground that gives to its refusal the appearance of right and to our demand the stamp of impossibility.

The Servian note continues:

7. On the very evening on which your note arrived the Royal Government caused the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic. But, regarding Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and who was employed until June 15 (as candidate) in the Department of Railroads, it has not been possible to arrest this man up to now, for which reason a warrant has been issued against him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested, in order that the investigation may be made as soon as possible, to make known in the specified form what grounds of suspicion exist, and the proofs of guilt collected at the investigation in Serajevo.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

This answer is insincere. Ciganovic, according to our investigation, went on a furlough three days after the crime, when it became known that he was concerned in the plot, and repaired to Ribari in the service of the Prefect of Police of Belgrade. So that it is incorrect to say that, between June 15 and 28, Ciganovic was already out of the Servian service. To this must be added that the Prefect of Police of Belgrade, who himself had brought about the departure of Ciganovic, and who knew where the latter was, declared in an interview that there was no man of the name of Milan Ciganovic in Belgrade.

The Servian note continues:

8. The Servian Government will increase the severity and scope of its measures against the smuggling of arms and explosives.

It goes without saying that it will at once start an investigation and mete out severe punishment to the frontier officials of the Sabac-Loznica line who failed in their duty and allowed those responsible for the crime to cross the frontier.

9. The Royal Government is willing to give explanations of the statements made in interviews by its officials in Serbia and foreign countries after the crime, and, which, according to the Austro-Hungarian Government, were anti-Austrian, as soon as the said Government indicates where these statements were made and provides proofs that such statements were actually made by the said officials. The Royal Government will itself take steps to collect the necessary proofs and means of transmission for this purpose.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government: *

The Royal Servian Government must have perfectly good knowledge of these interviews. If it requires that the Austro-Hungarian Government provide all sorts of details about these interviews and demands a regular investigation, it shows that it has no desire really to accede to this demand.

The Servian note continues:

10. The Royal Government will, in so far as this has not already occurred in this note, inform the Austro-Hungarian Government of the taking of the measures concerning the foregoing matters, as soon as such measures have been ordered and carried out.

The Royal Servian Government is of the opinion that it is mutually advantageous not to hinder the settlement of this question, and therefore, in case the Austro-Hungarian Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, it is ready as always to accept a peaceful solution, either by referring the decision of this question to the international tribunal at The Hague or by leaving it to the great powers who co-operated in the preparation of the explanation given by the Servian Government on the 18th-31st March, 1909.

Annex 1 A. From the Austro-Hungarian Material

VIENNA, July 27.—The "dossier" mentioned in the Austro-Hungarian circular note to the foreign Embassies concerning the Servian dispute is made public today.

In this memorial, attention is called to the fact that the movement originating in Serbia, which has as an object to tear away the southern portions of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy and unite them to Serbia, strikes far back into the past. This propaganda, always the same in purpose, changing only in means and intensity, reached its climax at the time of the annexation crisis, and came out openly at that time with its aims. While, on the one side, the entire Servian press preached for war against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, associations were formed—to say nothing of other means of propaganda—which prepared such warfare, among which the Narodna Odbrana was the most important. Originating in a revolutionary committee, this association became entirely dependent on the Servian Foreign Office, under the direction of statesmen and officers, among them Gen. Jankovic and former Minister Ivanovic. Among the

founders are also Major Oja Tankovic and Milan Pribicevic. This association had as an object the formation and equipment of bodies of volunteers for the coming war against Austria-Hungary. In addition to the memorial, a quotation is given from the association's official organ, which bears the same name, Narodna Odbrana, and is issued at the association's headquarters, wherein, in several articles, the activities and aim of this society are set forth. Therein it is stated that part of the main task of the Narodna Odbrana is to effect union between its brothers far and near on the other side of the border, and with all the rest of our friends in the world.

Austria is mentioned as the first and greatest enemy. Just as the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of war with Austria, it also preaches a holy truth about our national situation. The closing chapter contains an appeal to the Government and people of Serbia to prepare in every way for the struggle which the annexation foreshadowed.

The memorial tells of the Narodna Odbrana's activities at that time, as set forth in a statement of a komitadji raised by the association; it maintained a school under the direction of two of its principal members, of whom one was Tankovic, for the instruction of bands of men—schools which Gen. Jankovic and Capt. Milan Pribicevic inspected regularly. Furthermore, the komitadjis were instructed in shooting, bomb-throwing, laying of mines, blowing up of railway bridges, &c. After the solemn declaration of the Servian Government in 1909 it looked as if the end of this organization also had come. But expectations in this direction have not only not been fulfilled, but the propaganda was continued by the Servian press. The memorial adduces as an instance of this how the attack on the Bosnian local chief, Varesanin, was utilized in the public prints, which extolled the man responsible for it as a national hero and glorified his deed. These sheets were not only circulated in Serbia, but were smuggled into Austria-Hungary along well-organized secret channels.

Under the same leadership as when it was founded, the Narodna Odbrana recently became the centre of an agitation to which the Schütz-enbund, including 762 associations, a Sokolbund, with 3,500 members, and various other societies belonged.

Appearing in the disguise of a culture association, concerned only with the intellectual and physical development of the population of Serbia as well as with its material strengthening, the Narodna Odbrana betrays its genuine reorganized programme in the above-mentioned quotations from its official organ, in which "the holy truth" is preached—that it is an inevitable necessity to carry on this fight of extermination against Austria, the first and greatest enemy, with rifle and cannon, and to prepare the people in every way for the struggle to liberate the oppressed territories where many millions of enslaved brothers are suffering. The appeals quoted in the memorial, and addresses of a like character, cast a light on the manifold foreign activities of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated societies, which consist of lecture tours and taking part in celebrations of Bosnian societies, at which members for the above-mentioned Servian union are openly recruited. At present an investigation is being made of the fact that the Sokol societies of Serbia intended to unite with similar societies in Austria-Hungary in a union kept secret up to now. Men of trust and missionaries stirred up adults and unthinking youths. Thus

Milan Pribicevic persuaded former Honved officers and a lieutenant of gendarmes to leave army service in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy under serious circumstances. In the schools where teachers are educated an agitation of wide scope was developed. The wished for fight against the Austro-Hungarian empire was also prepared militarily to the point that Servian emissaries were commissioned to destroy means of transportation, etc., and to kindle revolts and panics, in case of the outbreak of hostilities. All this is told in a special inclosure.

The memorial tells further of the connection between this activity of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated organizations with the attempts against Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, in July, 1912; with the attempt of Dojcic in Agram in 1913 against Skerlec, and the unsuccessful attempt of Schäfer on May 20 in the Agram Theatre. It then takes up the connection with the attack on the Crown Prince and his wife, and how even children in school are poisoned with thoughts of the Narodna Odbrana, and how the conspirators, with the aid of Pribicevic and Dacic, secured the weapons for the attack. Here special stress is laid on the part played by Major Tankosic, who delivered the weapons for the murder, as also on that of a certain Ciganovic, a former comitadji, now employed on the Servian railways at Belgrade, who as early as 1909 figured as a graduate of the school for instructing bands of men maintained by the Narodna Odbrana of that time. Furthermore, it is told how bombs and arms were secretly smuggled into Bosnia, which leaves no doubt that this is a well-prepared and often utilized road for the secret aims of the Narodna.

One inclosure contains a quotation from the minutes of the court-martial in Serajevo concerning the investigation of the attack on the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife. According to this, Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic, and Papovic appear as having confessed that they, in company with the fugitive Mehmedbasic, organized a plot for the murder of the Archduke and that they kept watch on him for this purpose. Cabrinovic is said to have confessed that he threw the bomb and that Gabrilo Princip carried out the attempt with the Browning pistol. Both men acknowledged that in doing the deed they premeditated murder. The other parts of the inclosure contain further statements of the guilty parties before the Judge conducting the investigation as to the origin of the plot and whence the bombs came. These were manufactured for military purposes and, judging from the way they were originally packed, came from the Servian arsenal at Kragujewac. Finally, the inclosure gives information as to the transportation of the three conspirators and their arms from Servia to Bosnia. From further testimony of witnesses it appears that a subject of Austria-Hungary wished to give information to the Austro-Hungarian Consulate at Belgrade that he suspected a plan existed for an attempt on the life of the Archduke during his stay in Bosnia. It is alleged that this man was prevented from lodging this information by Belgrade police officials, who arrested him on some empty pretext just as he was entering the Consulate. It is furthermore stated that the testimony of witnesses shows that the said police officials had knowledge of the attempt planned. Since these statements have not yet been investigated no opinion can be formed for the present as to their validity. In the inclosure with the memorial it is stated: Before the reception hall of the Servian Ministry of War there are four allegorical pictures of

which three are representations of Servian victories, while the fourth shows the realization of Serbia's hostile dreams against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Over a landscape that is partly mountains (Bosnia), partly plains (Southern Hungary), the Zora, the morning light of Servian hopes, is dawning. In the foreground stands the armed figure of a woman, on whose shield are the names of the "provinces yet to be freed"—Bosnia, Herzegovina, Wojwodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c.

Annex 1 B. The Chancellor of the German Empire to the Imperial Ambassadors in Paris, London, St. Petersburg

Berlin, July 23, 1914.

The statements of the Austro-Hungarian Government as to the conditions under which the attempt on the life of the Austrian Crown Prince and his wife occurred make clear the aims of the Pan-Servian propaganda, and the means which it employs to accomplish its ends. Also, in view of the facts brought forward, there is no longer any doubt that Belgrade must be looked upon as the centre of action of the efforts to tear away the southern Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and effect their union with the Servian Kingdom, and that these efforts develop there with the connivance, at least, of officials of the Government and army.

The Servian machinations go back many years. Servian Chauvinism showed itself in an especially marked form during the Bosnian crisis. That there was no conflict as a result of Serbia's provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary at this time was due to the moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intervention of the great powers. The assurances of future good behavior which the Servian Government then gave have not been kept. Under the very eyes, or, at least, with the silent consent, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has continually grown in scope and intensity; the latest crime, the threads which lead to Belgrade, must be placed to its account. It has become unmistakably apparent that it is incompatible both with the dignity and the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy that it should continue to look on inactively at the plotting across the border, which continually jeopardizes the integrity of its territory. Considering the conditions, the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot but be looked upon as justified. Nevertheless, the attitude adopted recently both by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia does not preclude the apprehension that the Servian Government will refuse to comply with these demands, and that she is allowing herself to be led into an attitude of provocation toward Austria-Hungary. Unless the Austro-Hungarian Government wishes definitely to give up all claim to its position as a great power there is nothing for it to do but back up its demands on the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by recourse to military measures, in which case the choice of means must be left to it.

I ask your Excellency to express yourself in the above terms to the representative of (Mr. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (Mr. Sazonof) and to

lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned. We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure.

I shall await with interest a telegraphic report from you as to the result of your interview.

Annex 2. The Imperial Chancellor to the Confederated Governments of Germany

July 23, 1914.

Confidential!

Kindly make the following announcement to the Government to which you are accredited:

In view of the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Government has made known in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the plot to which the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince and his wife were victims was hatched in Servia, with the connivance, at least, of officials of the Servian Government. It is a product of the Pan-Servian efforts which, during a number of years, have become a source of lasting disquietude for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for all Europe.

Pan-Servian Chauvinism showed itself in an especially marked form during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-control and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intervention of the great powers was it due that the provocation which Austria-Hungary suffered at this time from Servia did not lead to war. The assurances of future good behavior which the Servian Government gave have not been kept by it. Under the very eyes, or at least with the silent consent, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has continually grown in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with the dignity nor the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy if the latter continued to look inactively upon the plotting across the border, through which the safety and integrity of its territory is menaced. In view of the conditions, the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government must be looked upon as justified.

The answer of the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government made on the 23d of the month through its representative in Belgrade makes clear that those at the head of Servian affairs are not inclined to give up the policy hitherto adopted by them, nor their activity as agitators. Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish to give up forever its position as a great power, has nothing left to it but to back up its demands with strong pressure, and, if necessary, by the adoption of military measures.

Certain elements in Russia consider it a natural right and the duty of Russia energetically to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary. In fact, the *Novoe Vremya* considers itself justified in making Germany responsible for the European conflagration that might result from such a move by Russia, if it does not compel Austria-Hungary

to back down. Here the Russian press takes a wrong view. It was not Austria-Hungary that brought on the conflict with Servia, but Servia, which by unscrupulous favoring of Pan-Servian aspirations even in parts of Austria-Hungary's territory, has jeopardized the very existence of the latter, and created conditions which finally found expression in the dastardly crime of Serajevo. If Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it. But she must bear clearly in mind that in so doing she makes Servia's aspirations to undermine the conditions necessary for the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, identical with her own, and that she alone must bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize. This responsibility of Russia is perfectly apparent and is all the heavier since Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that there is no intention of acquiring Servian territory, nor of threatening the continued existence of the Servian Kingdom, but that all that is desired is to obtain permanent relief from Servian machinations that threaten Austria's existence.

The attitude of the Imperial German Government in this matter is clearly outlined. The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs against Austria-Hungary has, as its principal aim, the dissolution or weakening of the Triple Alliance by means of the destruction of the Danube Empire, and, as a result, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our closest interests, therefore, summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty to save Europe if possible from a general war demands also that we support the efforts to localize the trouble in accordance with the policy which we have successfully followed for the last forty-four years in the interests of the preservation of the peace in Europe. But if, contrary to hope, the trouble should spread owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire. We shall draw our sword only if obliged to do so, and we shall do it then in the firm conviction that we bear no responsibility for the calamity which a war must needs bring to the nations of Europe.

Annex 3. Telegram from the Imperial German Ambassador in Vienna to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 24, 1914.

Count Berchtold today summoned the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Servia. After going over the historical developments of the last few years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy did not wish to appear against Servia in the rôle of a conqueror. He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure against Servian machinations, that Austria-Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly behavior of Servia toward the monarchy, that she had no intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans. The Chargé d'Affaires, who as yet had no instructions from St. Petersburg,

took the explanations of the Minister ad referendum adding that he would immediately transmit them to Sasanow.

Annex 4. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 24, 1914.

I have just availed myself of the contents of Decree 592 in a long talk with Sasanow. The Minister made wild complaints against Austria-Hungary, and was much excited. What he said most definitely was this: that Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned.

Annex 5. The Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor—Telegram

July 26, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had a long interview today with Sasanow. Both, as they told me afterward, received a satisfying impression. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary was planning no conquests and simply wished to secure quiet at last on her boundaries visibly calmed the Minister.

Annex 6. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 25, 1914.

Report for his Majesty from Gen. von Chelius. Today the drilling of the troops in the Krasnoe camp was suddenly interrupted and the regiments are to return at once to their garrison posts. The manœuvres have been given up. The military pupils were promoted to officers today instead of in the Autumn. Great excitement reigns in general headquarters as to Austria's proceedings. I have the idea that all preparations have been made for mobilization against Austria.

Annex 7. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 26, 1914.

The Military Attaché requests the transmission of the following report to the General Staff:

I consider it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kieff and Odessa. It is doubtful whether this is the case at Warsaw and Moscow, and elsewhere it has probably not been ordered.

Annex 8. Telegram of the Head of the Imperial German Consulate in Kovno to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 27, 1914.

State of war declared in Kovno.

Annex 9. Telegram of the Imperial German Envoy in Berne to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 27, 1914.

Have learned reliably that Fourteenth French Corps stopped manoeuvres.

Annex 10. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London

Important!

July 26, 1914.

Austria-Hungary has declared officially and solemnly in St. Petersburg that she contemplates no acquisition of territory in Servia, and that she will not endanger the continuance of the kingdom, but wishes only to secure quiet. According to reports reaching here, Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists immediately, which would be equivalent to mobilization against us. If this news is corroborated, we shall be forced against our will to take measures to meet it. Today our efforts are still directed toward localizing the trouble and maintaining the peace in Europe. For this reason we ask that the strongest possible pressure be brought to bear in St. Petersburg for achieving this end.

Annex 10 A. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris

July 26, 1914.

After Austria-Hungary officially declared to Russia that she contemplated no acquisition of territory and would not tamper with the continuance of the Servian kingdom, the decision of the question as to whether there is to be a European war lies with Russia alone, who has to bear the full responsibility. We trust that France, with whom we know we are agreed in the desire to maintain the peace in Europe, will use her influence in St. Petersburg in a quieting manner.

Annex 10 B. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg

July 26, 1914.

After Austria formally declared that she was not interested in acquiring territory, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace in Europe through Russian intervention lies with Russia alone. We still

trust that Russia will take no steps that may seriously endanger European peace.

Annex 11. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 27, 1914.

Military Attaché reports concerning talk with Minister of War:

Said Sasanow had asked him to explain the situation to me. The Minister of War then gave me his word of honor that as yet no mobilization order had gone forth, that for the time being merely preparatory measures were being taken, but that not one reservist had been summoned nor a single horse requisitioned. He said that if Austria should cross the Servian frontier, the military districts in the direction of Austria—Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan—would be mobilized, that those on the German front—Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg—would not be under any circumstances. He said that peace with Germany was earnestly desired. To my inquiry as to the purpose of the mobilization against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred me to diplomatic channels. I told the Minister that we appreciated the friendly attitude toward ourselves but would look upon the mobilization against Austria alone as very menacing.

Annex 12. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London

July 27, 1914.

Nothing is known here as yet as to a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey to hold a four-sided conference in London. It is impossible for us to bring our ally before a European court in its difference with Servia. Our mediatory activity must confine itself to the danger of a Russian-Austrian conflict.

Annex 13. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London

July 25, 1914.

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct. We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the Powers from intervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that Russia will refrain from any active intervention, conscious of her responsibility and of the

seriousness of the situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are ready, with the reservation of our known duties as allies, to co-operate with the other great Powers in mediation between Russia and Austria.

Annex 14. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg

July 28, 1914.

We are endeavoring continually to cause Vienna to make clear in St. Petersburg the purpose and scope of the Austrian action regarding Servia in an indisputable and, it is to be hoped, satisfying manner to Russia. The declaration of war made in the meantime makes no difference in this connection.

Annex 15. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London

July 27, 1914.

We have started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna immediately, in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey. Moreover, we have communicated to Count Berchtold the wish of Mr. Sasanow for a direct talk with Vienna.

Annex 16. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in Vienna to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 28, 1914.

Count Berchtold requests me to express to your Excellency his deep gratitude for communicating to him the English mediation plan. He remarks, however, concerning it, that, after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the declaration of war made in the meantime, he must look upon England's step as belated.

Annex 17. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris

July 29, 1914.

Reports to us of French preparations for war increase from hour to hour. I request that you talk on this matter with the French Government and make it clear to them that such measures would lead to precautionary measures on our part. We should be obliged to proclaim the danger of war, and even if this should not mean calling in reserves and mobilization, it would, nevertheless, increase the tension. We still hoped uninterruptedly for the maintenance of peace.

Annex 18. Telegram of the German Military Envoy in St. Petersburg to His Majesty the Kaiser

July 30, 1914.

Yesterday Prince Troubetzki told me, after he had caused your Majesty's telegram to Emperor Nicholas to be delivered at once: "God be praised that a telegram from your Emperor has come." He told me a little while ago that the telegram had made a deep impression on the Emperor, but since mobilization against Austria had already been ordered, and Sasonow had doubtless convinced his Majesty that it was no longer possible to recede, his Majesty unfortunately could do nothing to alter matters. I then said to him that the responsibility for the unmeasurable consequences lay on the early mobilization against Austria-Hungary, who was involved after all in a purely local war with Serbia, that Germany's answer thereto was just and that the responsibility lay with Russia, as it had ignored Austria-Hungary's declaration that she contemplated no acquisition of territory from Serbia. I said that Austria-Hungary had mobilized against Serbia, not against Russia, and that there was no cause for Russia to plunge into the question. I added that in Germany we were unable after the frightful crime of Serajevo any longer to understand Russia's words to the effect that "we cannot leave our brothers in Serbia in the lurch." I told him in conclusion that he must not be surprised if Germany's forces were mobilized.

Annex 19. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Rome

July 31, 1914.

We negotiated continually with a view to reconciliation between Russia and Austria-Hungary, both through direct exchange of telegrams from his Majesty the Kaiser to his Majesty the Czar, as well as in our relations with Sir Edward Grey. But all our efforts are made much more difficult, if not impossible of realization, by Russia's mobilization. In spite of calming assurances, Russia, according to all reports that reach us, is taking such far-reaching steps against us also that the situation becomes constantly more threatened.

Annex 20. I. His Majesty to the Czar

July 28, 10:45 P. M.

With the greatest disquietude I hear of the impression which Austria-Hungary's action against Serbia is making in your empire. The unscrupulous agitation which has gone on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Francis Ferdinand was the victim.

The spirit which allowed the Servians to murder their own King and his wife still rules in that land. Undoubtedly you will agree with me that we two, you and I as well as all sovereigns, have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for this terrible murder shall suffer deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook how difficult it is for you and your Government to resist the tide of popular opinion. Remembering the heartfelt friendship which has bound us closely for a long time, I am therefore exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia. I earnestly hope that you will help me in my efforts to set aside all obstacles that may yet arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin.

(Signed) WILHELM.

Annex 21. II. The Czar to His Majesty

Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1 P. M.

I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak nation; the indignation at this, which I fully share, is immense in Russia. I foresee that soon I can no longer withstand the pressure that is being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be forced to adopt measures which will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as a European war I ask you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all that is possible to you to prevent your ally from going too far.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

Annex 22. III. His Majesty to the Czar

I have received your telegram and share your wish for the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless—as I said to you in my first telegram—I cannot consider Austria-Hungary's action "disgraceful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Serbia's promises, when they are merely on paper, are quite unreliable. According to my opinion, Austria-Hungary's action is to be looked upon as an attempt to secure full guarantees that Serbia's promises shall also be turned into deeds. I am confirmed in this view by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary contemplates no acquisition of territory at the expense of Serbia. I think, therefore, that it is quite possible for Russia to remain in the rôle of a spectator toward the Austrian-Servian war, without dragging Europe into the most terrible war that it has ever seen. I think that a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna is possible and desirable, an understanding which—as I already telegraphed you—my Government is endeavoring to help with all its power. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which Austria-Hungary might take as

threatening, would hasten a calamity that we both wish to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator, which I have willingly assumed after your appeal to my friendship and help.

(Signed) WILHELM.

Annex 23. IV. His Majesty to the Czar

July 30, 1 A. M.

My Ambassador has been instructed to call your Government's attention to the dangers and serious consequences of mobilization; I said the same thing to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary mobilized only against Serbia, and at that she mobilized only a part of her army. If Russia, as appears from what you and your Government say, is mobilizing against Austria-Hungary, the position of mediator, which you intrusted to me in a friendly manner and which I accepted at your urgent request, is jeopardized if not rendered untenable. The whole weight of the decision now rests on your shoulders; they must bear the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed) WILHELM.

Annex 23 A. The Czar to His Majesty

Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1:20 P. M.

I thank you from my heart for your prompt answer. I am sending Tatisheff this evening with instructions. The military measures now being taken were decided upon five days ago for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any way your position as mediator, which I highly esteem. We need your strong pressure on Austria in order that an understanding may be brought about with us.

NICHOLAS.

Annex 24. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg

July 31, 1914.

In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also. By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the safeguarding of the empire, to announce that danger of war threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization, however, must follow unless Russia ceases within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and Austria-Hungary and gives us definite assurance thereof. Kindly communicate this at once to Mr. Sazonof and wire hour of its communication to him.

Annex 25. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris

Important!

July 31, 1914.

In spite of our still pending mediatory action, and although we ourselves have adopted no steps toward mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, which means mobilization against us also. Thereupon we declared the existence of a threatening danger of war, which must be followed by mobilization, unless Russia within twelve hours ceases all warlike steps against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably means war. Kindly ask the French Government whether it will remain neutral in a Russian-German war. Answer must come within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour that inquiry is made. Act with the greatest possible dispatch.

Annex 26. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg

Important!

Aug. 1, 1914.

In case the Russian Government gives no satisfactory answer to our demand, will Your Excellency, at 5 o'clock this afternoon (Central European time), kindly hand to it the following declaration:

The Imperial Government has endeavored from the beginning of the crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution. In accordance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in co-operation with England, applied himself to the accomplishment of a mediating rôle toward the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the outcome, proceeded to mobilize her entire land and naval forces.

Following this threatening measure, occasioned by no military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself confronted by a serious and imminent peril. If the Imperial Government had failed to meet this peril, it would have jeopardized the safety and even the existence of Germany. Consequently, the German Government was obliged to address the Government of the Emperor of all the Russias and insist upon the cessation of all these military measures. Russia having refused to accede to this demand, and having manifested by this refusal that her acts were directed against Germany, I have the honor, by order of my Government, to make known to Your Excellency the following:

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the Empire, takes up the defiance, and considers himself in a state of war against Russia.

I urgently ask that you wire the hour of arrival of these instructions, and of their carrying out, according to Russian time.

Kindly ask for your passports and hand over protection and business to the American Embassy.

**Annex 27. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris
to the Imperial German Chancellor**

Aug. 1, 1:05 P. M.

To my repeated inquiry as to whether France, in case of a German-Russian war, would remain neutral, the Premier declared that France would do that which might be required of her by her interests.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.

68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, July, 1913.

69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima, August, 1913.

70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne, September, 1913.

71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot, October, 1913.

72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane, November, 1913.

73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton, December, 1913.

A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, December, 1913.

The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy. Reprinted from The Congressional Record, October 29, 1913. December, 1913.

74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried, January, 1914.

Wanted—A Final Solution of the Japanese Problem, by Hamilton Holt, January, 1914.

The South American Point of View, by Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, January, 1914.

75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas Murray Butler, February, 1914.

76. Our Relations with South America and How To Improve Them, by George H. Blakeslee, March, 1914.

77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson, April, 1914.

A Panama Primer. Reprinted from *The Independent*, March 30, 1914. April, 1914.

78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from *La Revue* of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson, May, 1914.

79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne, June, 1914.

The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint from the *New York Times*, April 27, 1914. June, 1914. The Japanese in California, June, 1914.

80. War and the Interests of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprint from the *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1914. July, 1914.

81. Fiat Pax, by George Allan England, August, 1914.

82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D., September, 1914.

Special Bulletin. The Changing Attitude toward War as reflected in the American Press. September, 1914.

83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Reprinted Through the Courtesy of the *New York Times*, October, 1914.

Up to the limit of the editions printed, any one of the above will be sent post-paid upon receipt of a request addressed to the Secretary of the American Association for International Conciliation, Postoffice Sub-station 84, New York, N. Y.

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ADDITIONAL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS BEARING UPON THE EUROPEAN WAR

- I SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO REICHSTAG,
AUGUST 4, 1914
- II SPEECH OF THE PRIME MINISTER TO HOUSE OF COMMONS
AUGUST 6, 1914
- III THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK
- IV THE ORIGINAL TEXTS OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE OF JULY
23, 1914, AND THE SERBIAN REPLY OF JULY 25, 1914,
WITH ANNOTATIONS



NOVEMBER, 1914, No. 84

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City

The Executive Committee of the Association for International Conciliation wish to arouse the interest of the American people in the progress of the movement for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations. To this end they print and circulate documents giving information as to the progress or interruption of these movements, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have readily available accurate information on these subjects. A list of publications will be found on pages 58 and 59.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S APPEAL FOR IMPARTIALITY AND RESTRAINT IN DIS- CUSSING THE WAR

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself during the last troubled weeks what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say or do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what our ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinions, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such diversions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraint which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?

WOODROW WILSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 18, 1914.

I

SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR BEFORE THE GERMAN DIET, AUGUST 4, 1914

For 44 years since the time we fought for and won the German Empire and our position in the world, we have lived in peace and have protected the peace of Europe. In peaceable labor we have become strong and powerful, thereby arousing the envy of others. Patiently did we bear it when enmity was raised against us in the East and the West and fetters were forged for us, because Germany was said to wish for war. The wind then sown now has brought forth a harvest of Whitewind. We wished to continue our peaceful labors and like a secret vow the feeling ran from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier: Our sword shall only fly from its scabbard in defense of a just cause!

The day has now come when we must draw it, against our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavors.

Russia has set fire to the building.

We are at war with Russia and France, a war forced upon us.

Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during the pressure of these last days filled with hurried events, is before you. Allow me to accentuate those facts which characterize our actions.

From the first moment of the Austro-Servian conflict it was our opinion and aim that this conflict be limited to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All cabinets, especially England, took the same point of view, only Russia asserted that it had to take a hand in the settling of this matter.

The danger of a European crisis arose.

As soon as the first definite information about military preparations in Russia reached us, we informed St. Petersburg in a friendly but pressing manner that military measures against Austria would find us on the side of our ally and that military preparations against ourselves would oblige us to take countermeasures. But mobilization would be close to actual war.

Russia formally assured us of her desire for peace and declared that she was making no military preparations against us.

In the meantime, England, warmly assisted by us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

On the 28th of July, the Emperor, by telegram, asked the Czar to consider that Austria-Hungary had the duty and the right to defend herself against the pan-Serb agitation which undermined her existence. The Emperor called the Czar's attention to the fact that the interests of all monarchs must be identical in face of the murder of Serajevo. He asked him to personally assist him and to smooth over the divergence between Vienna and St. Petersburg. About the same time and before receipt of this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor to help him and to induce Vienna to moderate her demands.

The Emperor accepted the rôle of a mediator.

But scarcely had the action begun, according to his orders, when

Russia mobilized all her forces directed against Austria, while Austria-Hungary only had mobilized those of her corps which were directed against Servia. To the north she only had mobilized two of her corps, far from the Russian frontier.

The Emperor immediately informed the Czar that this mobilization of the Russian forces against Austria rendered the rôle of a mediator, which he had accepted upon the Czar's request, difficult, if not impossible.

Still we continued to mediate in Vienna, a mediation which in its form went as far as would appear permissible, even for an ally.

During this time Russia of her own accord renewed her assurances that she was making no military preparations against us.

The 31st of July has come. The decision is to fall in Vienna. We have already learned, thanks to our representations, that Vienna again has started the direct conversation with St. Petersburg which had already suffered an interruption. But before the final decision is taken in Vienna, the news arrives that Russia has mobilized her *entire* army and navy, *therefore also against us!* The Russian Government, who knew from our repeated statements what mobilization on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of this mobilization nor did it even vouchsafe any explanation. Only in the afternoon of July 31st, a telegram of the Czar to the Emperor arrived in which he guaranteed that his army would take no provocative attitude towards us. But the mobilization on our frontiers was in full swing since the night from the 30th to the 31st of July.

While we are mediating in Vienna in compliance with Russia's request, the Russian host arises all along our extended and open frontier, and France, though not mobilizing, must admit that she makes military preparations.

We had ourselves, up to then, not called in a single man for the sake of the peace of Europe. Were we now to patiently wait until the nations between which our country is situated, selected the moment for their attack? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on the 31st of July, we demanded demobilization from Russia as the only means to still preserve the peace of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg was besides instructed to inform the Russian Government that in case our demand meeting with a refusal, we would have to consider the state of war as existent.

The Imperial Ambassador followed these instructions. *What Russia answered to our demand of demobilization, we have not learnt up to this day.* Telegraphic reports on this question have not reached us even though the wire still transmitted much less important information.

Therefore, the time limit having long since expired, the Emperor saw himself obliged to mobilize our forces on the first of August, at 5 p. m.

At the same time we needed a positive assurance about the position France would take. Our direct question if she would remain neutral in a Russo-German war, was answered by her reply that she would do what her interests demanded. That was a subterfuge, if not a refusal.

In spite of this, the Emperor gave the order to absolutely respect the French frontier. This order was strictly obeyed, with one single exception. France, who mobilized at the same time as we did, assured us that she would respect a zone of 10 kilometers on her frontier. What was the outcome? Aviators throwing bombs, cavalry patrols and infantry detachments in the territory of the Empire!

Though war had not been declared, France thereby had broken the peace and had de facto attacked us.

Concerning the one exception on our side which I mentioned, the Chief of the General Staff reports as follows:

Only one of the French reclamations about crossing of the frontier from our side is justified. Against express orders, a patrol of the 14th army corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2nd. They seem to have been shot and killed, only one man having returned. But long before this isolated instance of crossing occurred, French aviators had thrown bombs on our railway tracks far into Southern Germany, French troops had attacked our frontier guard on the "Schlucht Pass." Our troops have obeyed orders and merely defended themselves. So far the report of the General Staff.

Gentlemen, we are now acting in self-defense. Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have possibly already entered on Belgian soil.

Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law.

The French Government has notified Brussels that it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as the adversary respected it. But we know that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French invasion in our flank and the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The injustice—I speak openly—the injustice we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his All, can only consider the one and best way to strike.

Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary.—As for England's attitude, the statements made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday, show the English point of view. We have informed the English Government that, as long as England remains neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France and that we will not touch the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. These assurances I now repeat before the world and I may add that, as long as England remains neutral we would also be willing, upon reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures against French commercial shipping.

Gentlemen, thus far the facts. I repeat the words of the Emperor: With a clear conscience we enter the lists. We fight for the fruits of our peaceful labors, for the inheritance of a great past and for our future. The 50 years are not yet gone which Count Moltke said we would have to remain armed to defend the inheritance of the gains of 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our people. Our army is in the field, our navy is ready,—behind them stands the entire German Nation (the members of the Diet rise from their seats). The entire Germany to the last man, you, gentlemen, know your duty to all its intent. The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask for their being passed.

II

EUROPEAN WAR

Report of a Speech by the Rt. Hon. H. H. Asquith (Prime Minister) in the House of Commons on the 6th August, 1914

In asking the Committee to agree to the Resolution which Mr. Whitley has just read from the Chair,* I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse again the ground which was covered by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago. He stated—and I do not think any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered—the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with what for many years and indeed generations past has been a friendly Power. But, Sir, the Papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands of hon. Members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. Friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace.

Everyone knows in the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. Friend, that the area of the conflict was limited, and that so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country—and I will add posterity and history—will accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries—universal peace.

These Papers, which are now in the hands of hon. Members, show something more than that. They show what were the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications—will read, learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the communication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July—No. 85 of the published Papers. I think I must refer to them for a moment. After alluding to the state of things as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward Goschen goes on:—

“He [the German Chancellor] then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was

* “That a sum, not exceeding £100,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or otherwise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war.”

clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government"—

Let the Committee observe these words—

"aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue."

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question:—

"I question His Excellency about the French colonies"—

What are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe—

"and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect."

Let me come to what, in my mind, personally has always been the crucial and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States:—

"As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise."

Then we come to Belgium:—

"It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

Let the Committee observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity, but also neutrality; but in regard to Belgium, there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added:—

"Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances"—

the assurances I have read out to the House—

"might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired."

What does that amount to? Let me just ask the Committee. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra

European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgium appeal? What should we have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day, in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal?

Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporized, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. Friend, and of which I will read to the Committee two of the more salient passages. This document, No. 101 of the Papers, puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. Friend says:—

“His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From the material point of view”——

My right hon. Friend, as he always does, used very temperate language:—

“Such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.”

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded:—

“Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.”

He then says:—

“We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem to us to require.”

And he added, I think, in sentences which the Committee must appreciate:—

"You should . . . add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . For that object this Government will work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill.

"If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it"—

The statement was never more true—

"as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto."

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language, the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of "Peace Maker of Europe," persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose?

I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? Everyone knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible, incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war with the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through—there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the people who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war, we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the

interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe that, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.

If I am asked what we are fighting for I reply in two sentences. In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power.

I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and a stronger conviction that it is fighting, not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured, that I am now about to ask this Committee—to make the very unusual demand upon it—to give the Government a Vote of Credit of £100,000,000.

I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supplementary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, the past Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confidence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit, so that this money which we are asking them to allow us to expend may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise, for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war.

I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would be a great pity—in fact, a great disaster—if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision—provision far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions

that prevailed in the old days—for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them.

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War—a position which I held until this morning—for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back, but which are fresh in the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an end, and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case; in fact, I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Department and another, still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all Departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties and all opinions.

I am asking on his behalf for the Army, power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions. and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family.

I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case, or in any general description of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose—it is not the purpose of any patriotic man—to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it.

III

“THE ORANGE BOOK”

PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

COUNT BENCKENDORFF	Russian Ambassador at London.
COUNT BERCHTOLD	Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary.
M. BERTHELOT	Of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
M. BRONEFSKY	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
M. JULES CAMBON	French Ambassador at Berlin.
BARON GIESL DE GIESLINGEN	Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.
SIR EDWARD GREY	British Foreign Secretary.
M. ISVOLSKY	Russian Ambassador at Paris.
HERR VON JAGOW	German Minister of Foreign Affairs.
M. KAZANSKY	Gérant of the Russian Consulate at Prague, Austria-Hungary.
PRINCE NICHOLAS KUDACHEF	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna.
BARON MACCHIO	Of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
M. PASHITCH	Servian Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
DR. PATCHOU	Servian Minister of Finance.
COUNT POURTALÈS	German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
M. SALVIATI	Russian Consul General at Fiume, Austria-Hungary.
M. SAZONOFF	Russian Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
M. SCHEBEKO	Russian Ambassador at Vienna.
BARON VON SCHOEN	German Ambassador at Paris.
M. SEVASTOPOULO	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris.
M. STRANDTMAN	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.
M. DE SWERBEEW	Russian Ambassador at Berlin.
COUNT SZAPARY Y SZAPAR	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

No. 1. The Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 10-23 July, 1914.

The Austrian Minister has just transmitted at 6 o'clock in the evening to the Minister of Finances Patchou, who is replacing Pashitch, a note in the form of an ultimatum from his Government fixing a time-limit of forty-eight hours for the acceptance of the demands contained therein. Giesl added verbally that in case the note should not be accepted in its integrity within a limit of forty-eight hours, he had orders to leave Belgrade with the Staff of the Legation. Pashitch and the other Ministers, who are absent on electoral campaign, have been recalled and are expected in Belgrade tomorrow, Friday, at 10 o'clock in the morning. Patchou, who communicated to me the contents of the note, solicits the aid of Russia, and declares that no Servian Government will be able to accept the demands of Austria.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 2. The Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 10-23 July, 1914.

Text of the Note which was transmitted today by the Minister of Austria-Hungary to the Servian Government:

On March 31st, 1909, the Minister of Serbia in Vienna made, by order of his Government, to the Imperial and Royal Government the following declaration:

"Serbia recognizes that she has not been injured in her rights by the accomplished fact created in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that she will conform in consequence to such decision as the powers will take in regard to Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Deferring to the counsels of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes from now on to abandon the attitude of protest and opposition which she has observed in regard to the annexation since last Autumn, and she undertakes, in addition, to change the course of her actual policy toward Austria-Hungary in order to live henceforward with this latter on the footing of good neighborliness (voisinage)."

Now, the history of the late years, and notably the sad event of June 28, have demonstrated the existence in Serbia of a subversive movement the object of which is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy certain parts of its territories. This movement, which was begun under the eyes of the Servian Government, has reached the point of showing itself beyond the territory of the kingdom by acts of terrorism, by a series of attentats, and by murders.

The Royal Government of Serbia, far from keeping the formal engagements contained in the declaration of March 31, 1909, has done nothing to suppress this movement; it has tolerated the criminal activity of the different societies and affiliations directed against the monarchy, the unrestrained language of the press, the glorification of the authors of the attentat, the participation of officers and functionaries in the subversive actions, an unhealthy (malsaine) propaganda in the public instruction—tolerated, in a word, all the manifestations which could lead the Servian population to hatred of the monarchy and disdain (*mépris*) of its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Government of Serbia had not ceased at the moment when the events of June 28 last showed to the entire world its dreadful consequences:

It results from the depositions and avowals of the criminal authors of the attentat of June 28 that the murder of Sarajevo was plotted in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were furnished had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the "Narodna Odbrana," and finally that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and of their arms was organized and effected by chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The results of the investigation mentioned do not permit the Imperial and Royal Government any longer to pursue the attitude of expectant longanimity which it had observed during years in the face of actions concentrated at Belgrade, and propagated from there over the territories of the monarchy; these results impose upon it, on the contrary, the duty of bringing an end to methods which form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the monarchy.

It is to attain this object that the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself obliged to demand from the Servian Government the official declaration that it condemns the propaganda directed against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, that is to say, the ensemble of the tendencies which seek in the last result to detach from the monarchy territories which form part of it, and that it undertakes to suppress by all means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a solemn character to this engagement the Royal Government of Serbia will have published on the first page of the Official Journal on the date of 26-13 July the following declaration:

The Royal Government of Serbia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the ensemble of the tendencies which have the ultimate object of detaching from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories which form part of it, and it deplors sincerely the dreadful consequences of these criminal actions.

The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries should have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thereby compromise the relations of good neighborhood to which the Royal Government had solemnly engaged itself by its declaration of March 31, 1909.

The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of or attempt at interference in the destinies of the inhab-

itants of any part of Austria-Hungary whatever, considers it its duty to formally notify the officers, the functionaries, and all the population of the kingdom that henceforth it will proceed with the utmost rigor against those persons who should render themselves guilty of such acts, acts which it will use all its efforts to prevent and to repress.

This declaration shall be simultaneously brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army by an order of the day from his Majesty the King, and shall be published in the official bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government engages itself, in addition:

1. To suppress any publication which excites to hatred and disdain of the monarchy, and of which the general tendency is directed against its territorial integrity.

2. To dissolve immediately the society called "Narodna Odbrana," to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and affiliations in Servia which give themselves to the propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Royal Government will take the measure necessary to prevent the dissolved societies from continuing their activity under another name and under another form.

3. To eliminate without delay from the public instruction in Servia, both in regard to the teaching corps and in the methods of education, anything which serves or could serve to foment the propaganda against Austro-Hungary.

4. To remove from the military service and from the administration in general all officers and functionaries guilty of the propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and whose names and acts the Imperial and Royal Government reserves to itself the right to communicate to the Royal Government.

5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of the agents of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

6. To open a judicial inquiry against the partisans of the plot of June 28 who are upon Servian territory. Agents delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will take part in the investigations bearing thereupon.

7. To proceed immediately to the arrest of Commander Voijs Tan-kosic and of the nommé Milan Ciganovic, employe of the Servian Government, compromised by the results of the investigation of Sarajevo.

8. To prevent by efficacious measures the assistance of the Servian authorities in the illegal traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss and severely punish the functionaries of the frontier service of Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having aided the authors of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating their passage across the frontier.

9. To give the Imperial and Royal Government explanations regarding the unjustifiable statements of high Servian functionaries, both in Servia and abroad, who, despite their official positions, did not hesitate after the attentat of 28 June to express themselves in interviews in a manner hostile toward the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; finally,

10. To notify without delay the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised in the preceding points.

The Imperial and Royal Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government at the latest up to Saturday, the 25th of this month, at 6 o'clock in the evening.

A memorandum concerning the results of the investigation of Sarajevo in regard to the functionaries mentioned in points 7 and 8 is annexed to this note.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 3. Verbal note transmitted personally by the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 11-24 July, 1914, at 10 o'clock in the morning

The Imperial and Royal Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Royal Government of Servia on Thursday, 10-23 of the current month, through the medium of the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade:—

(Here follows the text of the note.)

See Document No. 2.

No. 4. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires in Austria-Hungary
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 11-24 July, 1914.

Please transmit to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary the following:

The communication of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is entirely insufficient for them to undertake any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

Communicated to London, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 5. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Representatives of His Majesty the Emperor in England, in Germany, in Italy, and in France

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 11-24 July, 1914.

In reference to my telegram to Kudachef of today, we hope that the Government to whom you are accredited will share our point of view and will urgently instruct its representative in Vienna to express himself along similar lines.

Communicated to Belgrade.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 6. Telegram from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Servia to His Majesty the Emperor

Belgrade, 11-24 July, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening handed to the Servian Government a note concerning the "*attentat*" of Serajevo. Conscience of its international duties, Servia from the first days of the horrible crime declared that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an inquiry on her territory if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved in the investigation begun by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. However, the demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are unnecessarily humiliating for Servia and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. Thus we are called upon in peremptory tones for a declaration of the Government in the Official Journal, and an order from the Sovereign to the army wherein we should repress the spirit of hostility against Austria by reproaching ourselves for criminal weakness in regard to our perfidious actions. Then we have to admit Austro-Hungarian functionaries into Servia to participate with our own in the investigation and to superintend the execution of the other conditions indicated in the note. We have received a time-limit of forty-eight hours to accept everything, in default of which the legation of Austria-Hungary will leave Belgrade. We are ready to accept the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State as well as those whose acceptance shall be advised us by your Majesty. All persons whose participation in the "*attentat*" shall be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of these demands cannot be carried out without changes in our legislation, which require time. We have been given too short a limit. We can be attacked after the expiration of the time-limit by the Austro-Hungarian Army which is concentrating on our frontier. It is impossible for us to defend ourselves, and we supplicate your Majesty to give us your aid as soon as possible. The highly prized good will of your Majesty, which has so often shown itself toward us, makes us hope firmly that this time again our appeal will be heard by his generous Slav heart.

In these difficult moments I voice the sentiments of the Servian people, who supplicate your Majesty to interest himself in the lot of the Kingdom of Servia.

(Signed) ALEXANDER.

No. 7. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 11-24 July, 1914.

All the morning papers, even the few which recognize the impossibility of Servia accepting the conditions laid down, welcome with great sympathy the energetic tone adopted by Austria. The semi-official Lokal-Anzeiger is particularly aggressive. It describes as superfluous the eventual recourse of Servia to St. Petersburg, to Paris, to Athens, and to Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German people will breathe freely after it has learned that the situation in the Balkan Peninsula is at last going to be cleared up.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 8. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 11-24 July, 1914.

The copy of the note officially handed to Belgrade has been communicated by the Austrian Ambassador to the French Government. Later the German Ambassador visited the Minister and read to him a communication reproducing the Austrian arguments, and indicating that in case of refusal on the part of Servia, Austria would be obliged to have recourse to pressure, and in case of need to military measures; the communication concluded by the remark that in the opinion of Germany this question must be settled directly between Austria and Servia, and that it was in the interests of the Powers to limit the affair by reserving it to the interested parties. The Gérant of the Political Department, who was present at the interview, asked the Ambassador if the Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum—in other words if, in case Servia did not bow entirely to the Austrian demands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply by alleging the absence of instructions.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 9. The Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 11-24 July, 1914.

Pashitch has returned to Belgrade. He intends to give within the time limit, that is to say, by 6 o'clock in the evening, tomorrow, Saturday, a reply to Austria indicating the points acceptable and unacceptable. An appeal to defend the independence of Servia will be sent out today to the Powers. Finally, added Pashitch, if war is inevitable—we will make war.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 10. Communiqué from the Imperial Government

St. Petersburg, 12-25 July, 1914.

The recent events and the dispatch by Austria-Hungary of an ultimatum to Servia occupy the attention of the Imperial Government in the highest degree. The Government is carefully following the development of the Servo-Austrian conflict, which cannot be a matter of indifference to Russia.

No. 11. The Chargé d'Affaires in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Vienna, 12-25 July, 1914.

Count Berchtold is at Ischl. Seeing the impossibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed him our proposal to extend the limit of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this verbally to Baron Macchio. The latter promised me to communicate it in time to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but added that he could predict with assurance a categorical refusal.

(Signed) KUDACHEF.

No. 12. The Chargé d'Affaires in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Vienna, 12-25 July, 1914.

Following my telegram of today. Have just received from Macchio the negative reply of the Austro-Hungarian Government to our proposal to prolong the time-limit of the note.

(Signed) KUDACHEF.

No. 13. The Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 12-25 July, 1914.

Received after delay, 14-27 July, 1914.

I transmit the reply which the President of the Servian Ministerial Council has handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade today before the expiration of the delay of the ultimatum:

The Royal Servian Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th-23d of this month, and it is persuaded that its reply will remove any misunderstanding that threatens to spoil (gâter) the good relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

The Royal Government is conscious that the protests which have been made both in the tribune of the national Skupshtina and in the declarations and acts of the responsible representatives of the State, pro-

tests which were cut short by the declaration of the Servian Government under date of 18-31 March, 1909, have not been renewed in regard to the great neighboring monarchy on any occasion, and that since this time both on the part of the Royal Governments which have succeeded one another and on the part of their agents no attempt has been made with the object of changing the state of affairs, either political or judicial, created in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Royal Government note that in this respect the Imperial and Royal Government has made no representation except as regards a schoolbook, on the subject of which the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation.

Servia has numerous times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkanic crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice she made in the exclusive interest of European peace that this peace was preserved.

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character such as the articles in newspapers and the peaceful work of societies, manifestations which take place in almost all countries as an ordinary thing, and which as a general rule escape official control, all the less that the Royal Government at the time of the solution of the whole series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary has shown a great care and has succeeded in this fashion in settling the greatest number of them to the profit of the progress of the two neighboring countries.

It is for this the Royal Government has been painfully surprised by the affirmations according to which persons in the Kingdom of Servia had taken part in the preparation of the attentat committed at Serajevo. It expected to be invited to collaborate in the investigation of everything bearing upon this crime, and it was ready, in order to prove by acts its entire correctness, to act against all persons in regard to whom communications should be made to it.

Bowing, then, to the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government is disposed to hand over to the courts any Servian subject without regard to his situation or his rank of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs should be furnished.

It undertakes especially to publish on the first page of the official journal under date of 13-26 July the following declaration:

The Royal Government of Servia condemns all propaganda which might be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the ensemble of the tendencies which have the ultimate object of detaching from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories which form part of it, and it sincerely deplores the dreadful consequences of these criminal actions.

The Royal Government regrets that certain Servian officers and functionaries should have taken part, according to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the above-mentioned propaganda and thereby compromised the relations of good neighborliness to which the Royal Government had solemnly pledged itself by its declaration of 18-31 March, 1909.

The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates any

idea of or attempt at interference in the destinies of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary whatever, considers it is its duty to formally warn officers, functionaries, and all the population of the kingdom that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who should render themselves guilty of such actions, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and to repress.

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the royal army by an order of the day in the name of his Majesty the King by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official bulletin of the army.

The Royal Government undertakes further:

(1) To introduce at the first regular session of the Skupshtina a clause in the law dealing with the press by which the most severe punishment will fall upon any provocation to hatred and disdain of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as well as upon any publication whose general tendency would be directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

It undertakes, at the time of the revision of the Constitution which is soon to come, to introduce into Article 22 of the Constitution an amendment of such a character that the foregoing publications can be confiscated, which is actually, under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution, an impossibility.

(2) The Government possesses no proof, and the note of the Imperial and Royal Government does not furnish it with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" society and the other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this kind by any one of their members. Nevertheless the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana society and any other society which should act against Austria-Hungary.

(3) The Servian Royal Government undertakes to eliminate without delay from the public instruction in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment a propaganda against Austria-Hungary when the Imperial and Royal Government shall furnish it with the facts and proofs of this propaganda.

(4) The Royal Government similarly accepts to remove from the military service those whom the judicial inquiry shall prove to have been guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; it expects that the Imperial and Royal Government will communicate to it later the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the procedure which will follow.

(5) The Royal Government must acknowledge that it does not clearly understand the sense and the meaning of the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government contending that Servia should undertake to accept upon its territory the collaboration of the agents (officers) of the Imperial and Royal Government.

But it declares that it will admit any collaboration which would fit in with the principles of international law and the criminal procedure, as well as accord with good neighborly relations.

(6) The Royal Government, it goes without saying, considers it its duty to open an inquiry against all those who are or who, eventually, might have been mixed up in the plot of 15th June, and who should be found on the territory of the kingdom. As for the participation in this inquiry of agents of the Austro-Hungarian authorities who should be delegated to this effect by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept it, for it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law upon criminal procedure. However, in the concrete cases, communications on the results of the inquiry in question could be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

(7) The Royal Government proceeded, on the evening of the receipt of the note, to the arrest of Commander Voijs Tankositch. As for Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and who up to the 15th June was employed as aspirant in the Administration of the Railways, he has not yet been found. The Imperial and Royal Government is requested to be so good as, in the accustomed form, to make known the soonest possible the presumptions of culpability, as well as the eventual proofs of culpability, which have been gathered up to this day by the inquiry at Serajevo, for the purpose of the ulterior inquiries.

(8) The Servian Government will strengthen and extend the measures taken to prevent the illegal traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that it will order immediately an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier functionaries on the Schabatz-Loznica Line who have been derelict in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to escape.

(9) The Royal Government will willingly give explanations regarding the statements which its functionaries both in Servia and abroad have made after the attentat in interviews and which according to the affirmation of the Imperial and Royal Government have been hostile toward the monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government shall have communicated to it the passages in question of these statements and as soon as it shall have demonstrated that the statements employed were in effect made by the said functionaries, although the Royal Government itself will undertake to collect proofs and convictions.

(10) The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised in the preceding points in so far as that has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure shall have been ordered and executed. In case the Imperial and Royal Government should not be satisfied with this reply, the Servian Royal Government, considering that it is the common interest not to precipitate the solution of this question, is ready as always to accept a pacific understanding by leaving this question either to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the elaboration of the declarations which the Servian Government made on the 18-31st March, 1909.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 14. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 12-25 July, 1914.

Have received your telegram of 11-24 July. Have communicated the contents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He told me that the English Government had likewise asked him to urge upon Vienna the extension of the time-limit of the ultimatum. He had communicated this step by telegraph to Vienna. He is going to do as much in regard to our step (*démarche*), but he fears that in consequence of the absence of Berchtold at Ischl, and seeing the lack of time, his telegrams will remain without result. He has, besides, doubts about the opportuneness of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he asks if that could not increase the self-assurance of Servia. I replied that a great power like Austria could yield without any injury to its prestige, and brought forward all similar arguments possible. However, I was not able to obtain more precise promises. Even when I let it be understood that it was necessary to act at Vienna in order to avoid the possibility of alarming consequences, the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied each time negatively.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 15. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 12-25 July, 1914.

Have received the telegram of 11-24 July concerning the extension of the time-limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and have communicated it as instructed. The French Representative in Vienna has received similar instructions.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 16. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

London, 12-25 July, 1914.

Received telegram of 11-24 July. Grey has instructed the English Ambassador at Vienna to support our *démarche* concerning the extension of the limit of the ultimatum. He told me at the same time that the Austrian Ambassador had come to see him and had explained that the character of an ultimatum must not be attributed to the Austrian note—it must be considered as a *démarche* which, in the case of absence of reply or of insufficient reply within the set limit, would have as a consequence the rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure from Belgrade of the Minister of Austria-Hungary, without entailing, however, the immediate commencement of hostilities. Grey added that in consequence of this explanation he had instructed the English Ambassador at Vienna that in case it should be too late to raise the question of the exten-

sion of the limit of the ultimatum, that of the stay of hostilities might perhaps serve as a basis of discussion.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 17. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 12-25 July, 1914.

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, such as might call for similar action on the part of the Great Powers, we trust that England will not delay in placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France with a view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, for which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which the triumph of Austria would doubtlessly compromise.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 18. Verbal note handed by the Ambassador of Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 12-25 July, 1914

It comes to us from an authoritative source that the news spread by some papers that the step taken by the Government of Austria-Hungary at Belgrade had been made at the instigation of Germany is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in, and has not exercised any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to Germany a threatening attitude.

Germany naturally supports, as ally of Austria, the claims, in her opinion legitimate claims, of the Cabinet of Vienna against Servia.

Above all, she desires, as she has already declared at the commencement of the Austro-Servian difference, that this conflict remain localized.

No. 19. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 12-25 July, 1914.

Refers to my telegram of 11-24 July.

Today a morning journal published, in a form not entirely exact, the declarations of yesterday of the German Ambassador, following them with a commentary attributing to this *démarche* the character of a threat. The German Ambassador, very much moved by this, visited today the Gérant of the Political Department to inform him that his words had in no way the threatening character attributed to them. He declared that Austria had presented its note to Servia without a precise understanding with Berlin, but that nevertheless Germany approved the point of view of Austria, and that certainly "the arrow once let fly" (these are his own words) Germany could only allow herself to be guided by her duties as ally.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 20. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

London, 12-25 July, 1914.

Grey told me that the Ambassador of Germany had declared to him that the German Government had not been informed of the text of the Austrian note, but that it entirely supported the Austrian *démarche*. The Ambassador at the same time asked if England would consent to act in St. Petersburg in a spirit of conciliation. Grey replied that that was completely impossible. The Minister added that so long as complications only existed between Austria and Servia, English interests were only indirectly engaged, but that he of course foresaw that Austrian mobilization would have as a consequence the mobilization of Russia, and that from that moment they would be in presence of a situation in which all the Powers would be interested. England reserved in this case complete liberty of action.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 21. The Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 12-25 July, 1914.

Despite the extremely conciliatory character of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just, at half past six in the evening, informed the Servian Government by note that not having received a satisfactory response within the set time-limit, he is leaving Belgrade with the whole staff of the legation. The Skuptschina is summoned at Nish for the 14-27 July. The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Corps are leaving this evening for the same town.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 22. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

London, 12-25 July, 1914.

Grey told the German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian mobilization must bring on the mobilization of Russia, that in that case there would arise acute danger of a general war, and that he only saw one single means of a pacific solution: that in presence of the Austrian mobilization, Germany, France, Italy, and England should abstain from an immediate mobilization and propose their good offices straightway. Grey told me that this plan called above all for the agreement of Germany and the engagement of this power not to mobilize. In consequence he has first of all addressed to Berlin a question on this subject.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 23. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Italy
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 13-26 July, 1914.

Italy could play a rôle of the very first order in favor of the maintenance of peace by exercising the necessary influence upon Austria and by adopting an attitude clearly unfavorable to the conflict, a conflict which could not be localized. It is desirable that you express the conviction that it is impossible for Russia not to come to the aid of Servia.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 24. The Gérant of the Consulate at Prague to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Prague, 13-26 July, 1914.

Mobilization has been decreed.

(Signed) KAZANSKY.

No. 25. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Austria-Hungary
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 13-26 July, 1914.

I had today a long interview in a friendly tone with the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary. After having examined with him the tone of the demands addressed to Servia, I pointed out that apart from the rather awkward form (*la forme peu habile*) in which they are presented, some among them are absolutely impossible even in case the Servian Government should declare its willingness to accept them. Thus, for instance, the points (1) and (2) could not be carried out without an amendment of the Servian laws on the press and on associations for which it would be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina; as for points (4) and (5), their execution might produce highly dangerous consequences, and even create the risk of acts of terrorism against the members of the Royal House and against Pashitch, and this could not form part of the views of Austria. In regard to the other points, it seems to me that with certain changes in the details it would not be difficult to discover a ground of agreement if the accusations therein were confirmed by sufficient proofs.

In the interest of the preservation of peace, which, according to Szapary's statements, is precious to Austria in the same degree as to all the Powers, it would be necessary to put a stop as soon as possible to the strained situation of the moment. With this object it would seem to me very desirable that the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary should be authorized to enter with me into an exchange of private views with the object of a joint alteration (*remaniement*) of some clauses of the Austrian note of 10-23 July. This proceeding would perhaps permit of finding a formula which should be acceptable for Servia while at the same time giving satisfaction to Austria as to the basis of its demands. Be so good as to

have a prudent and friendly explanation in the sense of this telegram with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Communicated to the Ambassadors in Germany, in France, in England, and in Italy.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 26. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Germany
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 13-26 July, 1914.

Please communicate the contents of my telegram of today to Vienna to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and express the hope to him that on his side he will find it possible to advise Vienna to meet (*aller au devant de*) our proposal.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 27. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 13-26 July, 1914.

The Director of the Political Department informs me that when he informed the Austrian Ambassador of the contents of the Servian Reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal his astonishment that it had not given satisfaction to Giesl. The conciliatory attitude of Servia should, in the opinion of the Director of the Political Department, produce the best impression in Europe.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 28. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Minister

(Telegram.)

Paris, 13-26 July, 1914.

Today the German Ambassador again called upon the Gérant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and made him the following declarations:

"Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek territorial acquisitions and that she does not threaten the integrity of Servia. Her only object is to insure her own tranquility. Consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. Germany feels herself at one with France in her keen desire to preserve the peace, and strongly hopes that France will use her influence at Petersburg in the direction of moderation." The Minister observed that Germany could on her side take similar steps at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown. The Ambassador answered that such action was impossible, in view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict. Thereupon the Minister asked if the four Powers—England, Germany, Italy, and France—were not able to take steps at St. Petersburg and Vienna, since the affair reduced itself in essentials to a conflict between Russia and

Austria. The Ambassador pleaded the absence of instructions. Finally the Minister refused to join himself to the German proposal.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 29. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Minister

(Telegram.)

Paris, 13-26 July, 1914.

The Director of the Political Department declared that in his personal opinion the successive German *démarches* at Paris had for their object the intimidation of France, and thereby cause her to intervene at St. Petersburg.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 30. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 13-26th July, 1914.

After the reception in Berlin of the news of the mobilization of the Austrian Army against Serbia, a large crowd composed, according to the newspapers, partly of Austrians, indulged in a series of noisy manifestations in favor of Austria. At a late hour in the evening the demonstrators gathered several times in front of the Imperial Embassy, uttering cries against Russia. There were practically no police present, and no steps were taken.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 31. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

London, 14-27 July, 1914.

Received your telegram of 13-26 July. Please telegraph me if in your opinion direct *pourparlers* with the Cabinet of Vienna are in line with Grey's proposal concerning the mediation of the four Governments. Having learned from the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you were disposed to accept this combination, Grey decided to give it the form of an official proposal, which he made last night to Berlin, Paris, and Rome.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 32. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in France and in England

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 14th-27th July, 1914.

The English Ambassador called to ascertain if we thought it desirable for England to take the initiative by summoning at London a conference of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy in order to work out a solution of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I had opened *pourparlers* with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions that I hope are favorable. However, I have not yet received a reply to the proposal I made for a revision of the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna prove impracticable, I am ready to accept the English proposal or any other calculated to bring about a favorable solution of the conflict.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 33. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in France, in England, in Germany, in Austria-Hungary, and in Italy

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 14-27th July, 1914.

Have taken note of the reply sent by the Servian Government to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our anticipations by its moderation and its desire to give the most complete satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what more Austria could demand unless the Cabinet at Vienna is seeking a pretext for a war with Servia.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 34. The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 14-27 July, 1914.

The German Ambassador again today conferred at length on the situation with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador strongly insisted on the exclusion of all possibility of mediation or of a conference.

(Signed) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 35. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 14-27 July, 1914.

Conferred with the *Gérant* of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in presence of Berthelot, immediately after my return to Paris. Both confirmed to me the details concerning the steps (*démarches*) taken by the German Ambassador, which Sevastopoulo communicated to you in his telegrams. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed in writing his declaration of yesterday, namely: (1) Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek acquisitions and does not attack the integrity of Servia. Her only object is to insure her own tranquility; (2) Consequently, it depends upon Russia whether war is averted; (3) Germany and France, completely united in the ardent desire not to break the peace, must influence Russia in the direction of moderation. Baron von Schoen laid special stress on the expression of the united view (*solidarité*) of Germany and France. It is the strong conviction of the Minister of Justice that these *démarches* of Germany are clearly meant to disunite (*désunir*) Russia and France, to draw the French Government into line with the

representations made at St. Petersburg, and thus to compromise our ally in our eyes; finally, in case of war, to throw the responsibility off Germany, which professedly is employing all her efforts to maintain peace, and on to Russia and France.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 36. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 14-27 July, 1914.

It is clear from your telegram of 13-26th July that you did not by then know the reply of the Servian Government. The telegram by which this news was communicated to me from Belgrade was likewise twenty hours en route. The telegram from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, dispatched the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning at triple tariff, containing the order to support our demand, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraphic authorities.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 37. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 14-27 July, 1914.

By order of his Government the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the reply of Servia has been judged unsatisfactory at Vienna, and that tomorrow (Tuesday) Austria would proceed to "energetic action," the object of which would be to force Servia to give the necessary guarantees. The Minister asked in what this action would consist, and the Ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but that it might be a question of crossing the Servian frontier, of an ultimatum, and even of a declaration of war.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 38. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 14-27 July, 1914.

I have requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs to support at Vienna your proposal to authorize Szapary to elaborate by a private exchange of views with you, a presentation (*réduction*) of the Austro-Hungarian demands that would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow replied that he was acquainted with this proposal, and that he shared the opinion of Pourtales that, since Szapary had begun this conversation, he might very well continue it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to urge Vienna in a more pressing

fashion to take up this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 39. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 14-27 July, 1914.

Today, before my visit to him, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had received the visit of the French Ambassador, who had endeavored to make him accept the English proposal relative to action in favor of peace, such action to be exercised simultaneously at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by England, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon proposed that these Powers advise Vienna in the following terms: "To abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation at the present hour." By adopting this veiled formula there would be no necessity of mentioning the necessity of abstaining from an invasion of Servia. Jagow opposed a categorical refusal to this proposal in despite of the insistence of the Ambassador, who emphasized, as a good point in the proposal, the mixed grouping of the Powers, so that there would be no opposition of the Alliance to the Entente, and a situation of which Jagow had himself so often complained would be avoided.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 40. Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia, under date of 14-27 July, 1914

Your Royal Highness in addressing me in a moment of particular difficulty was not deceived in regard to the sentiments which animate me in your regard and in regard to my cordial sympathy for the Servian people.

My most serious attention is drawn by the present situation, and my Government is devoting itself with all its force to smoothing out the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Government wish to facilitate this task by neglecting nothing to arrive at a solution which would prevent the horrors of a new war while at the same time safeguarding the dignity of Servia.

So long as there is the least hope of avoiding bloodshed all our efforts must tend toward this object. If, despite our most sincere desire, we do not succeed, your Highness may be assured that in no case will Russia be indifferent to the fate of Servia.

(Signed) NICOLAS.

No. 41. The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Vienna, 14th-27th July, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is absent. During a prolonged conversation which I had today with Macchio I drew his attention in entirely

friendly terms to the unfavorable impression that had been produced in Russia by the presentation by Austria to Servia of demands absolutely unacceptable by any independent State, no matter how small. I added that such a proceeding, which might bring about complications of the least desirable kind, had provoked in Russia profound surprise and general reprobation. It must be supposed that Austria, influenced by the assurances of the German representative at Vienna, who during all this crisis has played the rôle of an instigator, counted upon the probability of the localization of her conflict with Servia and on the possibility of striking her a serious blow with impunity. The declaration of the Imperial Government regarding the impossibility for Russia to remain indifferent in the face of such procedure has provoked here a deep impression.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 42. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

London, 14th-27th July, 1914.

Grey has just replied to the Ambassador of Germany, who had called to question him regarding the possibility of action at St. Petersburg, that this action should be exercised at Vienna and that the Berlin Cabinet would be best qualified to exercise it. Grey pointed out at the same time that the Servian reply to the Austrian note exceeded by its moderation and its spirit of conciliation anything that could have been expected. Grey added that he concluded that Russia had advised Belgrade to give a moderate reply, and that he thought that the Servian reply could serve as the basis of a pacific and acceptable solution of the question.

Under these conditions, continued Grey, if Austria, despite this reply, began hostilities, her intentions of destroying Servia would be proven. The question placed on this ground would produce a situation which might bring about a war in which all the powers would be involved.

Grey in conclusion declared that the English Government was very sincerely disposed to collaborate with the German Government so long as it was a question of the preservation of peace, but that in the contrary case England reserved a liberty of action.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 43. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in England

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 15-28th July, 1914.

My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favor of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 44. The Consul General at Fiume to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Fiume, 15-28th July, 1914.

The state of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and at the same time the reservists of all classes have been mobilized.

(Signed) SALVIATI.

No. 45. The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Vienna, 15-28th July, 1914.

I had a conversation today with Count Berchtold on the line of the instructions from your Excellency. I pointed out to him in the most friendly terms how much it was desirable to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, should give to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy a real guarantee for its future relations with Servia.

I called the attention of Count Berchtold to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be brought about by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. He told me that on the other hand the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had decided only with reluctance upon the energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, could neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had been excited to such a degree that the Government, even if it desired, could no longer give its consent to such a course, and this was less possible, he said to me, because the very reply of Servia gave proof of the lack of sincerity in her promises for the future.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 46. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 15-28th July, 1914.

The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian response which was communicated to it. Up to this moment this note has not appeared in extenso in any of the local journals, which, according to all

evidence, do not wish to give a place in their columns, believing that the publication of it would bring a feeling of calmness upon German readers.
(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 47. The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Vienna, 15-28th July, 1914.

The decree of general mobilization has been signed.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 48. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 15-28th July, 1914.

In view of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia it is necessary that England should urgently undertake mediatory action and that military operations of Austria against Servia should be immediately suspended; otherwise mediation would only serve as a pretext to delay inordinately the solution of the question and would give Austria meanwhile the possibility to crush Servia completely and to occupy a dominant situation in the Balkans.

Communicated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 49. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires in Germany.

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 16-29th July, 1914.

The German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue this action even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there has been no news that the Austrian armies had crossed the Servian frontier. I requested the Ambassador to transmit to the Chancellor my thanks for the friendly tenor of this communication. I informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I said to him, were directed against Germany. I added that they did not indicate aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, these measures being explained by the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian Army. The Ambassador pronounced himself in favor of direct explanations between the Cabinet of Vienna and us, and I replied that I was quite in favor of that, provided the counsels of the Cabinet of Berlin, of which he spoke, should find an echo in Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account

the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

Communicated to the Ambassadors in England, in France, in Austria-Hungary, and in Italy.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 50. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in England and in France

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 16-29th July, 1914.

At the time of my conversation with the German Ambassador, of which my preceding telegram treats, I had not yet received the telegram of 15-28th July of M. Schebeko.

This telegram reports the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in the steps which they may consider advisable.

Communicated to Vienna, Rome, and Berlin.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 51. The Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 16-29 July, 1914.

Upon my question whether he had a reply from Vienna regarding your proposal of private *pourparlers* at St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State replied negatively.

He declares that it is very difficult for him to influence Vienna, especially openly. Speaking to Cambon, he, in fact, added that in case of too evident pressure Austria would hasten to present to Germany a *fait accompli*.

The Secretary of State said he had received today a telegram from Pourtalès from which he gathered that you are disposed to find a compromise acceptable to all even more than you were at the beginning. I replied that probably you had been from the commencement in favor of a compromise, of course on the condition that it should be acceptable not only to Austria but equally to us. He told me next that it appeared that we had begun to mobilize on the Austrian frontier and that he feared that this

would make it more difficult for Austria to come to an understanding with us, particularly as Austria was only mobilizing against Serbia and was making no preparations on our frontier. I replied that according to the information which I had, Austria was equally mobilizing on our frontier, and that consequently we must take similar measures. I added that the measures which we have probably taken on our side were in no wise directed against Germany.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 52. The Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Nisch, 16-29th July, 1914.

Today the Minister of Bulgaria, in the name of his Government, informed Pashitch that Bulgaria would observe neutrality.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 53. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 16-29 July, 1914.

For the arrival of the President of the French Republic the Minister of Foreign Affairs had prepared a brief summary of the actual political situation more or less in the following terms: Austria, fearing internal division, has used the assassination of the Archduke as a pretext to endeavor to obtain guarantees which may take the form of occupation of Servian military communications or even of Servian territory. Germany is supporting Austria. The maintenance of peace depends entirely upon Russia because it is a question of an affair which must be "localized" between Austria and Serbia, namely the punishment of the preceding policy of Serbia and the creation of guarantees for the future. From this Germany concludes that a moderating action must be exercised at Petersburg. This sophistry has been refuted in Paris as in London. In Paris Baron von Schoen in vain tried to draw France into joint action with Germany upon Russia in favor of the maintenance of peace. The same efforts have been made in London. In the two capitals the reply was made that this action must be exercised in Vienna, for the excessive demands of Austria, her refusal to discuss the reservations that Serbia did make, and the declaration of war threatened to provoke a general war. France and England cannot exercise a moderating influence upon Russia, who up to the present has given proof of the greatest moderation, especially in urging upon Serbia to accept all that was possible of the Austrian note. Today Germany seems to abandon the idea of action upon Russia alone and inclines toward mediatory action at Petersburg and Vienna, but at the same time Germany, like Austria, is seeking to drag the matter out to lengths. Germany opposes the conference without indicating any other practical manner of acting. Austria is carrying on *pourparlers* at Petersburg that are clearly dilatory. At the same time she is taking active measures, and if these measures are tolerated her pretensions will increase proportionately. It is very desirable that Russia should lend all her assistance to the plan of mediation

which Sir Edward Grey will present. Otherwise Austria, under pretext of "guarantees," might practically change the territorial situation of Eastern Europe.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 54. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, 16-29th July, 1914.

Have communicated the contents of your telegram of 15-28 July to Grey. He declared today to the German Ambassador that the direct *pourparlers* between Russia and Austria had failed, and that the correspondents of the newspapers telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Russia was mobilizing against Austria in consequence of mobilization by the latter. Grey said that in principle the German Government had declared in favor of mediation, but that it found difficulties in regard to the form. Grey urged the German Government to indicate the form which, according to the opinion of Germany, would permit the four Powers to exercise their mediation to avoid war; seeing the consent of France, Italy, and England had been given, mediation might take place if Germany would only consent to range herself on the side of peace.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 55. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 16-29th July, 1914.

Viviani has just confirmed to me the full determination of the French Government to act in accord with us. This resolution is supported very widely and by all parties, including the Radical-Socialists, who have presented to him a declaration expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic dispositions of the party. Upon his arrival in Paris Viviani telegraphed urgently to London that, in view of the cessation of direct *pourparlers* between Petersburg and Vienna, it was necessary that the London Cabinet should renew as soon as possible under one or another form its proposal for the mediation of the Powers. Before seeing me Viviani received today the German Ambassador, who renewed the assurance of the pacific tendencies of Germany. Viviani pointed out that if Germany desired peace she should hasten to join herself to the British proposal of mediation, and Baron Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitration" frightened Austria. Viviani replied that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find another form of mediation. According to Baron Schoen, in order that the negotiations between the Powers should succeed, it would be necessary to ascertain what Austria was going to demand from Servia. Viviani replied that the Berlin Cabinet might very easily inquire about this from Austria, but that in the meanwhile the Servian note of reply might serve as a basis of discussion; he added that France was still sincerely desirous of peace, but that she was at the same time determined to act in full harmony

with her allies and friends, and that he (Baron Schoen) could be convinced that this resolution would meet with the liveliest approval of the country.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 56. Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia to His Majesty the Emperor

Deeply moved by the telegram which your Majesty graciously addressed me yesterday, I hasten to thank you with all my heart. I beg your Majesty to be persuaded that the cordial sympathy with which your Majesty is animated toward my country is particularly precious to us, and that our souls are filled with the hope that the future of Servia is assured since it has become the object of the high solicitude of your Majesty. These painful moments can only strengthen the bonds of the deep attachment which unites Servia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of eternal gratitude for the aid and protection of your Majesty will be piously preserved in the souls of all Servians.

(Signed) ALEXANDER.

No. 57. The Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Nish, 16-29th July, 1914.

I communicated to Pashitch the text of the telegraphic reply of his Majesty the Emperor to Prince Alexander. Pashitch, after reading it, crossed himself and said, "Seigneur, the Czar is great and merciful." Then he embraced me, unable to restrain the emotion which had taken possession of him. The heir is expected at Nish in the course of the night.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 58. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in France

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 16-29th July, 1914.

Today the German Ambassador communicated to me the resolution taken by his Government to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now we only began these latter as a consequence of the mobilization to which Austria had already proceeded, and in view of the evident absence on the latter's part of any desire to accept any kind of a pacific solution of its conflict with Servia.

Since we cannot accede to the desire of Germany, it only remains for us to hasten our own armament and to take measures for the probable inevitability of war. Be so good as to notify the French Government and express to it at the same time our sincere gratitude for the declaration which the French Ambassador made me in its name to the effect that

we can count entirely upon the assistance of our ally France. In the present circumstances this declaration is particularly precious to us.

Communicated to the Ambassadors of England, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 59. The Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Nish, 17-30 July, 1914.

The Prince Regent published yesterday a manifesto signed by all the Ministers on occasion of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia. The manifesto finishes with the following words: "Defend with all your strength your homes and Serbia." At the solemn opening of the Skupshchina the Regent read in his name the speech from the throne, at the beginning of which he stated that the place of convocation would show the importance of the present events. Follows the exposé of the facts of the last days—the Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Royal Government to do everything compatible with the dignity of the State to avoid war, and finally the armed aggression of the most powerful neighbor against Serbia, on whose side is found Montenegro. Passing to the examination of the attitude of the Powers in presence of the conflict, the Prince laid stress first of all on the sentiments which animate Russia, and on the very gracious communication of his Majesty the Emperor saying that in no case will Russia abandon Serbia. At each mention of the name of his Imperial Majesty and of Russia a loud and excited "jivio" shook the session hall. The marks of sympathy on the part of France and England were also taken note of separately and provoked "jivios" of approbation on the part of the Deputies. The speech from the throne concludes with the declaration of the opening of the Skupshchina and with the expression of the wish that all measures will be taken to facilitate the task of the Government.

(Signed) STRANDTMAN.

No. 60. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, England, and Italy

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 17-30 July, 1914.

The German Ambassador, who has just left me, asked me if we could not content ourselves with the promise that Austria could give—not to infringe the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia—and indicate on what condition we could still agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him, to be transmitted urgently to Berlin, the following declaration:

"If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of a European question, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which are an infringement of the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to cease her military preparations."

Be so good as to telegraph urgently what will be the attitude of the German Government in presence of this new proof of our desire to do everything possible for the pacific solution of the question, for we cannot admit that such *pourparlers* should only have for their purpose to give time to Germany and Austria for their military preparations.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 61. The Ambassador in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 17-30 July, 1914.

I learn that the decree of mobilization of the German Army and fleet has just been promulgated.

(Signed) SWERBEEW.

No. 62. The Ambassador in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 17-30 July, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has just telephoned me to say that the news just given of the mobilization of the German Army and fleet is false; that the editions of the newspapers were printed in advance in view of all eventualities and were put on sale at midday, but that now they are confiscated.

(Signed) SWERBEEW.

No. 63. The Ambassador in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 17-30 July, 1914.

Have received your telegram of the 16-29th July and have transmitted the text of your proposal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen; he told me that he had received a similar telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg and declared that he found our proposal unacceptable for Austria.

*(Signed) SWERBEEW.

No. 64. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, 17-30 July, 1914.

Have communicated the contents of your telegrams of the 16th and 17th July to Grey, who considers the situation very serious, but desires to continue the *pourparlers*. I observed to Grey that since the time that you had offered him to accept anything he might propose that would favor the maintenance of peace, provided that Austria could not profit by the delays to crush Servia, the situation in which you found yourself was apparently modified. At that period our relations with Germany were not com-

promised. After the declaration of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg concerning the German mobilization these relations had changed, and her demand had received from you the only reply which a great Power could give. When the German Ambassador returned to you and asked for your conditions, you formulated them in altogether special circumstances. I, at the same time, again urged upon Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation created by fault of Germany through the action of the German Ambassador. Grey replied he understood it and that he would take these arguments into consideration.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 65. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, 17-30th July, 1914.

The German Ambassador asked Grey why England was taking military measures on land and on sea. Grey replied that these measures had not an aggressive character, but that the situation was such that every Power must prepare itself.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 66. The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Vienna, 18-31 July, 1914.

In spite of the general mobilization, I continue to exchange views with Count Berchtold and his collaborators. All insist on the absence both of aggressive intentions on the part of Austria against Russia and of ambitions of conquest in regard to Servia, but all equally insist on the necessity for Austria to carry out her action to the very end and to give to Servia a serious lesson which would constitute a real guarantee for the future.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 67. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, England, and Italy
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 18-31 July, 1914.

Referring to my telegram of 17-30 July. By order of his Government, the English Ambassador transmitted to me the desire of the London Cabinet to introduce certain modifications in the formula which I proposed yesterday to the Ambassador of Germany. I replied that I accepted the English proposal. Herewith I transmit to you the modified formula:

"If Austria agrees to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign

State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 68. The Ambassador in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 18-31 July, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has just told me that our *pourparlers*, which were already difficult in consequence of the mobilization against Austria, have become still more so in presence of the serious military measures which we are taking against Germany; information as to those measures is, according to him, received here from every side and this must inevitably provoke analogous action on the part of Germany.

To that I replied that according to reliable information in my possession which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving in Berlin, Germany was herself taking quite as active measures against us. Despite that, the Minister of Foreign Affairs affirms that here they are only recalling officers on leave and the troops of the "*champs de manœuvres*."

(Signed) SWERBEEW.

No. 69. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in England
(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, the 18-31 July, 1914.

I have requested the English Ambassador to transmit to Grey the expression of my most sincere gratitude for the friendly and firm tone which he used during the *pourparlers* with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of discovering a pacific issue of the present situation is still not yet lost.

I also asked him to inform the English Minister that I thought that it was only at London that the *pourparlers* would still have some chances of any success by offering to Austria some facilities for a compromise that is so necessary.

Communicated to the Ambassador in France.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 70. Secret Telegram to the Representatives of His Majesty the Emperor Abroad
(Telegram.)

19th July-1st Aug., 1914.

At midnight the German Ambassador declared to me, by order of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by midday Saturday, we did not commence demobilization, not only in regard to Germany but also in regard to Austria, the German Government would be forced to give the order of mobilization. To my question if this was war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 71. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, July 19th-Aug. 1st, 1914.

Grey told me that he had telegraphed to Berlin, that in his opinion the last formula accepted by the Russian Government constituted the basis of negotiations which presented the most chance of a pacific solution of the conflict. He at the same time expressed the hope that no great Power would commence hostilities before the examination of this formula.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 72. The Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

London, July 19th-1st August, 1914.

The Government of Great Britain has put to the French and German Governments the question whether they would respect the neutrality of Belgium.

France replied in the affirmative, whilst the German Government declared it could not reply to this question categorically.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 73. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 19 July-1 August, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador yesterday called upon Viviani and declared to him that Austria not only had no intention of infringing the territorial integrity of Serbia but was ready to discuss with the other Powers the basis of its conflict with Serbia. The French Government is very much concerned by the extraordinary military preparations of Germany on the French frontier, for it is convinced that under the veil of the "*Kriegszustand*" there is a veritable mobilization.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 74. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Telegram.)

Paris, 19 July-1 August, 1914.

On the reception here of the telegram of the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, which contained the communication made to you by the German Ambassador concerning the resolution of Germany to order today general mobilization, the President of the Republic signed the decree of mobilization. In the streets they are posting up the orders calling in the reservists. The German Ambassador has just paid a visit to Viviani, but made no fresh communication to him, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he had received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the decree of mobilization in reply to the German mobilization, and spoke to him of his astonishment that Germany should have

taken such a measure at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still proceeding between Russia, Austria, and the Powers; he added that the mobilization did not necessarily mean war, and that the German Ambassador might remain in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 75. The Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Telegram.)

Paris, 19 July-1 August, 1914.

I learn from the President that during these last days the Austrian Ambassador assured the President of the Council of Ministers and himself strongly that Austria had informed us she was ready to respect not only the territorial integrity of Serbia, but also its sovereign rights, and that we had intentionally kept silence about this declaration. I opposed a categorical denial to this.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 76. Note handed in by the Ambassador of Germany at St. Petersburg on July 19 (Aug. 1), 1914, at 10 minutes past 7 in the evening

Since the beginning of the crisis the Imperial Government has endeavored to bring about a peaceful solution. In conformity with the wish expressed to him by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in agreement with England, was endeavoring to act as mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without waiting for the results of his efforts, proceeded to mobilize the whole of its land and sea forces.

As the result of this threatening step, for which no motive was afforded by any military preparation on Germany's part, the German Empire found itself face to face with a serious and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed to parry this danger it would have compromised the security and even the existence of Germany. Consequently the German Government found itself compelled to address the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and to insist on the cessation of the said military acts. Russia having refused the satisfaction of (*not having thought it should reply to) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (*this attitude) that its action was directed against Germany, I have the honor to inform your Excellency, by my Government's command, as follows:—

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, raises the gage in the Empire's name and regards himself as in a state of war against Russia.

St. Petersburg, 19 July-1 Aug., 1914.

(Signed) F. POURTALES.

*The words between the parentheses are in the original. It is to be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance and that by error they were both inserted in the note.

No. 77. Communiqué of the Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning
the events of the last days

20th July-2d August, 1914.

An *exposé* distorting the events of the past days has appeared in the foreign press and the Minister of Foreign Affairs believes it his duty to publish the following *aperçu* of the diplomatic *pourparlers* during the time above indicated:

On the 10-23 July (old style) the Minister of Austria-Hungary at Belgrade presented to the Minister President of Servia a note in which the Servian Government was accused of having favored the Pan-Servian movement which had culminated in the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. In consequence Austria-Hungary called upon the Servian Government not only solemnly to condemn the above-mentioned propaganda but also to take, under control of Austria-Hungary, a series of steps in the investigation of the plot, the punishment of the Servian subjects that had participated in it, and the prevention on the soil of the kingdom of any *attentat* in the future. A time-limit of forty-eight hours was fixed for the Servian Government's reply to the above note.

The Imperial Government, to which the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its delivery at Belgrade, when it had studied the demands contained therein, saw that among the number were some that it was entirely impossible to comply with, while others were presented in a form incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. It was found inadmissible that the dignity of Servia should be impaired, as it would be by these demands, or that the preponderance of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans should in this way be assured, and the Russian Government pointed out in the most friendly fashion to Austria-Hungary that it would be desirable to submit the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note to a new examination. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not believe it possible to consent to a discussion of the note. The moderating action of the other Powers at Vienna likewise failed of success.

Although Servia had condemned the crime and had shown herself ready to give satisfaction to Austria in a measure which exceeded the expectations not only of Russia but also of the other Powers, the Minister of Austria-Hungary judged the Servian reply inadequate and left Belgrade.

Recognizing the excessive character of the demands presented by Austria, Russia had previously declared that it would be impossible for her to remain indifferent, while at the same time she was willing to employ all her efforts to obtain a pacific solution which would be acceptable to Austria and satisfy her *amour-propre* as a great power. At the same time Russia stated firmly that she only admitted such a pacific solution of the question as would not imply the diminution of the dignity of Servia as an independent State. Unfortunately all the efforts made by the Imperial Government in this direction remained without effect. The Austro-Hungarian Government, after evading (*s'être dérobé*) every conciliatory intervention of the Powers in its conflict with Servia, proceeded to mobilize, officially declared war on Servia, and the following day

bombarded Belgrade. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accused Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a Common Law crime against a whole people and a whole Government drew to Serbia by the clear lack of any foundation for it great sympathy throughout Europe.

As a consequence of this course of action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government despite the declaration of Russia that she could not remain indifferent to the lot of Serbia, the Imperial Government judged it necessary to order the mobilization of the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. Such a decision was necessary because between the date of the handing of the Austro-Hungarian note to the Servian Government and the first steps of Russia, five days had passed, and meanwhile the Cabinet of Vienna had made no step to meet our pacific efforts—on the contrary, the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian Army had been decreed.

The German Government was informed of the measures taken by Russia. Explanations were at the same time made that these measures were only the consequence of the Austrian armament and in no wise were they directed against Germany. At the same time the Imperial Government declared that Russia was ready to continue the *pourparlers* towards a pacific solution of the conflict, either by means of direct negotiations with the Cabinet of Vienna or, following the proposal of Great Britain, by means of a conference of the four Great Powers not directly interested, namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy.

However, this attempt of Russia also failed. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with us, and the Cabinet at Vienna evaded participation in the projected Conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless Russia did not discontinue her efforts in favor of peace. Replying to the question of the German Ambassador as to the conditions under which we would still consent to suspend our armament, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions would be the recognition by Austria-Hungary that the Austro-Servian question had taken the character of a European question, and the declaration of this same Power that she would consent not to insist on demands that were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Serbia.

The proposal of Russia was judged by Germany to be unacceptable for Austria. Simultaneously there was received at St. Petersburg the news of the proclamation of general mobilization by Austria-Hungary.

At the same time hostilities continued on Servian territory and Belgrade was again bombarded.

The failure of our pacific proposals obliged us to increase the military measures of precaution.

The Berlin Cabinet addressed to us a question on this subject, and reply was made that Russia was forced to begin to arm in order to safeguard herself against all eventualities.

While taking this measure of precaution, Russia none the less did not cease to seek, with all her powers, an issue from the situation, and declared herself ready to accept any method of solution of the conflict which would meet the conditions that we laid down.

Notwithstanding this conciliatory communication, the German Government, 18-31 July, addressed a demand to the Russian Government

for the suspension of her military measures by mid-day of the 19 July-1st August, threatening otherwise to proceed to a general mobilization.

Next day, 19th July-1st August, the Ambassador of Germany transmitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the name of his Government, the declaration of war.

No. 78. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Representatives of His Majesty the Emperor abroad

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 20 July-2 August, 1914.

It is absolutely clear that Germany is already endeavoring to throw upon us the responsibility of the rupture. Our mobilization was provoked by the enormous responsibility which we should have incurred if we had not taken all precautionary measures at a moment when Austria, confining herself to *pourparlers* that were only meant to gain time, was bombarding Belgrade and proceeding to a general mobilization.

His Majesty the Emperor had undertaken, by giving his personal word to the Emperor of Germany, not to undertake any aggressive act so long as the *pourparlers* with Austria should continue. After such a guarantee, and after all the proofs of Russia's love for peace, Germany could not and had no right to doubt our declaration that we would accept with joy any pacific issue compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other solution would be completely incompatible with our own dignity, and would certainly have shaken European equilibrium by ensuring the hegemony of Germany. This European, even world-wide, character of the conflict is infinitely more important than the pretext which created it. By its decision to declare war upon us at a moment when the negotiations between the Powers were still being carried on, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

No. 79. Note handed by the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the 24th July, at 6 o'clock in the evening

By order of his Government the undersigned Ambassador of Austria-Hungary has the honor to notify his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia as follows:

In view of the menacing attitude taken by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia, and since Russia, as a consequence of this conflict, according to a communication from the Cabinet of Berlin, has deemed it advisable to open hostilities against Germany, and since Germany consequently finds herself in a state of war with the said power, Austria-Hungary considers herself equally in a state of war with Russia from the present moment.

(Signed) SZAPARY.

St. Petersburg, 24th July (Aug. 6), 1914.

IV

THE ORIGINAL TEXTS OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE OF JULY 23, 1914, AND THE SERVIAN REPLY OF JULY 25, 1914, WITH ANNOTATIONS

Note.—Much of the discussion in this country with regard to the completeness with which Serbia expressed herself as willing to comply with the Austrian demands has been based upon the translations of the notes of the two different governments, which appeared in England and were reprinted in the American press. The translations of the two notes, (already published in this series) were evidently made by different men, and in many cases the same French word was assigned two different meanings. Since these notes constitute the first steps in the diplomatic crisis which resulted in the general outbreak of war, and are historic documents of the first importance, they are now reprinted in the original French in parallel columns, with comments upon these discrepancies of translation.

EDITOR

International Conciliation.

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

... le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie ¹*fera publier* à la ²*première* page du "Journal officiel" en date du 26 juin (13 juillet) l'énonciation suivante:—

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie ³*condamne* la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche - Hongrie, ⁴*c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu* à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires ⁵*qui en font partie*, et il déplore sin-

SERVIAN REPLIES

... il s'engage à ¹*faire publier* à la ²*première* page du "Journal officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante:

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie ³*condamne* toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche - Hongrie, ⁴*c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu* à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires ⁵*qui en font partie*,

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

- ¹ Shall publish.....
- ² Front.....
- ³ Condemns.....
- ⁴ *i.e.*, To general tendency of which the final aim is to detach.....
- ⁵ Belonging to it.....

AND IN SERVIAN

- Cause to be published.
- First.
- Condemn (and so throughout).
- That is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching.
- Which form part thereof.

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

cèrement les conséquences ⁶ *funestes* de ces ⁷ *agissements* criminels.

“Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes ⁸ *aient participé* à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s’était solennellement ⁹ *engagé* par ¹⁰ *sa* déclaration du 31 mars, 1909.

“Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute ¹¹ *idée ou tentative d’immixtion* dans les ¹² *destinées* des habitants de quelque partie de l’Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d’avertir formellement les officiers, les ¹³ *fonctionnaires* et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera ¹⁴ *avec la dernière rigueur* contre les personnes qui

SERVIAN REPLIES

et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences ⁶ *funestes* de ces ⁷ *agissements* criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes ⁸ *aient participé*, d’après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement ⁹ *engagé* par ¹⁰ *sa* déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, qui désapprouve et répudie toute ¹¹ *idée ou tentative d’une immixtion* dans les ¹² *destinées* des habitants de quelque partie de l’Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considère de son devoir d’avertir formellement les officiers et ¹³ *fonctionnaires* et toute la population du royaume que, dorénavant, il procédera ¹⁴ *avec*

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

- ⁶ Fatal.....
- ⁷ Proceedings.....
- ⁸ Participated.....
- ⁹ Pledged.....
- ¹⁰ Its.....
- ¹¹ All idea of interfering or attempting to interfere.....
- ¹² Destinies.....
- ¹³ Functionaries.....
- ¹⁴ Proceed with the utmost rigour against persons.....

AND IN SERVIAN

- Baneful.
- Movements.
- Should have taken part.
- Engaged.
- The.
- All idea or attempt at interference.
- Destiny.
- Officials.
- Take the most rigorous steps against all such persons.

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

¹⁵ *se rendraient* coupables de pareils ¹⁶ *agissements* qu'il mettra tous ses efforts ¹⁷ *a prévenir et à réprimer.*"

Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale ¹⁸ *par* un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le "Bulletin officiel" de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre:

1. à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine ¹⁹ *et* au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale,

SERVIAN REPLIES

la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui ¹⁵ *se rendraient* coupables de pareils ¹⁶ *agissements*, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts ¹⁷ *a prévenir et a réprimer.*"

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale ¹⁸ *par* un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre:

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine ¹⁹ *et* au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire in-

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

¹⁵ Who may be guilty.....

¹⁶ Machinations.....

¹⁷ Which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress.....

¹⁸ As.....

¹⁹ And.....

AND IN SERVIAN

As are guilty.

Acts.

To prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour.

In.

Or.

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

2. à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite "Narodna Odbrana," à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3. à ²⁰ *éliminer* sans délai de ²¹ *l'instruction publique* en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou ²² *pourrait* servir à fomenter ²³ *la* propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

- ²⁰ Eliminate.....
²¹ Public instruction.....
²² Might.....
²³ The.....

SERVIAN REPLIES

introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société "Narodna Odbrana" et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société "Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à ²⁰ *éliminer* sans délais de ²¹ *l'instruction publique* en Serbie dans ce qui sert ou ²² *pourrait* servir à fomenter ²³ *la* propagande contre l'Autriche - Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et

AND IN SERVIAN

- Remove.
Public educational establishments.
Could.
(omits)

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

4. à éloigner ²⁴ du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal,

5. à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des ²⁵ organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie,

6. à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se

SERVIAN REPLIES

des preuves de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner ²⁴ du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des ²⁵ organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

²⁴ From the military service.....

²⁵ Representatives.....

AND IN SERVIAN

From military service.

Organs.

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

trouvant sur territoire serbe; des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives,

7. à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du ²⁶ *Commandant* Voija Tankosic et du nommé Milan Ciganovic, employé de l'Etat serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo,

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contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15 juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du ²⁶ *Commandant* Voislav Tankossitch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15 juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRIAN NOTE

AND IN SERBIAN

²⁶ Major..... Commandant.

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

8. à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aidé les ²⁷ auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière,

9. à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les ²⁸ *propos* injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes ²⁹ *tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger*, qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise, enfin

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tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les ²⁷ auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les ²⁸ *propos* que ses fonctionnaires, ²⁹ *tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger*; ont eu après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos em-

AS TRANSLATED IN AUSTRAIN NOTE

AND IN SERVIAN

²⁷ Perpetrators.....

Authors.

²⁸ Utterances.....

Remarks.

²⁹ Both in Servia and

Whether in Servia or . . .

AUSTRIAN DEMANDS

10. d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

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ployés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars, 1909.

Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.

68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, July, 1913.

69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima, August, 1913.

70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne, September, 1913.

71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot, October, 1913.

72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane, November, 1913.

73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton, December, 1913.

A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, December, 1913.

The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy. Reprinted from The Congressional Record, October 29, 1913. December, 1913.

74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried, January, 1914.

Wanted—A Final Solution of the Japanese Problem, by Hamilton Holt, January, 1914.

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75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas Murray Butler, February, 1914.

76. Our Relations with South America and How To Improve Them, by George H. Blakeslee, March, 1914.

77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson, April, 1914.

A Panama Primer. Reprinted from *The Independent*, March 30, 1914. April, 1914.

78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from *La Revue* of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson, May, 1914.

79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne, June, 1914.

The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint from the *New York Times*, April 27, 1914. June, 1914. The Japanese in California, June, 1914.

80. War and the Interests of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprint from the *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1914. July, 1914.

81. Fiat Pax, by George Allan England, August, 1914.

82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D., September, 1914.

Special Bulletin. The Changing Attitude toward War as reflected in the American Press. September, 1914.

83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Reprinted Through the Courtesy of the *New York Times*, October, 1914.

Special Bulletin. The Great War and its Lessons, by Nicholas Murray Butler.

84. Additional Official Documents bearing upon the European War. November, 1914.

Up to the limit of the editions printed, any one of the above will be sent post-paid upon receipt of a request addressed to the Secretary of the American Association for International Conciliation, Postoffice Sub-station 84, New York, N. Y.

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I

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DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN WAR SERIES No. III

- I THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG
- II ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE
FRENCH SENATE, AUGUST 4, 1914
- III OFFICIAL JAPANESE DOCUMENTS
- IV ADDRESSES TO THE PEOPLE BY THE EMPEROR OF
GERMANY



DECEMBER, 1914, No. 85

American Association for International Conciliation
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New York City

The Executive Committee of the Association for International Conciliation wish to arouse the interest of the American people in the progress of the movement for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations. To this end they print and circulate documents giving information as to the progress or interruption of these movements, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have readily available accurate information on these subjects. A list of publications will be found on page 38.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S APPEAL FOR IMPARTIALITY AND RESTRAINT IN DIS- CUSSING THE WAR

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself during the last troubled weeks what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say or do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what our ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinions, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such diversions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraint which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?

WOODROW WILSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 18, 1914.

I

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

INTRODUCTION

The neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg has been guaranteed at different times by the larger European powers now unfortunately at war, and the duties of belligerents, including that of the inviolability of neutral territory, have been formally recognized by the powers represented at the Second Hague Peace Conference.

First as to the specific treaties of European powers. On November 15, 1831, a treaty was signed between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Belgium, relative to the separation of Belgium from Holland. Article VII thereof decrees the neutrality of Belgium, and by Article XXV thereof the five powers "guarantee to His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the execution of all the preceding Articles." Article VII, which appears without change in the succeeding treaties, is as follows:

Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.

It will be noted that Holland was not a party to this treaty, as its king was at that time unwilling to acknowledge the independence of Belgium.

On April 19, 1839, a treaty was concluded between the Netherlands and Belgium, by which the former country recognized the independence of the latter, thus dissolving the union between Holland and Belgium created by the Treaty of Vienna of May 30, 1815. The seventh article of this treaty is the same as the corresponding article of the treaty of 1831 and of the subsequent treaties.

On the same date (April 19, 1839) a treaty was concluded between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, on the one hand, and the Netherlands, on the other, recognizing the independence and neutrality of Belgium; and an identical treaty was concluded between the five powers, on the one hand, and Belgium, on the other, to which was annexed the treaty of even date between the five powers and Holland, Article VII of which neutralizes Belgium. The first article of this treaty declares that "they (the articles of the treaty between the Netherlands and Belgium) are thus placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties." The essential difference between the treaty of November 15, 1831, and the series of treaties between the five powers, on the one hand, and the Netherlands and Belgium, on the other, is that, whereas in the first treaty an express guarantee was made to Belgium of its neutrality, in the latter treaties the guarantee is general.

It will be noted that the Germanic Confederation on April 19, 1839, acceded to Articles I to VII, inclusive, of the Treaties of April 19, 1839, and that this accession was accepted by the parties to such treaties. The

importance of this fact is that not merely Prussia and Austria guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, but that all of the German States, including Prussia and Austria, did so.

In 1870 Great Britain feared that France or Germany might violate the neutrality of Belgium, and for this reason Great Britain concluded a treaty with Prussia, on August 9, 1870, and a treaty with France, on August 11, 1870, by the terms of which Prussia and France agreed to observe the neutrality of Belgium, and Great Britain pledged itself in case of a violation of neutrality by either of these countries to use force against the Power so violating the neutrality.

It will be observed that these treaties confirm the quintuple treaty of 1839 and that "without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said quintuple treaty," they "shall be subsidiary and accessory to it."

Passing now to Luxemburg, it appears that Napoleon III, Emperor of France, expected the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, of which the King of the Netherlands was at that time Grand Duke, as the price of his neutrality in the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria. To this Austria objected, and proposed that the Grand Duchy should be neutralized as Belgium had been, and that its fortifications be destroyed. This proposal was agreed to, and a treaty was signed at London, on May 11, 1867, between Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia and Russia, recognizing the neutrality of Luxemburg, and placing it under their collective guaranty. Belgium as a neutral state was not a guarantor of this treaty.

In addition to the above treaties, neutralizing Belgium and Luxemburg, there is a Convention of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, which deals with the subject in general. It is entitled the Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land. The following are the material articles:

The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. (Article I.)

Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power. (Article II.)

A neutral power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Article 2 to 4 to occur on its territory. (Article V.)

The fact of a neutral power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality can not be regarded as a hostile act. (Article X.)

These articles were unanimously adopted by the Conference and were signed and ratified by Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France and other countries. Great Britain signed, but has not ratified the convention, as it objected to Articles XVI, XVII and XVIII thereof, which do not concern the present question. Likewise Servia and Montenegro have signed, but have not ratified the convention. Article XX states that "the provisions of the present convention do not apply except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention." This provision, however, does not justify the violation of Belgian territory by Germany on the morning of August 4, because at that time the powers with which Germany was at war had ratified the convention. Germany was not then at war with Great Britain, a non-contracting power, and it declared war two days later (August 6) against Servia.

**TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, FRANCE,
PRUSSIA, AND AUSTRIA, ON THE ONE PART AND
BELGIUM ON THE OTHER.—SIGNED AT LONDON,
APRIL 19, 1839.***

In the Name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, taking into consideration, as well as His Majesty the King of the Belgians, their Treaty concluded at London on the 15th of November, 1831, as well as the Treaties signed this day, between their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, on the other part, and between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His said Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, their said Majesties have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: * * *

Who, after having communicated to each other their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

**Articles annexed to have same Force as the Treaty. Guarantee of the
Five Powers**

ART. I. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, declare, that the Article hereunto annexed, and forming the tenor of the Treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg,† are considered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus placed under the Guarantee of their said Majesties..

(1) Article VII. Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an Independent and perpetually Neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such Neutrality towards all other States. [Treaty of April 19, 1839].

**Treaty of 15th November, 1831, not obligatory upon High Contracting
Parties**

ART. II. The Treaty of the 15th of November, 1831, between their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,

* See also Treaties of 5th November, 1842; 8th August, 1843; 11th May, 1867; and 9th and 11th August, 1871.

† See page 994.

the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Majesty the King of the Belgians, is declared not to be obligatory upon the High Contracting Parties.

Ratifications

ART. III. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of 6 weeks, or sooner if possible. This exchange shall take place the same time as that of the Ratifications of the Treaty between Belgium and Holland.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty, and have affixed thereto the Seal of their Arms.

Done at London, the 19th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, 1839.

(L. S.) SYLVAIN VAN DE WEYER.

(L. S.) PALMERSTON

(L. S.) SENFFT

(L. S.) H. SEBASTIANI

(L. S.) BULOW

(L. S.) POZZO DI BORGO.

Map of Europe by Treaty
Hertslet, Vol II, pp. 996-998

**ACT OF ACCESSION ON THE PART OF THE GERMANIC
CONFEDERATION TO THE TERRITORIAL AR-
RANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE GRAND DUCHY
OF LUXEMBURG, LAID DOWN IN THE TREATY
OF APRIL 19, 1839.—LONDON, APRIL 19, 1839.***

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia, having this day signed the Treaties concluded between the five Courts and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, between their Majesties the King of the Belgians and the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, and between the five Courts and His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the Plenipotentiaries have deemed it expedient that the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia, invested with Full Powers from the Diet of the Germanic Confederation, should be invited to accede in the name of the said Confederation, to the arrangements concerning the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, which are contained in the Treaties above mentioned.

In consequence, the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia, representing the Diet in virtue of the said Full Powers, declare that the Germanic Confederation formally accedes to the territorial arrangements concerning the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, which are contained in Article I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII, of the Annex to the Treaties this day concluded between the five Courts and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, and between the 5 Courts and His Majesty the King of the Belgians, as well as in the corresponding Articles of the Treaty signed at the same time between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg. And they take towards the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Prussia and Russia, in the name of the Germanic Confederation, the engagement that the Confederation will entirely conform to the stipulations contained in the said Articles, which are hereinafter inserted word for word, so far as they concern the Germanic Confederation.

[Here follow the first 7 Articles of the Annex to the two preceding Treaties.]†

The Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia, in virtue of their Full Powers, formally accept, in the name of their respective Courts, the said Accession on the part of the Germanic Confederation.

The present Act of Accession shall be ratified by the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Prussia and Russia, and also by the Germanic Confederation, by means of a Decree of the Diet,

* See also Treaty of 11th May, 1867.

† Article VII. Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually Neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such Neutrality toward all other States.

of which the requisite number of copies shall be prepared. And the respective Acts of Ratification shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of 6 weeks from this date, or sooner if possible, and at the same time as the exchange of the Ratifications of the 3 Treaties above mentioned.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Act of Accession, and have affixed thereto the Seal of their Arms.

Done at London, the 19th day of April, in the year of our Lord, 1839.

(L. S.) PALMERSTON.

(L. S.) SENFFT.

(L. S.) SENFFT.

(L. S.) BULOW.

(L. S.) SYLVAIN VAN DE WEYER.

(L. S.) H. SEBASTIANI.

(L. S.) DEDEL.

(L. S.) BULOW.

(L. S.) POZZO DI BORGO.

**TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND PRUSSIA,
RELATIVE TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND NEU-
TRALITY OF BELGIUM.—SIGNED AT LONDON,
AUGUST, 9, 1870.***

[Ratifications exchanged at London, August 26, 1870.]

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn Act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium, as provided in Article VII of the Treaty signed at London on the 19th of April, 1839, between Belgium and the Netherlands, which Article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually inserted in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to conclude between themselves a separate Treaty, which, without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it; and they have accordingly named as their Plenipotentiaries for that purpose, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Granville George Earl Granville, Lord Leveson, a Peer of the United Kingdom, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports and Constable of Dover Castle, Chancellor of the University of London, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

And His Majesty the King of Prussia, his Excellency the Minister of State, Albert Count of Bernstorff-Stintenburg, Grand Cross of the Order of the Red Eagle with Oak Leaves, and Grand Commander of the Royal Order of the House of Hohenzollern in Diamonds, &c., Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty from his said Majesty for the North German Confederation:

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ART. I. His Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to

* British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 60, pp. 13-17.

insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.

II. His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.

III. This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for 12 months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on Article I of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839.

IV. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 9th day of August, in the year of our Lord 1870.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE.

(L. S.) BERNSTORFF.

**TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,
RELATIVE TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND NEU-
TRALITY OF BELGIUM.—SIGNED AT LONDON,
AUGUST 11, 1870.***

[Ratifications exchanged at London, August 26, 1870.]

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn Act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium, as provided by Article VII of the Treaty signed at London on the 19th of April, 1839, between Belgium and the Netherlands, which Article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to conclude between themselves a separate Treaty, which, without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it; and they have accordingly named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Granville George Earl Granville, Lord Leveson, a Peer of the United Kingdom, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports and Constable of Dover Castle, Chancellor of the University of London, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

And His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Excellency the Marquis de la Valette, a Member of His Privy Council, a Senator, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honour, His Ambassador to Her Britannic Majesty;

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ART. I. His Majesty the Emperor of the French having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which France is now engaged with the North German Confederation and its Allies, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by the North German Confederation and its Allies, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of the North German Confederation and its Allies should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Imperial Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in con-

* British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 60, pp. 10-13.

junction with His Imperial Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between France and the North German Confederation and its Allies, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.

II. His Majesty the Emperor of the French agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.

III. This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between France and the North German Confederation and its Allies, and for 12 months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest, as heretofore, on Article I of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839.

IV. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respect[ive] Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 11th day of August, in the year of our Lord 1870.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE.

(L. S.) LA VALETTE.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS, PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA, RELATIVE TO THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBURG AND THE DUCHY OF LIMBURG.—SIGNED AT LONDON, MAY 11, 1867.*

In the Name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, taking into consideration the change produced in the situation of the Grand Duchy in consequence of the dissolution of the ties by which it was attached to the late Germanic Confederation, has invited Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the King of the Belgians, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, to assemble their Representatives in Conference at London, in order to come to an understanding, with the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King, Grand Duke, as to the new arrangements to be made in the general interest of Peace.

And Their said Majesties, after having accepted that invitation, have resolved, by common consent, to respond to the desire manifested by His Majesty the King of Italy to take part in a deliberation destined to offer a new pledge of security for the maintenance of the general tranquillity.

In consequence, Their Majesties, in concert with His Majesty the King of Italy, wishing to conclude a Treaty with a view to that object, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:—

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Edward Stanley, commonly called Lord Stanley, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, a Member of Parliament, her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Sieur Rudolph Count Apponyi, Chamberlain and Privy Councillor of His Imperial Royal and Apostolic Majesty, his Ambassador Extraordinary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the Sieur Sylvain Van de Weyer, Minister of State, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Sieur Godfrey Bernard Henry Alphonse, Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne Lauraguais, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

His Majesty the King of Italy, the Sieur Emmanuel Taparelli de Lagnasco, Marquis d'Azeglio, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

* See Declarations of France and Prussia of 17th July, 1870.

His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, the Sieur Adolphus Baron Bentinck, his Chamberlain and Minister of State, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.; the Baron Victor de Tornaco, Minister of State, President of the Government of the Grand Duchy, his Honorary Chamberlain, &c.; and the Sieur Emanuel Servais, Vice-President of the Council of State and of the Superior Court of Justice, formerly Member of the Government, &c.;

His Majesty the King of Prussia, the Sieur Albert Count de Bernstorff-Stintenburg, his Minister of State and Chamberlain, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

And His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Philip Baron de Brunnow, his Actual Privy Councillor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, &c.;

Who, after having exchanged their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Maintenance of Rights of the House of Orange-Nassau

ART. I. His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, maintains the ties which attach the said Grand Duchy to the House of Orange-Nassau, in virtue of the Treaties which placed that State under the Sovereignty of the King Grand Duke, his descendants and successors.

The Rights which the Agnates of the House of Nassau possess with regard to the Succession of the Grand Duchy, in virtue of the same Treaties, are maintained.

The High Contracting Parties accept the present Declaration, and place it upon record.

Grand Duchy to form a Perpetual Neutral State under Guarantee of Contracting Parties

ART. II. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, under the Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State.

It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other States.

The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of Neutrality stipulated by the present Article.

That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the collective Guarantee of the Powers signing Parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral State.

Luxemburg to cease to be a Fortified City. Troops to be maintained by the King Grand Duke.

ART. III. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg being Neutralised, according to the terms of the preceding Article, the maintenance, or establishment

of Fortresses upon its Territory becomes without necessity as well as without object.

In consequence, it is agreed by common consent that the City of Luxemburg, considered in time past, in a military point of view, as a Federal Fortress, shall cease to be a fortified city.

His Majesty the King Grand Duke reserves to himself to maintain in that city the number of troops necessary to provide in it for the maintenance of good order.

Evacuation of Fortress of Luxemburg by Prussian Troops

ART. IV. In conformity with the stipulations contained in Articles II and III, His Majesty the King of Prussia declares that his troops actually in garrison in the Fortress of Luxemburg shall receive orders to proceed to the Evacuation of that place immediately after the exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty. The withdrawal of the artillery, munitions, and every object which forms part of the equipment of the said Fortress shall commence simultaneously. During that operation there shall remain in it no more than the number of troops necessary to provide for the safety of the material of war, and to effect the dispatch thereof, which shall be completed within the shortest time possible.

Demolition of Fortress of Luxemburg by the Netherlands

ART. V. His Majesty the King Grand Duke, in virtue of the rights of Sovereignty which he exercises over the City and Fortress of Luxemburg, engages, on his part, to take the necessary measures for converting the said Fortress into an open city by means of a demolition which His Majesty shall deem sufficient to fulfill the intentions of the High Contracting Parties expressed in Article III of the present Treaty. The works requisite for that purpose shall be commenced immediately after the withdrawal of the garrison. They shall be carried out with all the attention required for the interests of the inhabitants of the city.

Fortifications not to be Restored

His Majesty the King Grand Duke promises, moreover, that the Fortifications of the city of Luxemburg shall not be restored in future, and that no Military Establishment shall be there maintained or created.

Duchy of Limburg to form an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

ART. VI. The Powers signing Parties to the present Treaty recognise that the Dissolution of the Germanic Confederation having equally produced the Dissolution of the ties which united the Duchy of Limburg, collectively with the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, to the said Confederation, it results therefrom that the relations, of which mention is made in Articles III, IV, and V of the Treaty of the 19th April, 1839, between the Grand Duchy and certain Territories belonging to the Duchy of Limburg, have ceased to exist, the said Territories continuing to form an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Ratifications*

ART. VII. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged at London within the space of 4 weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the Seals of their Arms.

Done at London, the 11th day of May, in the year of Our Lord, 1867.

(L. S.) STANLEY.
(L. S.) APPONYI.
(L. S.) VAN DE WEYER.
(L. S.) LA TOUR D'AUVERGNE.
(L. S.) D'AZEGLIO.
(L. S.) BENTINCK.
(L. S.) TORNACO.
(L. S.) E. SERVAIS.
(L. S.) BERNSTORFF.
(L. S.) BRUNNOW.

(During the War between France and Prussia in 1870,* 1871, those Powers mutually engaged to respect the Neutrality of Luxemburg.)

* Ratifications exchanged at London, 31st May, 1867.
The Map of Europe by Treaty,
Hertslet, Vol. III, pp. 1801-1805.

CONVENTION RESPECTING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS AND PERSONS IN CASE OF WAR ON LAND.

CHAPTER I.—THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS

ARTICLE I

The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

ARTICLE II

Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.

ARTICLE III

Belligerents are likewise forbidden to:

(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea;

(b) Use any installation of this kind established by them before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public messages.

ARTICLE IV

Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.

ARTICLE V

A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles II to IV to occur on its territory.

It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of its neutrality unless the said acts have been committed on its own territory.

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ARTICLE X

The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act.

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CHAPTER V.—FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE XX

The provisions of the present Convention do not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.

II

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE FRENCH SENATE AUGUST 4, 1914.

Translated by Theodore Henckels

Gentlemen, after having notified us of the existence of a state of war, the German Ambassador left Paris yesterday.

It is incumbent upon the government to lay before Parliament the true account of the events which in less than ten days have led to the European war and compelled peaceful and sturdy France to defend her frontier against an aggression whose premeditated suddenness emphasizes the odious injustice of it.

This aggression that nothing can excuse and that had already been started before any declaration of war had reached us, is the final act in a plan, the origin and purpose of which I mean to lay before our democracy and the public opinion of the civilized world.

In the train of the abominable crime which brought about the death of the Arch-Duke and heir of Austria-Hungary and of the Duchess of Hohenberg, certain difficulties arose between the cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade.

A majority of the powers were only semi-officially informed of this fact on Friday, July 24, when the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors forwarded to them a circular which has been reprinted in the public press.

It was the object of this circular to explain and justify an ultimatum which the envoy of Austria-Hungary, accredited to Belgrade, had on the previous day addressed to Servia.

Affirming the complicity of numerous Servian citizens and associations in the crime of Serajevo, this ultimatum insinuated that the official Servian authorities themselves had had a hand in the act. It demanded an answer from Servia by six o'clock P. M., Saturday, July 25.

The satisfactions exacted, or some of them at least, incontestably assailed the rights of a sovereign state; despite their excessive nature, Servia on July 25 declared almost unreservedly her readiness to comply with them.

The counsels of France, of Russia, and of Great Britain offered to Belgrade from the beginning had had a part in this compliance, which meant a diplomatic success for Austria-Hungary and a guarantee for European peace.

These counsels were all the more important because the Austro-Hungarian demands had been concealed from the chancellories of the Triple Entente, to which, within the previous three weeks, the Austro-Hungarian government had repeatedly given assurances that these demands would be extremely moderate.

The cabinets of Paris, of St. Petersburg and of London were therefore justly astounded when on July 26 they learned that the Austrian Minister

at Belgrade had, after an examination of a few minutes, declared the Servian answer unacceptable, and broken off diplomatic relations.

This unexpected action was aggravated by the fact that as early as Friday, July 24, the German Ambassador had come to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom he read a verbal note stating that the Austro-Servian conflict must be localized without the intervention of the great powers, or otherwise there would be cause to fear "incalculable consequences." Similar steps were taken on Saturday, the 25th, at London and at St. Petersburg.

Gentlemen: is it necessary to point out to you in what measure the threatening words used by the German Empire at Paris were in contrast with the conciliating sentiments of which the powers of the Triple Entente had just given proof by advising Servia to comply with the demands presented? Without further discussing the abnormal nature of the step taken by Germany, we did, nevertheless, in agreement with our allies and our friends immediately engage in conciliatory negotiations by inviting Germany to take part therein.

From the beginning we regretfully realized that our dispositions and our efforts were not reciprocated at Berlin.

Not only did Germany in no way appear disposed to give to Austria-Hungary such friendly advice as her position entitled her to, but from that very moment and even more so in the days following, she seemed to interpose herself between Vienna and the propositions for negotiations made on the part of the other powers.

On Tuesday, July 28, Austria-Hungary declared war against Servia. This declaration, which aggravated the state of affairs created by the rupture of diplomatic relations forty-eight hours previously, gave reason to believe that war had been premeditated and a systematic program had been evolved with a view to subjugating Servia.

Not only the independence of a sturdy people, but the balance of power in the Balkans, inscribed in the treaty of Bucharest of 1913 and approved by the moral adhesion of all the great powers, were thus put in jeopardy.

At the suggestion of the British government, ever conscientiously endeavoring to maintain European peace, the negotiations were nevertheless carried forward, or to be more exact, the powers of the Triple Entente endeavored to carry them forward. From this common desire issued the proposition of a four-fold action by England, France, Germany, and Italy for the purpose of reaching an equitable settlement of the conflict, and of assuring to Austria compliance with every legitimate demand she had made. When on Wednesday, July 29, the Russian government realized the persistent check to these endeavors, and in view of the Austrian mobilization and declaration of war feared that Servia would be crushed by the Austrian army, that government decided by way of precaution to mobilize her troops in four military districts, that is to say, to form a military cordon along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively.

In doing this Russia took care, however, to inform the German government that this limited measure of no offensive character with regard to Austria was also in no way directed against Germany.

In the conversation which he had with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged this fact forthwith.

On the other hand, everything Great Britain attempted to do with the adhesion of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria and Servia together under the moral patronage of Europe met at Berlin with the opposition of an irreconcilable attitude, of which the absolute proof is disclosed in the diplomatic correspondence.

This was a disquieting state of affairs, indicating that very probably Berlin was making certain mental reservations. A few hours later these suppositions and fears were to be transformed into certainties.

Indeed, within thirty-six hours the negative attitude of Germany was replaced by justly alarming measures. In declaring the state of war on July 31, Germany cut off communication between herself and the rest of Europe, and under the veil of absolute secrecy undertook military operations against France which, as appears from what I have stated, nothing could justify.

For several days, and in a situation which it is difficult to explain, Germany had already been preparing to transform her army from the peace to the war footing.

As early as the morning of July 25, that is to say, even before the expiration of the time limit granted to Servia by Austria, Germany had issued instructions to the garrisons in Alsace-Lorraine. On the same day she had provided ammunition for the fortified positions near the frontier. On the 26th she had issued to the railroads preparatory instructions with a view to the concentration of their rolling stock. On the 27th she had effected all requisitions and placed her covering troops. On the 28th individual appeals to reservists had been sent out and those far removed from the frontier had been brought nearer.

Could all these measures, prosecuted with an unrelenting thoroughness, leave any doubts regarding the intentions of Germany?

This was the state of affairs when, on the evening of July 31, the German government, which since the 24th had by no positive act participated in the conciliatory endeavors of the Triple Entente, addressed an ultimatum to the Russian government on the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilization of her armies, and it demanded that within the space of twelve hours an end should be brought to this mobilization.

This demand, all the more insulting in its form because only a few hours before Emperor Nicholas II had requested the mediation of the German Emperor, an act of spontaneous trustfulness, was made at the very moment when, upon the request of England and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian government had accepted a proposition which was intended to prepare for a friendly adjustment of the Austro-Servian conflict and the Austro-Russian difficulties through the simultaneous stopping of all military operations and preparations.

This unfriendly measure toward Russia was on the same day followed by acts plainly hostile toward France, stoppage of all railway, telegraph and telephone communication, seizure of French railway engines upon their arrival at the frontier, placing of mitrailleuses in the middle of the railway track, which had been torn up, and concentration of troops on the frontier.

From this moment we could no longer believe in the sincerity of the pacific assurances which the representative of Germany persisted in giving us.

We knew that under the mask of the state of war which she had declared, Germany was mobilizing her army.

We learned that six classes of the reserves had been called to the colors and that the transportation stock to facilitate the concentration of these forces was ordered made ready for army corps stationed at a great distance from the frontier.

As these events proceeded, our government, alert and vigilant, took from day to day and from hour to hour those safeguarding measures made necessary by the situation; the general mobilization of our land and sea forces was ordered.

That same evening at 7:30 o'clock, and regardless of the acceptance by the St. Petersburg cabinet of the English proposition to which I have already referred, Germany declared war against Russia.

The following morning, Sunday, August 2, regardless of the extreme moderation of France, contrary to the pacific declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in utter contempt of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier at three different points.

At the same time, and in violation of the treaty of 1867, which with the signature of Prussia guaranteed the neutrality of Luxemburg, German troops invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy, thereby justifying the protest made by the Luxemburg government.

And finally the neutrality of Belgium was threatened: the German envoy on the evening of August 2 presented to the Belgian government an ultimatum, requesting it to facilitate in Belgium the military operations of Germany against France, on the false pretext that we were threatening Belgian neutrality. The Belgian government refused to comply, declaring that it was resolved to defend, with energy, a neutrality which was respected by France and guaranteed by a treaty, among the signatories to which was the King of Prussia.

Gentlemen: aggressive acts have ever since been continued, increased and accentuated; at more than fifteen different points our frontier has been violated. Our soldiers and customs officers were fired at, resulting in killed and wounded. Only yesterday a German military aviator dropped three bombs upon Lunéville.

We have communicated these facts to all the great powers, as well as to the German Ambassador, who has neither denied them nor expressed any regret. On the contrary, he came to me last evening to ask for his passports and to notify us of the state of war by declaring, contrary to all truth, that French aviators had committed hostile acts within German territory in the region of the Eiffel and even on the railway from Carlsruhe to Nuremberg. I have his letter with me and I am going to read it to you:

Mr. President:

The German military and administrative authorities have observed a certain number of marked acts of hostility committed by the French military aviators on German territory. Several of these aviators have plainly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country. One of them attempted to destroy certain constructions near Wesel, others have been seen over the region of the Eiffel, while still another has dropped bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I have been directed, and I have the honor to make known to your Excellency, that in the presence of these aggressions the German Empire considers itself at war with France, through acts of the latter power.

At the same time I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the German authorities will hold French merchant vessels in the German ports, but will release them if, within forty-eight hours, complete reciprocity has been assured.

My diplomatic mission having thus been brought to an end, there remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to provide me with my passport and to order such measures taken as your Excellency may deem necessary to insure my return to Germany, together with the personnel of the Embassy, the personnel of the Bavarian Legation, and of the Consulate-General of Germany at Paris.

Be kind enough, Mr. President, to accept assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) SCHOEN.

Gentlemen: why is there need of my insisting upon the absurdity of these pretexts, which they would present to us in the guise of grievances? At no time did a French aviator penetrate into Belgium; neither in Bavaria or in any other part of Germany did any French aviator commit any act of hostility. Public opinion in Europe has already done justice to these miserable mendacities.

Against this attack, which violates all the laws of equity and all the rules of public law, we have already taken the necessary measures, which will be most emphatically and calmly carried out.

The mobilization of the Russian army is being likewise prosecuted with remarkable energy and unbounded enthusiasm. The Belgian army, mobilized to the number of 250,000 men, is making ready to defend the neutrality and independence of its country with magnificent ardor.

The English fleet is entirely mobilized and orders have been issued to mobilize the English land forces.

Since the year 1912, communications have been carried on between the English and French general staffs. They had led to an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State yesterday acquainted the House of Commons with the contents of this correspondence, and with the concurrence of the British government I have the honor to read these two documents to Parliament:

SIR EDWARD GREY TO M. CAMBON

London, Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador:—From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and

ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reasons to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c., E. GREY.

M. CAMBON TO SIR EDWARD GREY
(Translation)

French Embassy, London, Nov. 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward:—You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, November 22d, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. If those measures involved action the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c., PAUL CAMBON.

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to France amid the applause of the members in the highest and warmest terms, and his language has deeply impressed all French hearts.

From this tribune I wish, in the name of the government of the Republic, to thank the English government for the cordiality of its words, and I know the French Parliament is one with me in the expression of this sentiment.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has in particular made the following declaration:

In case the German fleet should cross the channel or move up into the North Sea or pass around the British Isles, for the purpose of attacking the French coasts or the French war fleet and to harass the French merchant marine, the English fleet will intervene and give her entire protection to the French marine, so that from that moment England and Germany would be at war.

Hence the English fleet covers our northern and western coasts against German aggression.

Gentlemen: those are the facts; I believe that in their rigorous succession they are sufficient to justify the acts of the government of the Republic.

From this recital I wish, however, to draw a conclusion and give the real meaning of the unheard-of aggression to which France has fallen victim.

Do you know that at various times the victors of 1870 have desired to follow up the blows they dealt us at that time? The war intended to overwhelm defeated France was in 1875 prevented only by the intervention of the two powers to which we were later to be bound by ties of alliance and friendship, by the intervention of Russia and by that of Great Britain.

Ever since, by the restoration of the national vigor and the consummation of diplomatic agreements invariably lived up to, the French Republic has succeeded in liberating itself from the yoke which even in time of peace Bismarck had placed upon Europe.

It has reestablished the European balance, the guarantee of the liberty and dignity of each nation.

Gentlemen: I do not know whether I am mistaken in my estimate of the situation, but it seems to me that this work of pacific rehabilitation, of liberation, and of dignity, definitely sealed in 1904 and 1907 with the genial help of King Edward VII, of England, and of the government of the Crown, it seems to me it is that which the German Empire now seeks to destroy by one audacious blow.

There is nothing in this situation for which Germany can blame us.

For the sake of peace we have made an unprecedented sacrifice by bearing in silence for half a century the open wound made by her in our side.

We have made still other sacrifices in all the discussions which since

1904 the Imperial diplomacy has systematically provoked, either in Morocco or elsewhere, in 1905 as well as in 1906, in 1908 and in 1911.

At the time of the events of 1908, as well as in the present crisis, Russia also has given proof of great moderation. She, together with the Triple Entente, has shown great moderation when, in the Eastern crisis of 1912, Austria and Germany made unwarranted demands upon Serbia and upon Greece, as has been proven by the events themselves.

But the sacrifices have proved useless, the compromises, futile; the efforts, idle; since now, while engaged in acts of conciliation, we and our allies are unexpectedly attacked.

No one can in good faith say that we were the aggressors; it is an effort spent in vain to try to obscure the sacred principles of right and of liberty that govern both nations and individuals: with the clear perception of the Latin genius, Italy has informed us that she means to remain neutral.

Throughout France this decision is met with an expression of sincerest joy. I have constituted myself the spokesman to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, by telling him how much I rejoiced because the two sister nations of the same origin and the same ideals, with a common glorious past, were not to be opposed to one another. Gentlemen, I wish to affirm most plainly that what Germany attacks is that independence, that dignity, that security which the Triple Entente has again found in that balance of power which it placed at the service of peace.

What Germany attacks is those liberties of Europe, of which France, her allies, and her friends are proud to be the defenders.

We are going to defend these liberties; for it is they that are at stake and all the rest has been but a pretext.

France unjustly challenged, has not sought this war. She has done all in her power to prevent it. But, being forced upon her, France will defend herself against Germany and against any other power which, not yet having made known its position in this crisis, should decide to take its place with the latter in the conflict between the two. A people free and strong, upholding century-old ideals and marshalling its forces to safeguard its existence; a democracy that has been able to develop its military strength, and that only this past year did not shrink from shouldering the additional burdens forced on us to meet the armaments of our neighbor; a nation in arms, fighting for its very life, for the independence of Europe, those are some of the elements of the spectacle that we feel honored to lay before the witnesses of this formidable struggle, for which preparations are under way and the result of which we face with absolute equanimity.

We are blameless. We are without fear.

Under less favorable conditions, France has repeatedly proven that she is a most redoubtable adversary when she prepares, as she is now doing, to fight in behalf of liberty and of right.

In laying our acts before you, you gentlemen who are our judges, we have on our side, that which will help us to bear the burden of our great responsibility, the consolation of a clear conscience and the feeling of certitude that we have well performed our duty.

III

OFFICIAL JAPANESE DOCUMENTS

I

THE IMPERIAL RESCRIPT ISSUED AT TOKIO, AUGUST 23, 1914, 6 P.M.

We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne occupied by the same Dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following Proclamation to all Our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war against Germany and We command Our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and We also command all Our competent authorities to make every effort, in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim by all means within the limits of the law of nations.

Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, calamitous effect of which We view with grave concern, We on our part have entertained hopes of preserving peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiaochou, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while its armed vessels cruising seas of Eastern Asia are threatening Our commerce and that of Our Ally. Peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

Accordingly, Our Government and that of His Britannic Majesty, after full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests, contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance and We on Our part being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means commended Our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, Our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice. It is with profound regret that We, in spite of Our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while we are still in mourning for Our lamented Mother.

It is Our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of Our faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the Empire be enhanced.

II

AGREEMENT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN, SIGNED AT LONDON, JULY 13, 1911.

PREAMBLE

The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said agreement, namely:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of their special interests in the said regions:—

ARTICLE I

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this agreement are in jeopardy, the two governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ARTICLE II

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either high contracting party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the other high contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III

The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this agreement.

ARTICLE IV

Should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

ARTICLE V

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the high contracting parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

ARTICLE VI

The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force ten years from that date.

In case neither of the high contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 13th day of July, 1911.

E. GREY,

His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.

TAKAAKI KATO,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the
Court of St. James.

III

TELEGRAM DESPATCHED BY THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM AT BERLIN ON AUGUST 15, 1914.

"You are hereby instructed to address to Herr von Jagow immediately on receipt of this telegram a signed note to the following effect:

The undersigned Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan has the honor in pursuance of instructions from his Government to communicate to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the German Emperor to the following effect:—

Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia which is the aim of the said agreement the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

First—To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn;

Second—To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914 to the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the entire leased territory of Kiaochou with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the same time that in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23rd, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

The undersigned, etc."

IV

ADDRESS OF THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE IMPERIAL DIET, SEPTEMBER, 5 1914.

Following is the text of Baron Kato's speech on foreign affairs to the Imperial Diet yesterday:—

Gentlemen, I esteem it an honor to be allowed to give you here in this House a brief review of the progress of events which led to war between Japan and Germany, with consequent termination of diplomatic relations between Japan and Austria-Hungary.

As you are well aware the present war in Europe originated in the Servo-Austro-Hungarian affair. On July 28th last Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia and the same day the Austro-Hungarian Government, in a note verbale, communicated that fact to the Japanese Ambassador at Vienna.

Previous to this event Russia ordered a partial mobilization of her army for the purpose of restraining the action of Austria-Hungary, to which the latter responded with counter mobilization on her part. A critical situation was thus brought forth upon the relations of several Powers. Hereupon Great Britain proposed a conference of four Powers, namely, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, with a view to pacific settlement of the situation. But the British efforts were not successful. In the meantime Austria Hungary ordered the mobilization of her entire military forces, thus compelling Russia to make more extended preparations. On July 31st the German Government communicated to the Russian Government that unless Russia would stop her military activities by noon August 1st Germany would order a general mobilization and on the following day the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in the name of his Government, advised the Russian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs that war was declared, whereupon Russia on her part declared war on Germany the following day.

On the other hand Germany which since July 31st had been showing military activities also on the Franco-German frontier, recalled her Ambassador in France. This compelled France to order mobilization and recall her Ambassador in Germany. The two States thus entered upon a state of war.

Furthermore Germany not only violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, but sent an ultimatum to Belgium demanding in disregard of her neutrality to facilitate German military operations. Great Britain, which has a very strong interest in Belgian neutrality, asked both the French and the German Governments whether they would respect the neutrality of that Kingdom. France replied that she was prepared to do so unless another Power violated that neutrality. But Germany refused to give that guarantee. It was under force of these circumstances that Great Britain decided at length to take part in the European war on the side of France and Russia.

The above is a résumé of the situation arising first from the Servo-Austro-Hungarian dispute and eventuating in the present war with Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side and Russia, France and Great Britain on the other.

Realizing from the outset the gravity of the European situation thus created the Imperial Government felt it necessary to make known the attitude of Japan in regard to this situation, and as early as August 4th the Foreign Office issued the following statement:—

"The Imperial Government cannot but view with grave concern from both political and economical standpoints the latest aspect of the political situation in Europe. It need hardly be said that the Imperial Government earnestly hope for a speedy termination of strife and early restoration of peace. But unfortunately if the present war must continue, the Imperial Government hope that the sphere of the contest will not extend beyond the regions which are actually involved in the war, and so far the Imperial Government believe that they will be able to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality. It is necessary, however, that further development of the situation should be most closely watched. In the event of Great Britain becoming involved in the conflict and the object of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance be at stake, Japan may take such measures as are necessary to fulfil her obligations under that Agreement. It cannot be predicted at present whether a time for such action may come or not. The Imperial Government, while earnestly hoping that no such occasion will arise, are nevertheless paying most careful attention to various aspects of the situation."

It is plain from the foregoing statement that the Imperial Government from the outset earnestly hoped that the effect of the European war would not extend over to the Far East. As was related above, however, Great Britain was at last compelled to take part in the contest, and early in August the British Government asked the Imperial Government for assistance under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance. German men-of-war and armed vessels were then prowling the seas of Eastern Asia to the serious menace of our commerce and that of our Ally, while in Kiaochou, her leased territory in China, Germany was busy with warlike preparations, apparently with the purpose of making it the base of her warlike operations in Eastern Asia. Grave anxiety was thus felt as to the maintenance of the peace of the Far East.

As you all are aware the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain has for its object, the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in Eastern Asia, insuring the independence and integrity of China as well as the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in that country, and the maintenance and defence respectively of the territorial rights and of the special interests of the contracting parties in Eastern Asia. Therefore inasmuch as she is asked by her Ally for assistance at the time when the commerce in Eastern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain regard alike as one of their special interests, is subjected to constant menace, Japan, which regards that alliance as the guiding principle of her foreign policy, cannot but comply with such request and do her part. Besides in the opinion of the Government the possession by Germany, whose interests are opposed to those of the Anglo-Japanese

Alliance, of a base of her powerful activities in one corner of the Far East is not only a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent peace of Eastern Asia, but is also in conflict with the more immediate interests of our own Empire. The Government, therefore, resolved to comply with the British request and if necessary in doing so to open hostilities against Germany and after the Imperial sanction was obtained, they communicated this resolution to the British Government. Full and frank exchange of views between the two Governments followed and it was finally agreed between them to take such measures as may be necessary to protect the general interest contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance.

Japan had no desire or inclination to get herself involved in the present conflict. She only believed that she owed it to herself to be faithful to the Alliance and strengthen its foundation by ensuring the permanent peace of the East and by protecting the special interests of our two allied Powers. Desiring, however, to solve the situation by pacific means, the Imperial Government gave on August 15th the following advice to the German Government:

"Considering it highly important and necessary, in the present situation, to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:—

"1st. To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

"2nd. To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chou with a view to eventual restoration of same to China.

"The Imperial Japanese Government announce, at the same time, that, in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23, 1914 the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying an unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation."

But until the last moment of the time allowed for the purpose, namely, noon August 23rd, the Imperial Government received no answer from the German Government. Thus the two countries having unfortunately entered upon a state of war, the Imperial Rescript declaring war on Germany was issued the same day.

As for Austria-Hungary, which has only very limited interests in the Far East, Japan desired to maintain peaceful relations with it as long as possible for in spite of the fact that the present trouble originated in the affair between that country and Servia, Japan's position in relation thereto, was naturally different from that of other Powers of Europe. At the same

time it appeared as if Austria-Hungary had also desired to avoid complications with Japan. In fact, as soon as Japan and Germany entered upon a state of war, the Austro-Hungarian Government asked for the consents and good offices of the Imperial Government for permitting the Kaiserin Elizabeth, their only man-of-war in the Far East likely to force a state of war upon Japan and Austria-Hungary, to go to Shanghai to be disarmed there. But Great Britain being already at war with Austria-Hungary, the Imperial Government had to consult with the British Government before coming to any decision on this matter. The Imperial Government, therefore, consulted with the British Government and having ascertained that the latter entertained no particular objection to Japan's acceding to the Austro-Hungarian request, I was about to communicate that fact to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, when all of a sudden on August 27 the said Ambassador informed me that in consideration of Japan's action against Germany, his Government instructed him to leave his post. Hereupon the Imperial Government immediately handed passports to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador and at the same time instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna to withdraw from his post. Diplomatic relations between Japan and Austria-Hungary were thus broken off.

The above is the résumé of the situation which led to war between Japan and Germany and to consequent rupture of diplomatic relations of Japan with Austria-Hungary.

I cannot close my speech without a word on the courtesy which the American Government were good enough to extend to the Imperial Government in connection with the present trouble.

When the relations between Japan and Germany reached a point of rupture, the Imperial Government asked the American Government if in case of need they would be good enough to undertake the protection of Japanese subjects and interests in Germany. This request the American Government promptly complied with. Subsequently upon the rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and Austria-Hungary, the Imperial Government again appealed to the American Government for the protection of Japanese subjects and interests in Austria-Hungary and were given the same willing consent as before. I desire to avail myself of this opportunity to give an expression to the sincere appreciation on the part of the Imperial Government of the courtesy so kindly extended by the American Government.

While regretting that Japan was compelled to take up arms against Germany, I am happy to believe that the army and navy of our illustrious Sovereign will not fail to show the same loyalty and valor with which they distinguished themselves in the past, so that we all may be blessed with an early restoration of peace.

IV

ADDRESSES TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE

Out of the depths of my heart I thank you for this expression of your love and your fidelity. During the conflict we are about to enter upon, I shall no longer distinguish political parties among my people. We are one and all Germans. And whatsoever parties have, in the heat of debate, turned upon me, I forgive. It is a question now solely of standing together like brothers, then God will help the German sword to victory.—KAISER WILHELM on August 1, 1914, from the balcony of the Berlin Palace.

To the German People!

Since the founding of the Empire, during a period of 43 years, it has been my zealous endeavor and the endeavor of my ancestors to preserve peace to the world and in peace to promote our vigorous development. But our enemies envy us the success of our toil. All professed and secret hostility from East and West and from beyond the sea, we have till now borne in the consciousness of our responsibility and power. Now, however, our opponents desire to humble us. They demand that we look on with folded arms while our enemies girt themselves for treacherous attack. They will not tolerate that we support our ally with unshaken loyalty, who fights for its prestige as a great power, and with whose abasement our power and honor are likewise lost. Therefore the sword must decide. In the midst of peace the world attacks us. Therefore up! To arms! All hesitation, all delay were treachery to the Fatherland. It is a question of the existence or non-existence of the Empire which our fathers founded anew. It is the question of the existence or the non-existence of German might and German culture. We shall defend ourselves to the last breath of man and beast. And we shall survive this fight, even though it were against a world of enemies. Never yet was Germany conquered when she was united. Then forward march with God! He will be with us as He was with our fathers.

WILHELM,
I. R.

BERLIN, August 6, 1914.

ERRATUM

In Document No. 83, page 113, Annex II, the Confidential Communication of the Imperial Chancellor to the Confederated Governments of Germany was dated July 23. It has been pointed out that the original *Vorläufige Denkschrift und Aktenstücke zum Kriegausbruch*, which had not been received when the material was set up, is dated July 28. To avoid possible misapprehension and consequent injustice the error is herewith brought to the attention of the readers of INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.
68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, July, 1913.
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82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D., September, 1914.
- Special Bulletin. The Changing Attitude toward War as reflected in the American Press. September, 1914.
83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Reprinted Through the Courtesy of the *New York Times*, October, 1914.
- Special Bulletin. The Great War and its Lessons, by Nicholas Murray Butler.
84. Additional Official Documents bearing upon the European War. November, 1914.
85. Documents Regarding the European War. Series III. December, 1914.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SPECIAL BULLETIN

CONTEMPORARY WAR POEMS



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

JOHN ERSKINE

DECEMBER, 1914 No. 85th

American Association for International Conciliation
Sub-Station 84 (407 West 117th Street)
New York City



THE poems of this collection have been chosen to illustrate the emotional attitudes of the United States toward the war, as those attitudes find expression in newspaper and magazine verse. At another time the literary merits of these pieces would invite judgment or comment; now, however, the suitability of war poems for the purpose of an anthology is a very minor question, and it is therefore not as a literary museum that these verses are offered, but as social documents, as evidence of the state of our civilization at this moment. Of course the emotional attitudes of a nation may unfortunately change from day to day, and it is quite possible that before these selections are in print they may have ceased to represent the national feeling, but at this moment at least we may read in them certain well-defined and common attitudes which are all the more significant since the individual poems were written in various circumstances, and come together here almost by accident.

The first observation the reader will make is that the glamor of war has not touched these poems; here are no stirring battle songs and no heroic ballads. Perhaps the newspaper correspondent and the newspaper photograph have made war too frightfully real for any but a horrified treatment; perhaps warfare has ceased for the moment at least to be an idea of any sort, alluring or otherwise, and has become, or has tended to become, for the public consciousness simply an ugly and stupefying fact. But however we explain it, the absence of glamor from these verses on the war is a new and interesting phenomenon. Even when war has been condemned in itself, poets have usually recognized the moral value of certain of its by-products, or have justified the battles fought in a good cause. Chivalry gave the modern gentleman the example and the name for his ideal behavior, as the Roman arms gave St. Paul an illustration of the Christian life; Wordsworth could portray the duties of conscientious bloodshed in his "Happy Warrior" without disturbing his own or his readers' equanimity; Tennyson could sing of that peculiarly militaristic obedience that does not discriminate between a useful and unequivocal command and a fatal and obvious error—he could even satisfy us that those

men are "noble" who discard reason and execute what they know is a blunder; and even yesterday, as it seems, William Vaughan Moody could imply in his beautiful and otherwise enlightened "Ode in Time of Hesitation" that a war is just, even morally alluring, if it rises from generous impulses and is made to serve some high end. Doubtless there are many to agree with the great poets in all these instances, but clearly the verse-writers who have been expressing the emotional judgments of the United States in the last few weeks do not agree with them. The battle passages in Wordsworth's poem, Tennyson's fine song, and Moody's eloquent peroration have suddenly become antiquated, and Christianity is invoked, not in the images of discipline and strategy, but in the figure of the widowed and the orphaned and the slain. There can be little question that if the United States were actually in the conflict this humane attitude would largely disappear, and the glamor of war would return upon much of our verse; yet never before has so general a condemnation of war been voiced even by a nation at peace.

Since this frame of mind prevails in these poems, it is not surprising that the "literary" manner is absent from them. Whatever else they are, these pieces are spontaneous and sincere; they impress the reader as vehicles of an urgent protest rather than as elaborations of a theme. No one would charge the writers with having used the war for "copy." Such abstinence may not be self-denial—it may not be a virtue at all; it is, however, unusual. War in the past has not only fitted out ethics and religion with a language of spiritual control and conflict, but it has also furnished the ballad-maker with incident. This war from the beginning has been rich in incident, and it broke out at a moment when narrative verse, after a long interval, was returning to popular favor. We might have expected, therefore, that such a collection as this would contain accounts of air- and sea-fights, of forced marches and exciting encounters, but the papers have been singularly barren of such material. One journal complained editorially that its office was deluged with verse on the war in general, but no poems were coming in which dealt with single events or aspects, and the editor pointed out that successful war-poems in the past have confined themselves to the stirring details of the conflict, instead of projecting a broad mental attitude. His testimony is significant. When we have become hardened to this war or have got further away from its horrors, we may begin to make literary use

of them, but at present, it seems, the poets and their readers think it a kind of sacrilege to convert any of this stupendous misery to the purposes of art.

It might have been expected also that feeling so anti-military would have directed itself against one or another of the warring governments, as against the supposed nurse and citadel of militarism. Yet the poems in our newspapers have in this respect shown remarkable poise; much more in fact than the editorials. To be sure, a few foreign-born Americans whose spirit at such a moment as this naturally resides in their fatherland, wherever their physical presence may be, have expressed a violent partisanship. To make this collection representative, examples of this kind of prejudice have been included. For the most part, however, it has been militarism rather than any one country or government that has roused the indignation expressed in these poems.

Is it fanciful to read in them a new emphasis on democracy? There have always been protests in American literature against the aristocratic conception of war, against the willingness to devote the common man to the salvation or the profit of a few, but the protests here gathered seem to contain surprise as well as indignation. Why surprise? We cannot suppose these writers are ignorant of the venerable antiquity of this selfishness, or of its prevalence in all aristocratic countries to-day. Carlyle summed the matter for us in a famous passage in "Sartor Resartus." Evidently the American poet to-day supposed that the old giant of feudalism had been withered up by modern humaneness, and his surprise comes from discovering his mistake. In his own intellectual background liberal ideas of the best sort have, it seems, been making during recent decades faster progress than he realized; the manner of his protest implies that the right of all men to live and enjoy life is everywhere beyond dispute, and that all life, whether in peasant or noble, is equally sacred. This implication, if we do not deceive ourselves in reading it throughout these poems, is probably their most American contribution and their chief significance. It is what makes them seem remarkably cosmopolitan. The bitterness against war here expressed is very remote from the interest an outsider would manifest; the makers of these verses write not as spectators of the disaster but as sharers in it. Sympathy so broad has been the mark of rare natures, but here it seems to be a public attitude.

Is it fanciful to discover also in certain of these poems an in-

lication of the new position that woman holds in society? War has always fallen heavily on the children and the mothers, and such poems as Ella Wheeler Wilcox's "The Messenger" have always been part of man's comment on the tragedy of battle. But in some of these poems the injustice that war does to womanhood is defined in a new way, with the implication that the tragedy might be avoided, and that women will no longer accept it as inevitable. So at least one may read the verses by Edith M. Thomas and those by Edna Valentine Trapwell. As in the rest of this collection the emphasis is upon the right of the common man to enjoy life, peace and safety, so in these fine poems the emphasis is upon woman's right to decide whether she will pay the penalty that war always exacts of her.

These are the attitudes that are most clearly discovered in these verses. As a whole the collection represents, so to speak, the nation's first impression of the war. It should have value as evidence of our instinctive reaction at a moment so searching.

JOHN ERSKINE.

Columbia University.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN WALKS AT MIDNIGHT

BY VACHEL LINDSAY

It is portentous, and a thing of state
That here at midnight, in our little town
A mourning figure walks, and will not rest
Near the old court-house pacing up and down.

Or by his homestead, or the shadowed yards
He lingers where his children used to play,
Or thru the market, on the well-worn stones
He stalks until the dawn-stars burn away.

A bronzed, lank man! His suit of ancient black,
A famous high top-hat and plain worn shawl
Make him the quaint great figure that men love,
The prairie-lawyer, master of us all.

He cannot sleep upon his hillside now.
He is among us, as in times before!
And we who toss and lie awake for long
Breathe deep, and start, to see him pass the door.

His head is bowed. He thinks on men and kings.
Yea, when the sick world cries, how can he sleep?
Too many peasants fight, they know not why,
Too many homesteads in black terror weep.

The sins of all the war-lords burn his heart.
He sees the dreadnaughts scouring every main.
He carries on his shawl-wrapt shoulders now
The bitterness, the folly and the pain.

He cannot rest until a spirit-dawn
Shall come;—the shining hope of Europe free;
The league of sober folk, the Workers' Earth
Bringing long peace to Cornland, Alp and Sea.

It breaks his heart that kings must murder still,
That all his hours of travail here for men
Seem yet in vain. And who will bring white peace
That he may sleep upon his hill again?

Springfield, Illinois.

—The Independent.

THE NEW BEATITUDE

BY RICHARD BUTLER GLAENZER

In gay Brabant I have danced till the night turned rose,
All the health and the wealth of a Rubens before my eye.

In meadows which only the trumper of byways knows,
I have tasted the peace of earth neath a kind calm sky,
Glad of the Angelus, gladdened by love-looks shy
And the laughter of children and songs of men who mow.
All that I hear to-day is the harsh dull cry:

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

In Picardy plain through which all joyance flows
Like the tranquil Somme; and churches beautify

Every hamlet with noble shrines that spell repose;
And the simple peasant has never a thought to deny
A bed or a snack to the stranger wandering by,—
In gentle, smiling Picardy, all aglow

With poppies amid ripe wheat, I hear the sigh:

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

In Prussia the proud, whose boundaries enclose
Full many a fireside happy once to vie

In soft content with any home that owes
Its worth to toil and thrift, now gone awry;

Yea, in proud Prussia, not only those that fly
The Cossack, but women secure from death or blow,—
Do not their hearts confess (though lips may lie):

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

ENVOY

Lord Prince of Peace, who for men's sins didst die,
Let them not reap the whirlwind that they sow!

Twice-crucified, do not Thou too reply:

Blessed are they which died a year ago!

—*The Bookman.*

THE MAD WAR

BY RICHARD BUTLER GLAENZER

Because one man, one man, was slain—
No more a man than you or I—
Must nations suffer murder's stain,
Millions be made to die?

They have no cruel wrong to right,
No wrong to rouse a righteous ire;
No noble cause for which to fight
With heart and soul on fire.

Austria's heir was killed by plan!
Ah, so is someone's hope each day:
Can vengeance give back life to man,
Though royal be his clay?

A ruler's death to punish? Then,
Punish the cowards and their tool;
But not a million guiltless men
With hungry homes to rule!

Attila and his wolfish Huns,—
We read of them as horror past:
That "Scourge of God" before our guns
Were less than trumpet-blast.

Ponder how Death now bares his teeth,
Waiting the certain holocaust;
The vanquished torn and crushed beneath
A conqueror half lost.

War . . . this red madness of an hour
Whelped from base fear by baser pride
Unbalanced by its lust for power?
The mailed fist defied!

One group of three who fraternise
To-day, though once close locked in hate,
To thwart another three must rise,
All blaming all on Fate.

Christians, they prate of "Triplices"
As if of pledges made to God.
What is the Trinity to these
Who trample life roughshod?

The civilised! The civilised!—
Smug irony of modern cant!
Culture so blind, self-idolised,
The East may well supplant.

And well may smile the pagan Mars
And grin the bloody Juggernaut:
Christendom rends its Saviour's scars
With weapons Judas-bought.

Harken, vain Europe— Nay, your ears
Can only hear your shout "To arms!"
Deaf to your women's pleading tears,
Your children's dazed alarms.

Yet could you hear, and heed the roar
Of sullen Asia, you would cease
Ruin's mad march, though cold before
Your flaunted Prince of Peace.

—*The Bookman.*

WAR

BY WITTER BYNNER

Fools, fools, fools,
Your blood is hot to-day.
It cools
When you are clay.
It joins the very clod
Wherein your foe shall be,—
Wherein you look at God,
Wherein at last you see
The living God,
The loving God,
Which was your enemy.

—*The Nation.*

A PRAYER

BY EDWARD S. VAN ZILE

God of my Fathers, grant me aid
That I may rout my countless foes!
By Thee were guns and cannons made,
From Thee the joy of battle flows.

O God, who gave me might and power,
Thou knowest that my heart is pure.
Be with me in this awful hour,
That I and mine may still endure.

Thou art the God who loveth war,
And famine, rapine, blood and death;
I pray Thee stand beside me, for
Thou knowest what my spirit saith.

The soul of me is linked with Thine
To bid the blood of heroes flow,
The death we grant them is divine,
And in Thy name I bid them go.

God of my Fathers, still be kind
To them who raise Thy banner high,
While Thou and I together find
The surest way for them to die.

They do my bidding. God, look down
And bless the sword that I have drawn.
My blight shall fall on field and town,
And thousands shall not see the dawn.

To Thee, O God, I give all praise
That Thou hast made my hand so strong;
That now, as in my father's days,
The King and Thee can do no wrong.

—*The New York Sun.*

IF!

BY BARTHOLOMEW F. GRIFFEN

Suppose 'twere done!
The lanyard pulled on every shotted gun;
Into the wheeling death-clutch sent
Each millioned armament,
To grapple there
On land, on sea and under, and in air!
Suppose at last 'twere come—
Now, while each bourse and shop and mill is dumb,
And arsenals and dockyards hum—
Now all complete, supreme,
That vast, Satanic dream!

Each field were trampled, soaked,
Each stream dyed, choked,
Each leaguered city and blockaded port
Made famine's sport;
The empty wave
Made reeling dreadnought's grave;
Cathedral, castle, gallery, smoking fell
'Neath bomb and shell;
In deathlike trance
Lay industry, finance;
Two thousand years'
Bequest, achievement, saving, disappears
In blood and tears,
In widowed woe
That slum and palace equal know,
In civilization's suicide—
What served thereby, what satisfied?
For justice, freedom, right, what wrought?
Naught!

Save, after the great cataclysm, perhap
On the world's shaken map
New lines, more near or far,
Binding to king or czar;
In festering hate
Some newly vassalled state;
And passion, lust and pride, made satiate;
And just a trace
Of lingering smile on Satan's face!

—*The Boston Globe.*

THE VICTORY

BY JAMES J. MONTAGUE

No martial music goes before,
No stirring bugles play,
As in the smoking wake of war
I take my somber way.
But where pale women wait and weep,
Where old men cringe in dread,
And little trusting children sleep,
I take my toll of dead.

Afar from fame's highways I seek,
Through farm and little town,
The frail, the innocent, the meek,
And swiftly strike them down.
They never know the battle's thrill
Nor watch the flag that waves
Its inspiration, ere they fill
Their unremembered graves.

They shall not wake a nation's pride
In years that are to be;
For war and fame march side by side,
But hunger walks with me.
I fill no glowing history's page
With thrilling hero lore;
Yet I have been, through every age,
The blackest curse of war.

—*Hearst's Magazine,*

THE MESSENGER

BY ELLA WHEELER WILCOX

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She rose up in the early dawn,
And white and silently she moved
About the house. Four men had gone
To battle for the land they loved,
And she, the mother and the wife,
Waited for tidings from the strife.
How still the house seemed! and her tread
Was like the footsteps of the dead.

The long day passed; the dark night came,
She had not seen a human face,
Some voice spoke suddenly her name.
How loud it echoed in that place,
Where, day on day, no sound was heard
But her own footsteps. "Bring you word,"
She cried to whom she could not see,
"Word from the battle-plain to me?"

A soldier entered at the door,
And stood within the dim firelight:
"I bring you tidings of the four,"
He said, "who left you for the fight."
"God bless you, friend," she cried, "speak on!
For I can bear it. One is gone?"
"Ay, one is gone," he said. "Which one?"
"Dear lady, he, your eldest son."

A deathly pallor shot across
Her withered face; she did not weep.
She said: "It is a grievous loss,
But God gives His beloved sleep.
What of the living—of the three?
And when can they come back to me?"
The soldier turned away his head:
"Lady, your husband, too, is dead."

She put her hand upon her brow;
A wild, sharp pain was in her eyes.
"My husband! Oh, God help me now!"
The soldier heard her shuddering sighs.

The task was harder than he thought.
"Your youngest son, dear madam, fought
Close at his father's side; both fell
Dead, by the bursting of a shell."

She moved her lips and seemed to moan.

Her face had paled to ashen gray:
"Then one is left me—one alone,"

She said, "of four who marched away.
Oh, overruling, All-wise God,
How can I pass beneath Thy rod!"
The soldier walked across the floor,
Paused at the window, at the door,

Wiped the cold dew-drops from his cheek
And sought the mourner's side again.

"Once more, dear lady, I must speak:

Your last remaining son was slain
Just at the closing of the fight.

"Twas he who sent me here to-night."

"God knows," the man said afterward,

"The fight itself was not so hard."

—*The New York Evening Journal.*

THE SURVIVOR

BY DANA BURNET

Have ye heard the thunder down the wind?

Have ye seen the smoke against the sky?

*Nay, for my love goes from my arms
To march and die!*

Have ye seen the scarlet battle flags,

The distant lightnings of the sword?

*Nay, for my house hath lost its king,
My heart its lord!*

Have ye heard the splendid lifting song

The wind-blown pæan of the strife?

*Nay, for they sing of Death—and I
Am chained to life!*

—*The New York Evening Sun.*

WOMAN AND WAR

"SHOT. TELL HIS MOTHER"

BY W. E. P. FRENCH, Captain, U. S. Army

What have I done to you, Brothers,—War-Lord and Land-Lord and Priest,—

That my son should rot on the blood-smeared earth where the raven and buzzard feast?

He was my baby, my man-child, that soldier with shell-torn breast,
Who was slain for your power and profit—aye, murdered at your behest,
I bore him, my boy and my manling, while the long months ebbed away:
He was part of me, part of my body, which nourished him day by day.

He was mine when the birth-pang tore me, mine when he lay on my heart,

When the sweet mouth mumbled my bosom and the milk-teeth made it smart,

Babyhood, boyhood, and manhood, and a glad mother proud of her son—

See the carrion birds, too gorged to fly! Ah! Brothers, what have you done?

You prate of duty and honor, of a patriot's glorious death,
Of love of country, heroic deeds—nay, for shame's sake, spare your breath!

Pray, what have you done for your country? Whose was the blood that was shed

In the hellish warfare that served your ends? My boy was shot in your stead.

And for what were our children butchered, men makers of cruel law?

By the Christ, I am glad no woman made the Christless code of war!

Shirks and schemers, why don't you answer? Is the foul truth hard to tell?

Then a mother will tell it for you, of a deed that shames fiends in hell:—

Our boys were killed that some faction or scoundrel might win mad race

For goals of stained gold, shamed honors, and the sly self-seeker's place;
That money's hold on our country might be tightened and made more sure;

That the rich could inherit earth's fullness and their loot be quite secure;

That the world-mart be wider opened to the product mulct from toil;
That the labor and land of our neighbors should become your war-won
 spoil;

That the eyes of an outraged people might be turned from your graft
 and greed

In the misruled, plundered home-land by lure of war's ghastly deed;
And that priests of the warring nations could pray to the selfsame God
For His blessing on battle and murder and corpse-strewn, blood-soaked
 sod.

Oh, fools! if God were a woman, think you She would let kin slay
For gold-lust and craft of gamesters, or cripple that trade might pay?

This quarrel was not the fighters':—the cheated, red pawns in your
 game:—

You stay-at-homes garnered the plunder, but the pawns,—wounds,
 death, and "Fame"!

You paid them a beggarly pittance, your substitute prey-of-the-sword,
But, ye canny beasts of prey, they paid, in life and limb, for your hoard.
And, behold! you have other victims: a widow sobs by my side,
Who clasps to her breast a girl-child. Men, she was my slain son's
 bride!

I can smell the stench of the shambles, where the mangled bodies lie;
I can hear the moans of the wounded; I can see the brave lads die;
And across the heaped, red trenches and the tortured, bleeding rows
I cry out a mother's pity to all mothers of dear, dead "foes."
In love and a common sorrow, I weep with them o'er our dead,
And invoke my sister woman for a curse on each scheming head.

Nay, why should we mothers curse you? Lo! flesh of our flesh are ye;
But, by soul of Mary who bore the Christ man-murdered at Calvary,
Into our own shall the mothers come, and the glad day speed apace
When the law of peace shall be the law of the women that bear the race;
When a man shall stand by his mother, for the world-wide common
 good,
And not bring her tears and heart-break nor make mock of her mother-
 hood.

—*New York Times.*

A PRAYER OF THE PEOPLES

(On the Day of the President's Call to Prayer)

BY PERCY MACKAYE

God of us, who kill our kind!
Master of this blood-tracked Mind
Which from wolf and Caliban
Staggers toward the star of Man—
Now, on Thy cathedral stair,
God, we cry to Thee in prayer!

Where our stifled anguish bleeds
Strangling through Thine organ reeds,
Where our voiceless songs suspire
From the corpses in Thy choir—
Through Thy charred and shattered nave,
God, we cry on Thee to save!

Save us from our tribal gods!
From the racial powers, whose rods—
Wreathed with stinging serpents—stir
Odin and old Jupiter
From their ancient hells of hate
To invade Thy dawning state.

Save us from their curse of kings!
Free our souls' imaginings
From the feudal dreams of war;
Yea, God, let us nevermore
Make, with slaves' idolatry,
Kaiser, czar, or king of *Thee!*

We who, craven in our prayer,
Would lay off on Thee our care—
Lay instead on *us* Thy load;
On our minds Thy spirit's goad,
On our laggard wills Thy whips
And Thy passion on our lips!

Fill us with the reasoned faith
That the prophet lies who saith
All this web of destiny,
Torn and tangled, cannot be
Newly wove and redesigned
By the Godward human mind.

Teach us, so, no more to call
Guidance supernatural
To our help, but—heart and will—
Know ourselves responsible
For our world of wasted good
And our blinded brotherhood.

Lord, our God! to whom, from clay,
Blood and mire, Thy peoples pray—
Not from Thy cathedral's stair
Thou hearest:—Thou criest *through* our prayer;
For our prayer is but the gate:
We, who pray, ourselves are fate.

—*The New York Times.*

MEMORY AWAKES

BY ETHEL H. WOLFF

What care I for war, or who may lose!
Thank God that I am old, and these dim eyes
Long since wept dry. Fear, in her hideous guise,
No more can haunt my pillow till the long night flies,
Whispering her dreadful tale.

What is't to me that others' sons must go?
My share is paid in three mounds, side by side;
And I live on, who gladly would have died,
With naught to lose, whate'er may now betide—
Whether 'tis win or fail.

Women may lie with open eyes till the faint dawn
Thinking of lips that babble feebly to a darkening sky—
Gray hands that clutch a water flask long since run dry—
Of husband, lovers, sons—but not so I—
On dreamless seas I sail.

Prate not to me of war! I've had my fill
Of death and sacrifice and bitter tears;
Yon marching feet, and blaring music in my ears
But rend apart my graves, now green these many years—
Make Time Past drop its veil.

—*The New York Times.*

WE MOURN FOR PEACE

[For the Peace Parade, August 29]

BY EDITH M. THOMAS

"Who is this pacing sisterhood,
Moving in silent, broken mood,
Clad all in mourning weeds?
Are ye the celebrants of martial deeds—
The work of dauntless spirits lifted high
From many a red field where the brave for country die?"

No! We are not the celebrants of warlike deeds—
We mourn for World-Peace slain,
Hid in our hearts until she rise again!
We hate your fields of death,
Your brazen Mars that leads
Where men are reaped as grain!
Your "Glory" is to us but venomous breath!
A-near our hearts your "causes" do not lie—
Nor one, nor other, O ye warring States!

But we are they who hate your mutual hates;
And we are they whom ye shall ask in vain,
In home's dear covert to remain—
Praying at home—yet serving still your needs,
Yielding to you our sons, our brothers and our mates—
We mourn for World-Peace slain—
We mourn—but oh, not that alone!
A heresy through all our ranks is blown:
The order old is changing—shall not come again;
No more shall tender cowardice restrain,
The "Call of Country" shall betray no more,
To trick our tears in bravery of a smile,
Gazing upon the glittering file
Of those that march away to war (so fain!)—
Of whom what remnant shall their fate restore?

We—celebrants of martial deeds?
Trading in precious lives more dear than are our own?
At last, O warring States, the soul-of-woman know—
We will not give our men, to serve your schemes,
Your cozzening plans, and your Imperial dreams!

And if ye seize them, we to slaughter too will go,
And in the breach ourselves will throw;
Upon us, too, the quiver of your hatreds rain!
We mourn the World-Peace slain!

—*The Evening Post.*

WHO PAYS?

BY EDNA VALENTINE TRAPNELL

Drum and trumpet and banner, banner and trumpet and drum!
Tramp, tramp, through the city streets the new-listed armies come.
Song and laugh on the transports steaming under the stars,
Wet eyes star-blind of those behind who pay for the nations' wars—
(The women who pay and have paid, dear Lord, for immemorial wars.)

Cheers and shouts greet the headlines that tell of the battles won.
Who remembers the death-wrecked bodies motionless under the sun?
"Victory stood to our banners, only a handful lost—"
Only! We bore those bodies, and we know what bodies cost!
(Mothers and wives of the soldiers dead—who better can gauge the cost?)

Man is blinded by passion, by glory or gold or power.
Shall we not see more clearly when it comes to the woman's hour?
Before we loose hell's lightning that shall prove a cause through strife,
Shall we not weigh the price we pay when the payment's in human life?
(Dear Lord, we know by each birth-throe the value of human life.)

Counselors, kings, and rulers, ye take what ye cannot give.
Can ye say to the things in the trenches, "Be whole, rise up and live"?
Do ye know—who have killed your thousands by a word from a death-
tipped pen—
One little pang of the cost to those who breed you your fighting men?
(Who pays, dear Lord, for their bodies and souls but the mothers and
wives of men?)

—*The Outlook.*

DOUBT

BY PERCY MACKAYE

So thin, so frail the opalescent ice
Where yesterday, in lordly pageant, rose
The monumental nations—the repose
Of continents at peace! Realities
Solid as earth they seemed; yet in a trice
Their bastions crumbled in the surging flocks
Of unconceivable, inhuman woes,
Gulfed in a mad, unmeaning sacrifice.

We, who survive that world-quake, quail and start,
Searching our hidden souls with dark surmise:
So thin, so frail—is reason? Patient art—
Is it all a mockery, and love all lies?
Who sees the lurking Hun in childhood's eyes?
Is hell so near to every human heart?

—*Boston Evening Transcript.*

DESTINY

BY PERCY MACKAYE

We are what we imagine, and our deeds
Are born of dreaming. Europe acts to-day
Epics that little children in their play
Conjured, and statesmen murmured in their creeds;
In barrack, court and school were sown those seeds,
Like Dragon's teeth, which ripen to affray
Their sowers. Dreams of slaughter rise to slay,
And fate itself is stuff that fancy breeds.

Mock, then, no more at dreaming, lest our own
Create for us a like reality!
Let not imagination's soil be sown
With armed men but justice, so that we
May for a world of tyranny atone
And dream from that despair—democracy.

—*Boston Evening Transcript.*

RHEIMS

BY PERCY MACKAYE

Apollo mourns another Parthenon
In ruins!—Is the God of Love awake?
And we—must we behold the world's heart break
For peace and beauty ravished, and look on
Dispassionate?—Rheims' gloried fane is gone:
Not by a planet's rupture, nor the quake
Of subterranean titans, but to slake
The vengeance of a Goth Napoleon.

O Time, let not the anguish numb or pall
Of that remembrance! Let no callous heal
Our world-wound, till our kindled pities call
The parliament of nations, and repeal
The vows of war. Till then, pain keep us thrall!
More bitter than to battle—is to feel.

—*Boston Evening Transcript.*

IN MEMORIAM

NOTRE DAME DE RHEIMS, SEPTEMBER, 1914

BY LEE WILSON DODD

Men raised thee with loving hands;
Thy stones, more precious than gems,
They wrought for a Light to the Lands;
Now the Light of all Lands condemns
Hun and Vandal and Goth
Who serve the Lords of the Night,
Who have turned the coat of their troth
And darkened Our Lady of Light.

Men made thee beautiful, yea
Their hearts flowed out as they wrought;
Thou wast builded not for a day,
For an age thou wast builded not:
And they carved thy portals and towers
For peer and burgher and clown,
That the Book of Our Lady's Hours
Might endure tho' the sun burned down.

By the grace of thy ruined Rose,
By the sullied strength of thy Towers,
Thou shalt triumph, Lady! Thy foes
Shall cower as the hunted cowers.
Thou hast not fallen in vain—
Fallen? Thou canst not fall:
They shall crave thy pity in pain,
Who flung thee hate for a pall.

—*The New York Tribune.*

PEASANT AND KING

(What the peasants of Europe are thinking)

BY CHRISTOPHER MORLEY

You who put faith in your banks and brigades,
Drank and ate largely, slept easy at night,
Hoarded your lyddite and polished the blades,
Let down upon us this blistering blight—
You who played grandly the easiest game,
Now can you shoulder the weight of the same?
Say, can *you* fight?

Here is the tragedy: losing or winning
Who profits a copper? Who garners the fruit?
From the bloodiest ending to futile beginning
Ours is the blood, and the sorrow to boot.
Mustering your music, flutter your flags,
Ours are the hunger, the wounds, and the rags.
Say, can *you* shoot?

Down in the muck and despair of the trenches
Comes not the moment of bitterest need;
Over the sweat and the groans and the stench
There is a joy in the valorous deed—
But, lying wounded, what one forgets
You and your ribbons and d——d epaulettes—
Say, do *you* bleed?

This is *your* game: it was none of our choosing—
We are the pawns with whom you have played.
Yours is the winning and ours is the losing,
But, when the penalties have to be paid,
We who are left, and our womenfolk, too,
Rulers of Europe, will settle with you—
Are you afraid?

—*The Evening Post.*

WHO DIES IF ENGLAND LIVE?

BY MORRIS RYSKIND

LONDON, Sept. 3.—England, ready for a staggering blow on publication of the government casualty list, heaved a sigh of relief when it was found that so few of the noble families had been affected.—*The Mail*, Sept. 3.

Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses went forth into the fray;
Ten thousand stalwart Tommies who gave Death their lives for pay.
But still we sing, "God Save the King," and thank the Fates of War:
For Viscount What-the-Who's-This hasn't even got a scar.

Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses, courageous, clear-eyed, brave,
Went boldly into battle—and the battlefield's their grave.
Their souls God rest!—He knows what's best: Good news, bad news
shall match:
The Duke of What-You-Call-It hasn't even got a scratch.

Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses that faced the German hordes;
Ten thousand Tommy Atkinses cut down by guns and swords.
In peace they sleep.—Why do ye weep, ye girls they left behind?
Lord So-and-So is safe and sound.—The others,—never mind!
—*The Columbia Jester.*

THE PRICE

By J. H. H.

A costly thing is a War Lord's word
When he bids his subjects draw the sword.

Here's part of the cost the Germans pay
For their Kaiser's plunge into bloody strife:
For a metal check they trade away
A vigorous German soldier's life.
Thousands and thousands of little tags
Have been garnered by British and French, they say,
To send to Berlin in gunny bags.
Dear God! what an awful price to pay;
And scarcely a month has flown away.

But this is only the partial cost,
Because in the tumult of the fray
Thousands and thousands of checks are lost,
And the lives they tally are thrown away;
For they fail to get even metal disks,
For those who bleeding and anguished stray,
For the souls they count in missing lists.
Great God! what an awful price to pay;
And scarcely a month has flown away.

Can the Kaiser bring them back again?
Can the War Lord still the tortured wail
Of wives and children for murdered men?
Oh! the shocked world shudders at the tale.
If 'twere only loss of yellow gold,
Or only lack of barter and sale,
Why, hearts might grieve, but they'd not grow cold.
Dear God! what an awful price to pay
Ere scarcely a month has flown away.

When the Kaiser bids them fight, they must;
They cannot, they dare not disobey.
But there'll be reckoning, since God is just,
For blood and iron have had their day;
And out of the wreck of war for greed
The German nation will be freed
From the heavy hand of the War Lord's breed.
But God! what an awful price to pay;
And scarcely a month has flown away.

A costly thing is a War Lord's word
When he bids his subjects draw the sword.

NOTE.—Each German soldier wears an identification check. The newspapers of September 7 reported that 62,000 of these checks had been gathered by the Allies to be sent to Berlin.

—*The New York Times.*

FOR ALL WE HAVE AND ARE

(*An Answer*)

BY HENRY B. SALISBURY

"For all we have and are,"
"For all our children's fate,"
Stand and denounce the war
Of horrid, hellish hate.
Let empires pass away
And kingdoms be o'erthrown.
For deeds ye've done to-day
Shall thrones and crowns atone?

"Though all we know depart,"
"The old commandments stand."
"Thou shalt not kill." Ye start?
"Thou shalt not steal" the land.

Though emperors give the word
To drench with blood the world,
There's a law above the sword
By mightier power unfurled.
"Love thou thy neighbor as thyself."
Heard ye that King's command?
Go! Royal lords of pelf,
Go! Hide your bloody hand.

Though kingly robes ye wear
(Your brother's keeper still.)
The mark of Cain ye bear;
Hark ye: "Thou shalt not kill."
The hand upon the wall
Has written out your fate.
"Begone." Ye rulers all,
Feel ye the millstone's weight.

The people to their own
Shall come when ye are gone.
Your exit shall atone.
(Ye were better never born.)
The brotherhood of man
From war's ruin shall rise,
War shall all nations ban
As your regal power dies.

"Though all we know depart,"

"The old commandments stand."

"Thou shalt not kill." Ye start?

"Thou shalt not steal" the land.

—*The New York Globe.*

TO EUROPE

BY GEORGE STERLING

I

Beat back thy forfeit plowshares into swords.
It is not yet the far, seraphic Dream
Of peace made beautiful and love supreme.
For now the strong, unwearable chords
Of battle shake to thunder, and the hordes
Advance, where now the circling vultures scream.
The standards gather and the trumpets gleam;
Down the long hillside stare the mounted lords.

Now far beyond the tumult and the hate
The white-clad nurses and the surgeons wait
The backward currents of tormented life,
When on the waiting silences shall come
The screams of men, and, ere those lips are dumb,
The searching probe, the ligature and knife.

II

Was it for such, the brutality and the pain,
Civilization gave her holy fire
Unto thy guardianship, and the snowy spire
Of her august and most exalted fane?
Are these the harvests of her ancient rain
Men glean at evening in the scarlet mire,
Or where the mountain smokes, a dreadful pyre,
Or where the war-ship drags a bloody stain?

Are these thy votive lilies and their dews,
That now the outraged stars look down to see?
Behold them, where the cold prophetic damps
Congeal on youthful brows so soon to lose
Their dream of sacrifice to thee—to thee,
Harlot to Murder in a thousand camps!

III

Was it for this that loving men and true
Have labored in the darkness and the light
To rear the solemn temple of the Right
On Reason's deep foundations, bared anew
Long after the Cæsarian eagles flew
And Rome's last thunder died upon the Night?
Cuirassed, the cannon menace from the height;
Armored, the new-born eagles take the blue.

Wait not thy lords the avenging certain knell—
One with the captains and abhorrent fames
The echoes of whose conquests died in Hell?—
They that have loosened the ensanguined flood
And whose malign and execrable names
The Angel of the Record writes in blood.
—*The New York World.*

THE VULTURE

BY GEORGE S. HELLMAN

I

With bleeding wings and shame-enveiled eyes.
How like a stricken eagle flies
The soul of mankind now!
War, the great vulture, hunts her from the skies;
His raucous voice mocks at her high desire;
His grim, embattled wings forbid her goal.
O thou world-soul,
How long shall thy dark foe besmirch thee with his mire?

II

Blame not too far the Hohenzollern pride;
Trace not the curse alone to Emperor or Czar;
Yield sorrowful applause
To Belgic valor, Gaul's defensive cause,
Or England's loyalty to treaties and to laws;
Yet shall no man escape the essential shame,
Nor any of earth's nations, whatsoe'er its name,
To what avail, paternity denied,
Since misbegotten War
Is the foul offspring of a sire world-wide?

III

Oh, grim account soon to be rendered—
Illimitable columns of lost life—
When vulture War, whom mankind hath engendered,
With sated gorge flies from the fields of strife!
Then
Shall we, with searching vision of brave men,
To its far roots far-reaching evil trace,
And bear our share in a whole world's disgrace;
Or, quibbling like mean merchants, face the score,
Crying, "The crafty Slav hath caused this war!"
Or "Sordid Anglo-Saxon!" or "Nay,
The too-ambitious Teuton—let *him* pay!"

IV

Immediate causes are for shallow minds:
He hath small sight who uses but his eyes.
If the world-soul sails forth on high emprise,
Her care is not alone the contravening winds
Of autocratic wills,
Or venomous shafts of ancient racial passions.
These shall be transient ills—
The forms ridiculous of barbaric fashions—
When once the universal voice of man
Proclaims in tones that God shall hear afar:
"In the great future's perfect plan
There is no place for war!"

V

Let tiger 'gainst fierce tiger fight in lust,
While the dark jungle trembles with the fray;
Deep crimsoning with blood the gray Saharan dust,
Let lions dispute their prey.
How long, O Soul of Man, shall men be such as they?
How long, how long,
Redress of evil seek through means of greatest wrong?
How long shall Christian nations hurl in air
The final blasphemy of the battle-prayer?
Oh, when shall cease
This gibe, this cruel gibe, against their Prince of Peace?

VI

Backward move all marching feet,
And downward strikes each mailed hand.
The cry to arms confesses man's defeat
In whatsoever land.

Poor little human minds
That seek in armaments their strength or their disguise;
The trumpet blares how we are weakly wise,
The bugle blows our justice to the winds.

VII

Today
In black humiliation stand we all,
Seeing, how like a house of cards,
Similitudes, with no essential stay,
Shards, useless shards,
Civilization's boasted structures fall.
Not force, but wisdom, be our shield,
And our sword justice, man's divinest power!
For when these twain, that make us more than beast,
Sway all the earth, war shall have ceased.
And it may be that this disgraceful hour
Will from its shadows still the sunlight yield—
The sunlight of high peace, which man's rebirth shall see.
His soul from the great vulture, War, set free, O God, set free!
—*The New York Times.*

THE VINTAGE

BY CLINTON SCOLLARD

Rumors of ravaging war perturb the mind,
Ruffling the channels of our wonted ease;
Within the sky we read red auguries,
And hear grim portents shivering down the wind.
Not as aforetime do we fondly find
Orchestral notes or lulling harmonies
In the long plunge and murmur of the seas,
But discords horrent unto all mankind!

The fields of France are bright with poppy flowers;
Along the terraced vineyards by the Rhine
The ripening grapes are crimsoning for the wine;
Beneath the sun what fairer sight to see!
But ere the march of many hastening hours,
What will the bloom, what will the vintage be?

—*The Sun.*

THE RECKONING

BY CLINTON SCOLLARD

What do they reck who sit aloof on thrones,
Or in the chambered chancelleries apart,
Playing the game of state with subtle art,
If so be they may win, what wretched groans
Rise from red fields, what unrecorded bones
Bleach within shallow graves, what bitter smart
Pierces the widowed or the orphaned heart—
The unhooded horror for which naught atones!

A word, a pen stroke, and this might not be!
But vengeance, power lust, festering jealousy,
Triumph, and grim carnage stalks abroad.
Hark! Hear that ominous bugle on the wind!
And they who might have stayed it, shall they find
No reckoning within the courts of God?

—*The Sun.*

THE WAR OF KINGS

BY CLINTON SCOLLARD

From dawn to dusk reign horror and affright,
And the sad night no healing respite brings;
In all its hideous panoply of might,
This is the war of kings!

The people are but pawns upon the board;
What of their wants, their woes, their sufferings?
Speak, Death, dark watcher both by field and ford,
In this grim war of kings!

Will history still repeat the sanguine past,
With all its trail of ruthless anguishings?
Oh, may this slaughter-carnival be the last—
The last dread war of kings!

—*The Outlook.*

AMERICA

BY CONRAD AIKEN

We lay and smiled, to see our sky
So blue, so luminous with sun;
Lo, far off, wailed an ominous cry;
We heard a thunder of footsteps run

Under a darkness settling there,
Some huge and sinister wing's eclipse;
Smoke fouled the east; a baleful glare
Lightened beneath; and maddened lips

Took up that cry, while darkness stirred
And heaved, and like a wounded thing
Bled, by the utterance of one word
Which bade a myriad war-swords sing.

What murderous shadow troubled so
Our summer dream? . . . The sunlight ceased.
A sick and fetid wind came slow
From the stale tenements of the east.

Brother to slay his brother rose,
The shambles fell, and from that gloom
Came the hoarse herded cry of those
Who blindly massed to fight for room.

Room! Give us air! A breathing space!
The sunlight and the land for all!
Each lifted up a stifled face,
And battered door, and beat at wall,

And surged against resurgent horde
For space to sow his little seed.
Lo, they would plow the earth with sword,
Strew dead on earth that earth might feed.

And we—where now our summer bliss?
From the stale tenements of the east
Stole fear lest we should come to this,
And prove us brother to the beast.

—*The Outlook.*

WAR AND DEATH

BY HELEN COALE GREW

Two figures out of the gloom of despair on man's vision broke;
And one, colossal, brute-visaged, vengeful, and pitiless, spoke—

"I am War! And behold in the courts of the gods none is greater than I!
Earth quivers and reels at my gauntlet's touch, and the dome of the sky
Is shattered and torn by my trumpet's blare and the flash of my sword;
And man at my coming is fearful and fain of the help of the Lord.
Yea, black is the doom that I spread on the world, and the ruin is wide.
Man may pray himself dumb! Can he slay me in fear who begot me in
pride?"

But he, the other, benignant, pitying, quiet of breath,
Smiled, "You shall know me and fear me not. I am but Death!"
—*The Outlook.*

PEACE

BY EDWIN MARKHAM

Who are the ghosts in flight
Where siege guns spat their rage upon the night?
What shapes are those that shiver in the moon
About the towers and banners of Verdun?
And what those cries at night on hill and tarn
Down the long ruined Valley of the Marne?
They are the ghosts that cannot rest, that cry
Because there was no need to die.

And look, on the north still runs a line of fire
Where armies struggle in the battle-mire!
And yonder, see the crimson battle-rain
Upon the height of Aisne!
And farther still upon the cliffs of Oise
That streaming banners and the loud huzzahs,
And far upon the east the marching masses
Are pouring thru the wild Carpathian passes;
And the bright quiet flood
Of Vistula is red with brother's blood.

Peace, peace, O men, for ye are brothers all—
Ye in the trench and on the shattered wall.
Do ye not know ye came
Out of one Love and wear one sacred name?

Let there be no more battles; earth is old
With sorrows; let the weary banners fold.
And the grim cannons spewing death on men,
They, too, are weary and would sleep again.
And they have drunk enough, the battle blades—
Enough, God knows, are laid asleep with spades.
Yes, there are ghosts enough hurled on ahead,
Choking the shadowy passes of the dead.

Peace, brothers; let the music of the loom
Help us a little to forget the doom.
Yes, let the busy whisper of the wheel
And the bright furrow of the happy keel,
Help to forget the rage of sword and flame,
And wrongs that are too terrible for name.
And let the grasses hurry to the graves
To cover them with ripple of green waves;
And where the fields ran reddest in wild hours,
Let Mercy hide them with a foam of flowers.

O brothers, lift a cry, a long world-cry
Sounding from sky to sky—
The cry of one great word,
Peace, peace, the world-will clamoring to be heard—
A cry to break the ancient battle-ban,
To end it in the sacred name of Man!

—*The New York American.*

STAIN NOT THE SKY

BY HENRY VAN DYKE

Ye gods of battle, lords of fear,
Who work your iron will as well
As once ye did with sword and spear,
With rifled gun and rending shell,—
Masters of sea and land, forbear
The fierce invasion of the inviolate air!

With patient daring man hath wrought
A hundred years for power to fly,
And shall we make his winged thought
A hovering horror in the sky,
Where flocks of human eagles sail,
Dropping their bolts of death on hill and dale?

Ah no, the sunset is too pure,
The dawn too fair, the noon too bright,
For wings of terror to obscure
Their beauty, and betray the night
That keeps for man, above his wars,
The tranquil vision of untroubled stars.

Pass on, pass on, ye lords of fear!
Your footsteps in the sea are red,
And black on earth your paths appear
With ruined homes and heaps of dead.
Pass on, and end your transient reign,
And leave the blue of heaven without a stain.

The wrong ye wrought will fall to dust,
The right ye shielded will abide;
The world at last will learn to trust
In law to guard, and love to guide;
The Peace of God that answers prayer
Will fall like dew from the inviolate air.

The Hague, Netherlands.

—The Independent.

TO THE PEACE PALACE AT THE HAGUE

BY ROBERT UNDERWOOD JOHNSON

Builted of Love and Joy and Faith and Hope,
Thou standest firm beyond the tides of war
That dash in gloom and fear and tempest-roar,
Beacon of Europe!—tho wise pilots grope
Where trusted lights are lost; tho the dread scope
Of storm is wider, deadlier than before;
Ay, tho the very floods that strew the shore
Seem to obey some power turned misanthrope.

For thou art witness to a world's desire,
And when—oh, happiest of days!—shall cease
The throes by which our Age doth bring to birth
The fairest of her daughters, heavenly Peace,
When Man's red folly has been purged in fire,
Thou shalt be Capitol of all the Earth.

—*The Independent.*

A VOICE FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

BY HERBERT BASHFORD

To look upon the fool that once was I—
That gory thing with face half red, half white,
I can but smile; it seems so droll—the sight
Of those glazed eyes—one staring at the sky!
And now that all is clear I wonder why
I could not see until that last mad fight—
When I awoke in His eternal light—
How blind is he who marches forth to die

For some vain monarch seated on a throne!
If those brave soldiers there could only see
As I see now who draw no mortal breath,
No more the lifted sword, the crash and groan,
The thunder of the red artillery—
That awful, flaming orchestra of Death!

—*The San Francisco Bulletin.*

A CHANT OF HATE AGAINST ENGLAND

BY ERNST LISSAUER, in Jugend

Rendered into English verse by Barbara Henderson

French and Russian, they matter not,
A blow for a blow and a shot for a shot;
We love them not, we hate them not,
We hold the Weichsel and Vosges-gate,
We have but one and only hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone.

He is known to you all, he is known to you all,
He crouches behind the dark gray flood,
Full of envy, of rage, of craft, of gall,
Cut off by waves that are thicker than blood.
Come let us stand at the Judgment place,
An oath to swear to, face to face,
An oath of bronze no wind can shake,
An oath for our sons and their sons to take.
Come, hear the word, repeat the word,
Throughout the Fatherland make it heard.
We will never forego our hate,
We have all but a single hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone—
ENGLAND!

In the Captain's Mess, in the banquet-hall,
Sat feasting the officers, one and all,
Like a sabre-blow, like the swing of a sail,
One seized his glass held high to hail;
Sharp-snapped like the stroke of a rudder's play,
Spoke three words only: "To the Day!"

Whose glass this fate?
They had all but a single hate.
Who was thus known?
They had one foe and one alone—
ENGLAND!

Take you the folk of the Earth in pay,
With bars of gold your ramparts lay,
Bedeck the ocean with bow on bow,
Ye reckon well, but not well enough now.
French and Russian they matter not,
A blow for a blow, a shot for a shot,
We fight the battle with bronze and steel,
And the time that is coming Peace will seal.
You will we hate with a lasting hate,
We will never forego our hate,
Hate by water and hate by land,
Hate of the head and hate of the hand,
Hate of the hammer and hate of the crown,
Hate of seventy millions, choking down.
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone—

ENGLAND!

—*The New York Times.*

ANSWERING THE "HASSGESANG"

BY BEATRICE M. BARRY

French and Russian, they matter not,
For England only your wrath is hot;
But little Belgium is so small
You never mentioned her at all—
Or did her graveyards, yawning deep,
Whisper that silence was discreet?

For Belgium is waste! Ay, Belgium is waste!
She welters in the blood of her sons,
And the ruins that fill the little place
Speak of the vengeance of the Huns.
"Come, let us stand at the Judgment place,"
German and Belgian, face to face.
What can you say? What can you do?
What will history say of you?
For even the Hun can only say
That little Belgium lay in his way.

Is there no reckoning you must pay?
What of the Justice of that "Day"?
Belgium one voice—Belgium one cry
Shrieking her wrongs, inflicted by
GERMANY!

In her ruined homesteads, her trampled fields,
You have taken your toll, you have set your seal;
Her women are homeless, her men are dead,
Her children pitifully cry for bread;
Perchance they will drink with you—"To the Day!"
Let each man construe it as he may.
What shall it be?
They, too, have but one enemy;
Whose work is this?
Belgium has but one word to hiss—
GERMANY!

Take you the pick of your fighting men
Trained in all warlike arts, and then
Make of them all a human wedge
To break and shatter your sacred pledge;
You may fling your treaty lightly by,
But that "scrap of paper" will never die!
It will go down to posterity,
It will survive in eternity.
Truly you hate with a lasting hate;
Think you you will escape that hate?
"Hate by water and hate by land;
Hate of the head and hate of the hand."
Black and bitter and bad as sin,
Take you care lest it hem you in,
Lest the hate you boast of be yours alone,
And curses, like chickens, find roost at home
IN GERMANY!

—*The New York Times.*

ANOTHER CHANT OF HATE

BY ROSALIE M. MOYNAHAN

French and Russian, they matter not,
Some wrong remembered, some good forgot.

England stands at the Bar alone,
Nemesis rises to claim her own.
Ireland or Belgium—dare you say
Whose wrongs cry loudest this Judgment Day,
ENGLAND?

For not in a sudden, swift campaign,
The World as Mourner, was Ireland slain;
No soldier's steel plunged straight to her heart—
The sword *you* wield has a finer art.
Deep in the darkness of your hold
You forged it with hate, you weighed it with gold;
You drew it with lust,
You swung it with sin,
Sure and stealthy you thrust it in,
And never have plucked it out again,
ENGLAND!

You cry aloud through the printed page
"For Liberty, Honor, the fight I wage!"
Australia, Canada, governed well?
Aye! *They* are distant, might rebel.
Ireland, helpless under your heel,
Proof of the value those words conceal!
You have wrenched their Celtic tongue away,
But their hate cries out in *your* tongue today,
And casts your treacherous past in the way,
ENGLAND!

Yet why the past do we judge you by?
Stricken Belgium must deny,
But we aloud to the world can cry:
"You pledged your Power to be her shield,
You pledged her the millions your conquests yield;
What help can now the wrong atone?
You pledged your honor—*She* fought alone,
ENGLAND!"

They have stood at the Judgment-Place,
The Saints, the Heroes of our race.
Through the long Night of the Tyrant's sin
Ireland has trusted her Cause to Him.
"Vengeance is Mine, I will repay,"
And God fulfills His Word today
Through *GERMANY!*

MOTHERHOOD'S CHANT

BY McLANDBURGH WILSON

French or Russian, they matter not,
German or English, as one begot.
We bore them all and we bore them well,
We went for them to the gates of hell,
We are the makers of flesh and bone,
We have one foe, one hate alone—

WAR!

He is known to you all, he has called to you all,
He crouches behind each boundary wall,
He rides on the waves of a crimson flood,
He rides on the tides of our children's blood,
He lies of glory and sacrifice,
Of honor and fame and pomp he lies—

WAR!

Come, let us stand in the Judgment Place
And take an oath for the human race,
An oath our daughters, and theirs, shall take,
An oath no trumpet or drum can shake.
We hate no sinner, we hate the sin,
Not those who lose, not those who win.
We, the makers of flesh and bone,
We have one foe, one hate alone—

WAR!

You take the folk of our pain to slay,
That gold nor steel can ever repay.
You shall we hate with a lasting hate.
We will never forego our hate—
Hate of the heart and hate of the womb,
Hate of the cradle and hate of the tomb.
And you shall answer and make reply,
For we are partners of God on high.
What will you say before that Throne
To Us, the makers of flesh and bone,

WAR?

—*The New York Times.*

MARS, COMEDIAN

War, an international dementia alleged to insure the survival of the fittest, should be assiduously encouraged by all unfit members of society. The man with narrow chest and withered hand struggles under a decided handicap in the piping times of peace. He commonly sees the rich, witty and pulchritudinous female of the species carried off into "happiness ever after" by strapping fellows against whom he has no chance whatever in the sex arena. All this is changed, however, with the declaration of war, and the arrival of the recruiting officer. Apollo Belvedere is the favorite fodder of the machine gun. Shrapnel screams with joy as it increases an athlete's chest expansion from seven inches to thirty feet. What matters it if ten thousand mothers weep and wail and gnash their teeth over the details of victory. Who taught their handsome sons to love war? These are but the tears of shameless recantation. Let them turn for comfort to little Oscar whose dry cough kept him out of the army; to Minnie and Hal at the State Home for the Feeble-Minded. Let the unfit dead bury themselves. These that survive are the fittest.—*Life*.

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